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udicial District Court - Canyon Cou 
ROA Report 
Case: CR-2004-0026831-C Current Judge: Thomas J Ryan 
Defendant: Watkins, Vance A 
User: RANDALL 
State of Idaho vs. Vance A Watkins 
Date 
12/8/2004 
12/9/2004 
12/10/2004 
12/16/2004 
12/22/2004 
113/2005 
New Case Filed-Felony 
Hearing Held 
Criminal Complaint 
Felony 
Hearing Scheduled (Arraignment (In Custody) 12/08/200401 :32 PM) 
Arraignment 1 First Appearance 
Constitutional Rights Warning 
Order Appointing Public Defender 
Commitment On Bond - set $100,000 
No Contact Order 
Change Assigned Judge 
Hearing Scheduled (Preliminary Hearing 12/22/2004 08:30 AM) 
Warrant Issued - Arrest Bond amount: 100000.00 NO CONTACT 
WNICTIM 
Case Status Changed: Inactive 
SUPERCEDING Indictment 
Hearing result for Preliminary Hearing held on 12/22/200408:30 AM: 
Hearing Vacated 
Change Assigned Judge 
Hearing Scheduled (Arraignment (In Custody) 12/10/2004 01:30 PM) 
Warrant Returned 
Case Status Changed: Activate (previously inactive) 
Judge 
James A. (J.R.) Schiller 
James A. (J.R.) Schiller 
James A. (J.R.) Schiller 
James C. Peart 
James A. (J.R.) Schiller 
James A. (J .R.) Schiller 
James A. (J.R.) Schiller 
James A. (J.R.) Schiller 
James A. (J.R.) Schiller 
Robert M. Taisey 
Robert M. Taisey 
Gregory M Culet 
Gregory M Culet 
Gregory M Culet 
Robert M. Taisey 
Renae J. Hoff 
James A. (J.R.) Schiller 
Gregory M Culet 
Renae J. Hoff 
Motion for bond reduction or release on own recognizance & notice of hr Renae J. Hoff 
Request For Discovery Renae J. Hoff 
Hearing Scheduled (Motion Hearing 12/22/2004 08:30 AM) motn for bond Gregory M Culet 
reduction 
Hearing resultfor Arraignment (In Custody) held on 12/10/200401 :30 PM: James A. (J.R.) Schiller 
Arraignment 1 First Appearance 
Hearing Scheduled (Motion Hearing 12/22/2004 09:00 AM) motn for bond Gregory M Culet 
reduction-HOFF 
Hearing result for Motion Hearing held on 12/22/2004 09:00 AM: Gregory M Culet 
Arraignment 1 First Appearance motn for bond reduction-HOFF-PT-JAN 
31 @3:00-JT-MARCH 10@9:00 
Hearing Scheduled (Pre Trial 01/31/200503:00 PM) 
Hearing Scheduled (Jury Trial 03/10/200509:00 AM) 
Hearing Scheduled (Motion Hearing 01/07/200509:00 AM) motion for 
bond reduction 
Request For Discovery 
Demand For Notice Of Defense Of Alibi 
Pa's Response For Request For Discovery 
Notice of Intent Rule 404(b), IRE Evidence 
Motion for Order to Produce Grand Jury Transcript 
000001. 
Renae J. Hoff 
Renae J. Hoff 
Renae J. Hoff 
Renae J. Hoff 
Renae J. Hoff 
Renae J. Hoff 
Renae J. Hoff 
Renae J. Hoff 
Date: 1/12/2011 
Time: 10:39 AM 
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T dicial District Court - Canyon Cou 
ROA Report 
Case: CR-2004-0026831-C Current Judge: Thomas J Ryan 
Defendant: Watkins, Vance A 
User: RANDALL 
State of Idaho vs. Vance A Watkins 
Date 
1/4/2005 
1/7/2005 
1/18/2005 
1/21/2005 
1/24/2005 
1/28/2005 
1/31/2005 
2/112005 
2/10/2005 
2/22/2005 
2/28/2005 
4/412005 
4/15/2005 
4/20/2005 
4/29/2005 
Felony 
Judge 
Order to produce GJ transcript Renae J. Hoff 
Hearing result for Motion Hearing held on 01/07/200509:00 AM: Motion Renae J. Hoff 
Held motion for bond reduction 
Hearing result for Motion Hearing held on 01/07/200509:00 AM: Motion Renae J. Hoff 
Denied motion for bond reduction 
Specific Request For Discovery 
PA's Response to Specific Request For Discovery 
PA's First Supp/Response For Request For Discovery 
Pa's second suppl Response For Request For Discovery 
pa's third suppl Response For Request For Discovery 
Hearing result for Pre Trial held on 01/31/200503:00 PM: Continued 
Lewd Conduct 
Hearing Scheduled (Pre Trial 02/28/200503:00 PM) Lewd Conduct 
Specific Request For Discovery 
Transcript Filed (Grand Jury) 
Document sealed 
Pa Fourth Suppl Response For Request For Discovery 
pa's fifth suppl Response For Request For Discovery 
Renae J. Hoff 
Renae J. Hoff 
Renae J. Hoff 
Renae J. Hoff 
Renae J. Hoff 
Dennis E. Goff 
Renae J. Hoff 
Renae J. Hoff 
Renae J. Hoff 
Renae J. Hoff 
Renae J. Hoff 
Hearing result for Pre Trial held on 02/28/2005 03:00 PM: Interim Hearing Renae J. Hoff 
Held Lewd Conduct 
Hearing result for Jury Trial held on 03/10/200509:00 AM: Hearing 
Vacated 
Hearing Scheduled (Jury Trial 04/05/200509:00 AM) 
Hearing Scheduled (Conference - Status 04/04/200501 :30 PM) Lewd 
Conduct 
Hearing result for Conference - Status held on 04/04/2005 01 :30 PM: 
Continued Lewd Conduct 
Hearing result for Jury Trial held on 04/05/2005 09:00 AM: Hearing 
Vacated 
Hearing Scheduled (Conference - Status 05/02/200501 :00 PM) 
Hearing Scheduled (Jury Trial 05/03/200509:00 AM) 
Amended Notice Of Hearing 
Hearing result for Conference - Status held on 05/02/2005 01 :00 PM: 
Hearing Vacated 
Hearing result for Jury Trial held on 05/03/2005 09:00 AM: Hearing 
Vacated 
Hearing Scheduled (Conference - Status 04/28/200501 :30 PM) 
Hearing Scheduled (Jury Trial 05/02/200509:00 AM) 
Motion to continue & notc of hr 
Hearing result for Conference - Status held on 04/28/2005 01 :30 PM: 
Continued motn to cant 
Hearing Scheduled (Conference - Status 05/02/200509:00 PM) 
000002 
Renae J. Hoff 
Dennis E. Goff 
Renae J. Hoff 
Renae J. Hoff 
Dennis E. Goff 
Dennis E. Goff 
Dennis E. Goff 
Renae J. Hoff 
Dennis E. Goff 
Dennis E. Goff 
Dennis E. Goff 
Dennis E. Goff 
Renae J. Hoff 
Dennis E. Goff 
Dennis E. Goff 
Date: 1/12/2011 
Time: 10:39 AM 
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dicial District Court· Canyon 
ROA Report 
Case: CR-2004-0026831-C Current Judge: Thomas J Ryan 
Defendant: Watkins, Vance A 
State of Idaho vs. Vance A Watkins 
Date 
4/29/2005 
5/212005 
5/5/2005 
5/11/2005 
5/17/2005 
6/612005 
6/10/2005 
6/15/2005 
6/24/2005 
6/28/2005 
6/30/2005 
7/1/2005 
7/13/2005 
7/14/2005 
7/18/2005 
Stipulation to Continue JT 
Waiver Of Speedy Trial 
Felony 
Hearing result for Jury Trial held on 05/02/2005 09:00 AM: Continued 
Hearing result for Conference - Status held on 05/02/2005 09:00 PM: 
Continued STIP TO CONTINUE AND RESET 
Order resetting jury trial 
Hearing Scheduled (Jury Trial OS/24/200509:00 AM) 
Amended Order Resetting JT 
Hearing result for Jury Trial held on OS/24/2005 09:00 AM: Hearing 
Vacated 
Hearing Scheduled (Jury Trial 06/28/200509:00 AM) cont 
Motion in Limine and NOHR 
Hearing Scheduled (Motion Hearing 06/06/2005 11 :30 AM) in limine 
Hearing result for Motion Hearing held on 06/06/2005 11 :30 AM: Interim 
Hearing Held 
Hearing result for Jury Trial held on 06/28/2005 09:00 AM: Hearing 
Vacated cont 
Hearing Scheduled (Conference - Status 08/29/200501 :30 PM) 
Hearing Scheduled (Jury Trial 08/30/200509:00 AM) 
Motion to Suppress and NOHR 
Specific Request For Discovery 
Hearing Scheduled (Motion Hearing 07/18/2005 10:00 AM) motn to 
suppress 
Order on OF's Motion in Limine 
Motion to Extend Time to File PT Motns 
PA's Response to Specfic Request For Discovery 
Specific Request For Discovery 
Motion to Compel Discovery and NOHR 
Hearing Scheduled (Motion Hearing 07/01/200509:00 AM) motn to 
compel 
Order to extend time to file PT motions 
Motion to compel discovery/motn shorten time/NOHR 
Hearing result for Motion Hearing held on 07/01/200509:00 AM: Hearing 
Held motn to compel/shorten time - defense motion to compel withdrawn 
Hearing result for Motion Hearing held on 07/01/200509:00 AM: Motion 
Granted motn to compel/shorten time - state's motion to compel granted 
Pa's Sixth Supp/Response For Request For Discovery 
Defs Response For Request For Discovery 
States objection to defs motion to suppress 
Hearing result for Motion Hearing held on 07/18/2005 10:00 AM: 
Continued motn to suppress 
000003 
User: RANDALL 
Judge 
Renae J. Hoff 
Renae J. Hoff 
Renae J. Hoff 
Renae J. Hoff 
Renae J. Hoff 
Dennis E. Goff 
Renae J. Hoff 
Dennis E. Goff 
Renae J. Hoff 
Renae J. Hoff 
Renae J. Hoff 
Renae J. Hoff 
Renae J. Hoff 
Phil Becker 
Phil Becker 
Renae J. Hoff 
Renae J. Hoff 
Renae J. Hoff 
Renae J. Hoff 
Renae J. Hoff 
Renae J. Hoff 
Renae J. Hoff 
Renae J. Hoff 
Renae J. Hoff 
Renae J. Hoff 
Renae J. Hoff 
Renae J. Hoff 
Renae J. Hoff 
Renae J. Hoff 
Renae J. Hoff 
Renae J. Hoff 
Renae J. Hoff 
Date: 1/12/2011 
Time: 10:39 AM 
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icial District Court - Canyon Coun 
ROA Report 
Case: CR-2004-0026831-C Current Judge: Thomas J Ryan 
Defendant: Watkins, Vance A 
State of Idaho vs. Vance A Watkins 
Date 
7/18/2005 
7/21/2005 
7/27/2005 
8/12/2005 
8/24/2005 
8/26/2005 
8/29/2005 
8/30/2005 
8/31/2005 
9/1/2005 
9/2/2005 
9/6/2005 
9/8/2005 
9/15/2005 
11/10/2005 
11/15/2005 
11/17/2005 
11/21/2005 
Felony 
Hearing Scheduled (Motion Hearing 08/26/2005 09:00 AM) motion to 
suppress 
Specific Request For Discovery 
Pa's Response For Request For Discovery 
Ex-parte motion for production of medical records/R. Watkins 
Ex-parte motion for production of medical recordslV. Watkins 
Pa's eighth suppl Response For Request For Discovery 
Hearing result for Motion Hearing held on 08/26/200509:00 AM: Interim 
Hearing Held motion to suppress - MOTION DENIED 
Motion in Limine/Motn to Shorten time and Notc of Hearing 
Specific Request For Discovery 
Witness List 
Hearing result for Conference - Status held on 08/29/2005 01 :30 PM: 
Hearing Held 
Hearing result for Jury Trial held on 08/30/2005 09:00 AM: Jury Trial 
Started motn in limine 
Pa Response For Request For Discovery 
Jury Trial Day 2 
Motion to Admit Evidence of False Allegations of Sex Crimes 
Jury Trial Day 3 
Motion for Deposition 
Jury Trial Continued 
Hearing Scheduled (Jury Trial 09/06/200509:00 AM) day 4 
Acknowledgement of Discovery 
Jury trial 
Continued 
PSI & psychosexual ordered 
Found Guilty After Trial 
Hearing Scheduled (Sentencing 11/21/200509:00 AM) 
Jury Instructions 
Verdict form 
Order for psycho-sexual abuse eval 
Order on defendant's Motion to Suppress 
Ex Parte Motion for Production of H & W Records 
Order for Production of H & W Records and/Or Order to Show Cause 
Hearing Scheduled (Order to Show Cause 11/21/200509:00 AM) 
Lodged- SentenCing Memorandum 
Submission pursuant to Id Code governing the protecton/disclosure of 
department records 
Hearing result for Sentencing held on 11/21/200509:00 AM: Continued 
Lewd Conduct w/Minor 
000004 
User: RANDALL 
Judge 
Renae J. Hoff 
Renae J. Hoff 
Renae J. Hoff 
Renae J. Hoff 
Renae J. Hoff 
Renae J. Hoff 
Renae J. Hoff 
Renae J. Hoff 
Renae J. Hoff 
Renae J. Hoff 
Phil Becker 
Phil Becker 
Renae J. Hoff 
Phil Becker 
Renae J. Hoff 
Renae J. Hoff 
Renae J. Hoff 
Phil Becker 
Phil Becker 
Renae J. Hoff 
Phil Becker 
Phil Becker 
Phil Becker 
Renae J. Hoff 
Phil Becker 
Phil Becker 
Renae J. Hoff 
Renae J. Hoff 
Renae J. Hoff 
Renae J. Hoff 
Renae J. Hoff 
Renae J. Hoff 
Renae J. Hoff 
Renae J. Hoff 
Date: 1/12/2011 
Time: 10:39 AM 
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icial District Court - Canyon Coun 
ROA Report 
Case: CR-2004-0026831-C Current Judge: Thomas J Ryan 
Defendant: Watkins, Vance A 
User: RANDALL 
State of Idaho vs. Vance A Watkins 
Date 
11/21/2005 
11/28/2005 
12/28/2005 
12/29/2005 
115/2006 
1/27/2006 
1/30/2006 
2/112006 
2/28/2006 
6/212008 
6/5/2008 
3/31/2009 
4/812009 
4/9/2009 
4/30/2009 
5/112009 
5/7/2009 
5/14/2009 
5/18/2009 
12/28/2009 
111112010 
1/15/2010 
1/25/2010 
1/29/2010 
2/2/2010 
Felony 
Hearing Scheduled (Sentencing 12128/2005 09:00 AM) Lewd Conduct 
W/Minor 
Lodged- Conduct Assessment from CCSO 
Judge 
Renae J. Hoff 
Renae J. Hoff 
Hearing result for Sentencing held on 12/28/200509:00 AM: Hearing Held Renae J. Hoff 
Lewd Conduct W/Minor 
Hearing result for Sentencing held on 12/28/200509:00 AM: Final Renae J. Hoff 
Judgement, Order Or Decree Entered Lewd Conduct W/Minor 
Hearing result for Sentencing held on 12/28/200509:00 AM: Sentenced Renae J. Hoff 
To Fine And Incarceration Lewd Conduct W/Minor 
Hearing result for Sentencing held on 12/28/200509:00 AM: Commitment Renae J. Hoff 
- Held To Answer Lewd Conduct W/Minor 
Case Status Changed: closed pending clerk action 
$5000.00 Civil penalty imposed 
Letter from def 
Judgment and Commitment 
Notice of Appeal 
Appealed To The Supreme Court 
Motion for Appointment of State Appellate Public Defender 
Order appointing State Appellate PO in direct appeal 
Amended Notice of Appeal 
Opinion (S C - Judgment Vacated & Remanded) 
Renae J. Hoff 
Renae J. Hoff 
Renae J. Hoff 
Renae J. Hoff 
Renae J. Hoff 
Renae J. Hoff 
Renae J. Hoff 
Renae J. Hoff 
Renae J. Hoff 
Renae J. Hoff 
Motion to transport def Renae J. Hoff 
Order to transport def upon receipt of remittiturlGave all copies back to PA Renae J. Hoff 
States Request for Status Conference to be set 
Order setting case for status conference 
Hearing Scheduled (Conference - Status 05/13/2009 02:00 PM) 
Motion to Transport Def 
Hearing Scheduled (Conference - Status 05/18/2009 10:00 AM) 
Amended Notice of Hearing 
Motion to Quash Transport Order 
Order to quash transport order 
Hearing result for Conference - Status held on 05/18/2009 10:00 AM: 
Hearing Vacated Lewd Conduct wlChiid Under 16 - Per Judge 
Opinion (S C - Judgment Vacated and Remanded - After Review) 
Motion to Transport Defendant 
Order to transport def 
Remittitur 
Hearing Scheduled (Conference - Status 02/04/201001 :00 PM) 
SCHEDULING CONF 
Notice Of Hearing 
Renae J. Hoff 
Renae J. Hoff 
Renae J. Hoff 
Renae J. Hoff 
Renae J. Hoff 
Renae J. Hoff 
Renae J. Hoff 
Renae J. Hoff 
Renae J. Hoff 
Renae J. Hoff 
Renae J. Hoff 
Renae J. Hoff 
Renae J. Hoff 
James C. Morfitt 
Renae J. Hoff 
Motion for Disqualification, Accompanying Affidavit and Notice of Hearing Renae J. Hoff 
000005 
Date: 1/12/2011 
Time: 10:39 AM 
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al District Court - Canyon Co 
ROA Report 
Case: CR-2004-0026831-C Current Judge: Thomas J Ryan 
Defendant: Watkins, Vance A 
User: RANDALL 
State of Idaho vs. Vance A Watkins 
Date 
2/2/2010 
2/4/2010 
2/5/2010 
2/8/2010 
2/9/2010 
2/10/2010 
2/11/2010 
2/16/2010 
2/17/2010 
2/19/2010 
Felony 
Judge 
Affidavit of Lance Fuisting, Defendant's Attorney Renae J. Hoff 
Hearing Scheduled (Motion Hearing 02/11/2010 10:30 AM) Motion to DO Renae J. Hoff 
Judge Hoff 
Hearing result for Conference - Status held on 02/04/201001 :00 PM: James C. Morfitt 
Interim Hearing Held SCHEDULING CONF 
Hearing result for Conference - Status held on 02/04/2010 01 :00 PM: James C. Morfitt 
Order RE-Appointing Public Defender 
Hearing result for Conference - Status held on 02/04/201001 :00 PM: James C. Morfitt 
Commitment On Bond - $200,000.00 
Hearing result for Conference - Status held on 02/04/2010 01 :00 PM: No James C. Morfitt 
Contact Order 
Hearing Scheduled (Pre Trial 03/19/201001 :30 PM) James C. Morfitt 
Hearing Scheduled (Jury Trial 06/14/201009:00 AM)reset due to the court James C. Morfitt 
being unavailable 
Notice Of Hearing - setting PT&JT Court Clerks District (998) 
Hearing Scheduled (Jury Trial 07/06/201009:00 AM) James C. Morfitt 
Motion For Order To Produce Grand Jury Transcript 
Request For Discovery 
Order to produce GJ transcript 
Order to enlarge time for Pretrial Motions/No later than 3-19-10 
Specific Request For Discovery 
Amended Notice Of Hearing 
Request For Discovery 
Demand For Notice Of Defense Of Alibi 
Renae J. Hoff 
Renae J. Hoff 
Renae J. Hoff 
Renae J. Hoff 
Renae J. Hoff 
Renae J. Hoff 
Renae J. Hoff 
Renae J. Hoff 
Hearing result for Motion Hearing held on 02/11/201010:30 AM: Hearing Renae J. Hoff 
Vacated Motion to DO Judge Hoff 
Pa's Response to Request for Discovery & Notice of Intent to Use I.R.E. Renae J. Hoff 
404(b) Evidence 
Order for Disqualification/Hoff 
Change Assigned Judge 
Order of assignment/Morfitt 
Change Assigned Judge 
Motion to Disqualify 1 Morfitt 
PA's Response To Specific Request For Discovery 
Order for Disqualification 1 Morfitt 
Change Assigned Judge 
Hearing result for Jury Trial held on 07/06/201009:00 AM: Hearing 
Vacated 
Hearing result for Pre Trial held on 03/19/201001 :30 PM: Hearing 
Vacated 
Order of Assignment - Ryan 
000006 
Renae J. Hoff 
Court Clerks District (998) 
Court Clerks District (998) 
James C. Morfitt 
James C. Morfitt 
James C. Morfitt 
James C. Morfitt 
Court Clerks District (998) 
James C. Morfitt 
James C. Morfitt 
Court Clerks District (998) 
Date: 1/12/2011 
Time: 10:39 AM 
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icial District Court - Canyon Coun 
ROA Report 
Case: CR-2004-0026831-C Current Judge: Thomas J Ryan 
Defendant: Watkins, Vance A 
User: RANDALL 
State of Idaho vs. Vance A Watkins 
Date 
2/19/2010 
2/23/2010 
2/25/2010 
3/812010 
3/9/2010 
3/12/2010 
3/15/2010 
3/19/2010 
5/6/2010 
5/11/2010 
5/13/2010 
5/18/2010 
Felony 
Change Assigned Judge 
Hearing Scheduled (Conference - Status 03/08/2010 11 :00 AM) 
Notice Of Hearing: Conference - Status 
Hearing result for Conference - Status held on 03/08/2010 11 :00 AM: 
Interim Hearing Held 
Hearing result for Conference - Status held on 03/08/2010 11 :00 AM: 
District Court Hearing Held 
Court Reporter: Kim Saunders 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing estimated: less than 100 
Hearing Scheduled (Conference - Status 05/18/201001 :30 PM) 
Hearing Scheduled (Jury Trial 06/21/201009:00 AM) 
Notice of hearing to PA and PO 
Motion to Release Evidence for New Trial 
Hearing Scheduled (Motion Hearing 03/19/2010 09:00 AM) Motn to 
Release Evid for New Trial 
Hearing result for Motion Hearing held on 03/19/201009:00 AM: Hearing 
Held Motn to Release Evid for New Trial 
Hearing result for Motion Hearing held on 03/19/201009:00 AM: Motion 
Granted Motn to Release Evid for New Trial 
Hearing result for Motion Hearing held on 03/19/201009:00 AM: Order 
releasing evidence for new trial 
District Court Hearing Held 
Court Reporter: Kathy Klemetson 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing estimated: less than 100 
Def's Specific Request For Discovery 
Motion For Order To Produce Search Warrant and Detention Order 
Materials 
Order to produce search warrent and detention order materials 
Pa's Response To Specific Request For Discovery 
Objection to def's motion and order for transcript of search warrant and 
detention ordre and supporting documentation 
Notice of intent rle 404 (b) IRE evidence 
Motion in Limine 
Motion to amend indictmentlNOHR 
Hearing result for Conference - Status held on 05/18/201001 :30 PM: 
Hearing Held Amend indictment 
Hearing result for Conference - Status held on 05/18/201001 :30 PM: 
Motion Granted Amend indictment 
Order granting motion to amend Indictment 
Amended Indictment 
Judge 
Thomas J Ryan 
Thomas J Ryan 
Thomas J Ryan 
Thomas J Ryan 
Thomas J Ryan 
Thomas J Ryan 
Thomas J Ryan 
Thomas J Ryan 
Thomas J Ryan 
Thomas J Ryan 
Thomas J Ryan 
Thomas J Ryan 
Thomas J Ryan 
Thomas J Ryan 
Thomas J Ryan 
Thomas J Ryan 
Thomas J Ryan 
Thomas J Ryan 
Thomas J Ryan 
Thomas J Ryan 
Thomas J Ryan 
Thomas J Ryan 
Thomas J Ryan 
Thomas J Ryan 
Thomas J Ryan 
Thomas J Ryan 
District Court Hearing Held Thomas J Ryan 
Court Reporter: Kim Saunders 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing estimated: less than 100 
Hearing Scheduled (Motion Hearing 05/27/201001 :30 PM) all afternoon Thomas J Ryan 
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icial District Court - Canyon Co 
ROA Report 
Case: CR-2004-0026831-C Current Judge: Thomas J Ryan 
Defendant: Watkins, Vance A 
User: RANDALL 
State of Idaho vs. Vance A Watkins 
Date 
5/19/2010 
5/21/2010 
5/24/2010 
5/25/2010 
5/26/2010 
5/27/2010 
5/28/2010 
6/8/2010 
6/9/2010 
6/16/2010 
6/17/2010 
Felony 
Transcript Filed (SW# 1847)) 
Motion for Bail Reduction or release on own recognizance and notice of 
hearing 
Def First motion to suppress and notice of hearing 
Def Second motion to suppress and notice of hearing 
Defendant's First Motion In Limine and Notice of Hearing 
Defendant's Second Motion In Limine and Notice of Hearing 
Motion to Dismiss Amended Superceding Indictment and Notice of 
Hearing 
Amended notice of intent Rule 404(b) IRE evidence 
Brief in support of motion to dismiss indictment 
Affidavit of Vance A Watkins in support of Defendant's first motion to 
suppress 
Affidavit of Vance A Watkins in support of defendant's 2nd motion to 
suppress 
Brief in support of motion to suppress and motions in Limine 
PA's First Supplemental Response to Request for Discovery 
Response to Defendant's First Motion to Suppress 
Response to Defendant's Second Motion to Suppress 
Response to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss 
State's Brief in Support of 404(b) Evidence 
Witness List, Exhibit List and Notice of Intent 
States Proposed Jury Instructions 
States scond brief in Opposition of Def Motion to dismiss 
Judge 
Thomas J Ryan 
Thomas J Ryan 
Thomas J Ryan 
Thomas J Ryan 
Thomas J Ryan 
Thomas J Ryan 
Thomas J Ryan 
Thomas J Ryan 
Thomas J Ryan 
Thomas J Ryan 
Thomas J Ryan 
Thomas J Ryan 
Thomas J Ryan 
Thomas J Ryan 
Thomas J Ryan 
Thomas J Ryan 
Thomas J Ryan 
Thomas J Ryan 
Thomas J Ryan 
Thomas J Ryan 
PA's Second Supplemental Response to Request for Discovery Thomas J Ryan 
Hearing result for Motion Hearing held on 05/27/201001 :30 PM: Hearing Thomas J Ryan 
Held all afternoon 1 Bond Reduction 
Defendant's First Motion In Limine 
Defendant's Second Motion In Limine 
Motion To Dismiss Amended Superceding Indictment 
Hearing result for Motion Hearing held on 05/27/201001 :30 PM: Motion Thomas J Ryan 
Denied - Bond Reduction, Motion To Dismiss Amended Superceding 
Indictment, Defendant's Second Motion In Limine 
Hearing result for Motion Hearing held on 05/27/2010 01 :30 PM: District Thomas J Ryan 
Court Hearing Held 
Court Reporter: Kim Saunders 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing estimated: less than 100 
PA's Third Supplemental Response to Request for Discovery Thomas J Ryan 
Supplemental in support of 404(b) evidence Thomas J Ryan 
Defendant's Second Specific Request For Discovery Thomas J Ryan 
Amended Witness List - Exhibit List 
Defs motion pursuant rule 412 of the Idaho Rules of Evidence 
PA's Response to Second Specific Request For Discovery 000008 
Thomas J Ryan 
Thomas J Ryan 
Thomas J Ryan 
Date: 1/12/2011 
Time: 10:39 AM 
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Case: CR-2004-0026831-C Current Judge: Thomas J Ryan 
Defendant: Watkins, Vance A 
User: RANDALL 
State of Idaho vs. Vance A Watkins 
Date 
6/18/2010 
6/21/2010 
6/22/2010 
6/23/2010 
7/1/2010 
7/2/2010 
7/13/2010 
7/14/2010 
7/21/2010 
7/22/2010 
7/23/2010 
Defendant's Proposed Jury Instructions 
Defendant's Witness and Exhibit Lists 
Felony 
Hearing result for Jury Trial held on 06/21/201009:00 AM: Jury Trial 
Started 
District Court Hearing Held 
Court Reporter: Kim Saunders 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing estimated: over 100 
District Court Hearing Held 
Court Reporter: Kim Saunders 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing estimated: over 100 
Found Guilty After Trial 
Jury Instructions 
Jury question #1 and answer 
Special Verdict Form 
Judge 
Thomas J Ryan 
Thomas J Ryan 
Thomas J Ryan 
Thomas J Ryan 
Thomas J Ryan 
Thomas J Ryan 
Thomas J Ryan 
Thomas J Ryan 
Thomas J Ryan 
District Court Hearing Held Thomas J Ryan 
Court Reporter: Kim Saunders 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing estimated: over 100 
Hearing Scheduled (Review Hearing 07/07/2010 03:00 PM) and possible Thomas J Ryan 
sentencing 
Notice Of Intent To Assert Fifth Aemendmant Right and Request For New Thomas J Ryan 
Presentence Investigation Report 
Hearing result for Review Hearing held on 07/07/201003:00 PM: Hearing Thomas J Ryan 
Vacated and possible sentencing 
Hearing Scheduled (Sentencing 07/14/2010 11 :00 AM) Thomas J Ryan 
Notice Of Hearing Thomas J Ryan 
Letter concerning def Thomas J Ryan 
Hearing result for Sentencing held on 07/14/2010 11 :00 AM: Hearing Held Thomas J Ryan 
Hearing result for Sentencing held on 07/14/2010 11 :00 AM: Final Thomas J Ryan 
Judgement, Order Or Decree Entered 
Hearing result for Sentencing held on 07/14/2010 11 :00 AM: Sentenced Thomas J Ryan 
To Fine And Incarceration 
Hearing result for Sentencing held on 07/14/2010 11 :00 AM: 
- Held To Answer 
Hearing result for Sentencing held on 07/14/2010 11 :00 AM: 
civil penalty in favor of the victim pursuant to 19-5307 
Case Status Changed: closed pending clerk action 
District Court Hearing Held 
Court Reporter: Kim Saunders 
Commitment Thomas J Ryan 
$5,000.00 Thomas J Ryan 
Thomas J Ryan 
Thomas J Ryan 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing estimated: less than 100 
Judgment for Victims (Civil Jdmt) 
Appealed To The Supreme Court 
Notice of Appeal 
Motion for Appointment of State Appellate Public Defender 
Restitution Ordered 5000.00 victim # 1 CIVIL JUDGMENT 
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Thomas J Ryan 
Thomas J Ryan 
Thomas J Ryan 
Thomas J Ryan 
Thomas J Ryan 
Date: 1/12/2011 
Time: 10:39 AM 
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Case: CR-2004-0026831-C Current Judge: Thomas J Ryan 
Defendant: Watkins, Vance A 
State of Idaho VS. Vance A Watkins 
Felony 
Date 
7/23/2010 Judgment and commitment 
7/26/2010 Order Appointing State Appellate Public Defender 
7/28/2010 S C - Order Suspending Appeal 
8/16/2010 S C - Order Augmenting Appeal 
11/24/2010 Objection To The Record 
12/312010 Orderl record on appeal 
000010 
User: RANDALL 
Judge 
Thomas J Ryan 
Thomas J Ryan 
Thomas J Ryan 
Thomas J Ryan 
Thomas J Ryan 
Thomas J Ryan 
bm 
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JOHN T. BUJAK 
CANYON COUNTY PROSECUTING ATTORNEY 
Canyon County Courthouse 
FEB 09 20tO 
CANYON COUNTY CLERK 
B RAYNE, DEPUTY 1115 Albany Street 
Caldwell, Idaho 83605 
Telephone: (208) 454-7391 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON 
THE STATE OF IDAHO 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
VANCE WATKINS 
Defendant 
CASE NO. CR2004-26831 
DEMAND FOR NOTICE OF 
DEFENSE OF ALIBI 
TO: VANCE WATKINS, the above named Defendant, and to the Canyon County Public 
Defender, Attorney for the above named Defendant: 
COMES NOW, JOHN T. BUJAK, Canyon County Prosecuting Attorney, who 
demands that the Defendant serve upon him within ten (10) days from the date of this notice or at 
such other time as the Court may direct, a written notice of the Defendant's intention to offer a 
defense of alibi. 
Such notice by the Defendant shall state the specific place or places at which the 
Defendant claims to have been at the time of the alleged offense and the names and addresses of 
the witnesses upon whom the Defendant intends to rely to establish such alibi. 
If prior to or during trial the Defendant learns of additional witnesses whose 
identity, if known, should have been included in this information furnished pursuant to this 
DEMAND FOR NOTICE OF 
DEFENSE OF ALIBI 
1 
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Demand, the Defendant or the Defendant's attorney shall promptly notify the Canyon County 
Prosecuting Attorney ofthe existence, identity and addresses of such additional witness or 
witnesses. 
The failure of the Defendant and the Defendant's attorney to comply with this 
Demand may result in the exclusion of the testimony of any undisclosed witnesses which may be 
offered by the Defendant to establish said alibi. 
This Demand was made and based upon Idaho Code Provision 19-519. 
DATED This ~ day of February, 2010. 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing instrument was served 
upon the attorney for the defendant, the 
Canyon County Public Defender, by placing 
said instrument in their ba~i at the Clerk's 
Office, on or about the --'::t- day of 
February, 2010. 
DEMAND FOR NOTICE OF 
DEFENSE OF ALIBI 
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\...' 
. D ORIGL 
MARK J. MIMURA 
CANYON COUNTY PUBLIC DEFENDER 
LARY G. SISSON 
510 Arthur Street 
Caldwell, Idaho 83605 
Telephone: (208) 639-4610 
Facsimile: (208) 639-4611 
Idaho State Bar No. 6072 
Attorneys for Defendant 
F 
MAY 2 5 2010 
CANYON COUNTY CLERK 
J DRAKE, DEPUTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Case No. CR-2004-26831-C 
Plaintiff: 
vs. 
BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF MOTION 
TO DISMISS INDICTMENT 
VANCE A. WATKINS, 
Defendant. 
COMES NOW Defendant, by and through his attorneys of record, the Canyon 
County Public Defender's Office and hereby provides the following legal and factual 
support and argument in support of its Motion to Dismiss the Indictment in this matter 
THIS MOTION is based on the pleadings, papers, records and files in the above 
entitled action including the transcript from the Grand Jury Proceedings. 
PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
On December 8, 2004 a Criminal Complaint was filed against Defendant and an 
Arrest Warrant issued. That same day, the alleged six year old victim in this case, plus 
Detective Don Peck of the Nampa Police Department, testified during a Grand Jury 
Proceeding. As a result the Grand Jury issued a one count Superceding Indictment for 
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Lewd Conduct with Minor Child Under Sixteen. The Arrest Warrant was returned on 
December 10, 2004. 
Defendant was arraigned in the District Court on the Superceding Indictment on 
December 22, 2004. Presumably, Defendant entered a not guilty plea on the Superceding 
Indictment. Eventually, a jury trial was held in this matter from August 30, 2005 thru 
September 6,2005. A jury found Defendant guilty of Lewd Conduct with Minor Child 
Under Sixteen. Defendant was sentenced on December 28, 2005 to a minimum of fifteen 
(15) years fixed and an indeterminate period of life with the Idaho Department of 
Corrections. 
On January 27,2006, Defendant appealed his Judgment and Conviction to the 
Idaho Supreme Court. On January 25,2010, the Canyon County District Court received 
a Remittitur from the Idaho Supreme Court overturning Defendant's conviction and 
remanding the matter back to the Canyon County District Court for a new trial. On 
January 29,2010, the Court scheduled a Scheduling Conference in front of Judge Hoff 
for February 4,2010. However, on February 2,2010, Defendant's attorney filed a 
Motion and Affidavit to Disqualify Judge Hoff. A hearing was hold on the Motion on 
February 9, 2010. The next day the Court issued an Order disqualifying Judge Hoff and 
assigning the case to Senior Judge Morfitt. 
On February 11, 2010, Plaintiff filed a Motion to Disqualify Judge Morfitt. That 
Motion was granted on February 17, 2010. Consequently, on February 19, 2010, District 
Court Judge Thomas J. Ryan was assigned to preside over this case. As Status 
Conference was held in the matter on March 8,2010. On that date, a Pre-Trial 
Conference was set for March 18, 2010 and a Jury Trial for June 21,2010. 
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On May 13,2010, Plaintiff filed a Motion to Amend Indictment and set a hearing 
for the Pre-Trial Conference. Defense counsel did not take a position on Plaintiff s 
Motion to Amend. Therefore, the Court allowed the filing of the Amended Indictment. 
At the hearing, defense counsel stated its intention to file several pre-trial motions. The 
Court stated it would hear pretrial Motions on May 27,2010. 
Subsequently, on May 21,2010, defense counsel filed, among other documents, a 
Motion to Dismiss the Amended Indictment in this matter. 
ARGUMENT 
Under Idaho Code Section 19-1107, the grand jury may issue an indictment when 
"all the evidence before them, taken together, if unexplained or uncontradicted, would, in 
their judgment, warrant a conviction by a trial jury." 
The role ofthe prosecutor in grand jury proceedings is to facilitate the 
presentation of competent witnesses who can testify to matters within their personal 
knowledge that relate to the inquiry. During its investigatory proceedings, the grand jury 
can receive any evidence that is given by witnesses produced and sworn before them. 
I.C. § 19-11 05. 
"Only legal evidence, excluding hearsay or secondary evidence can be received 
by the grand jury. I.C.R. 6(f). An indictment will be sustained as long as the grand jury 
has received legally sufficient evidence which in and of itself supports a finding of 
probable cause. State v. Jones, Idaho, (S.Ct. No. **181 *85419432, slip op. August 27, 
1993); State v. Edmonson, 113 Idaho 230, 236-37, 743 P .2d 459, 465-66 (1987). 
Any objections based on defects in a charging document are waived unless raised 
prior to trial; the only exception is if the objection alleges either the charging document 
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fails to establish jurisdiction or fails to charge an offense. In re Doe, 2007 WL 473701 
(Idaho.App., 2007). The assertion that a charging document fails to assert jurisdiction 
may be raised at any time during the proceedings. State v. Anderson, 175 P.3d 788 
(2008). There is a strong presumption of validity of a charging document, if the defects 
are raised in an untimely manner. State v. Anderson, 175 P.3d 788 (2008). Although 
due process concerns related to a charging document may be valid, they are waived 
unless raised before trial. State v. Jones, 101 P.3d 699 (2004). 
Testimony of R.W. 
In this particular case, on December 1, 2004 the alleged victim (R.W.) disclosed 
to her school counselor, and then later to police, that defendant had committed lewd acts 
upon her on the morning of December 1 st and again the previous day. She also disclosed 
that this kind of behavior had been going on since they had moved to Idaho two years 
prior. 
RW. testified at the Grand Jury proceedings on December 8, 2004. The 
Prosecuting Attorney examining R W. convered such topics as the difference between a 
truth and lie, body parts, and, presumably to test RW.'s memory asked her about her 
swimsuit. During the inquiry, RW. made statements which could have been construed 
by the Grand Jury as evidence of the defendant committing lewd acts upon RW. 
However, on page 7, line 12 of the Grand Jury transcript, the Prosecuting 
Attorney asks, "When was the last time this [the alleged lewd conduct] happened?" The 
response by R.W. in the next line of the transcript was, "It happened when I was four." 
The same question is asked and the same answer is given in lines 19 and 20 of page 7 of 
the transcript. 
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happened only a week ago, asks on page 8, lines 9 through 10, and 12 of the Grand Jury 
Transcript, "Did you tell Shannon [an employee of the Department of Health and 
Welfare] or Don [the law enforcement officer] about the times it happened when you 
were for your four years old or when you were - six? The reply by R.W. was, ''Yes. I 
was four." 
The Prosecuting Attorney, on page 9 of the Grand Jury Transcript, goes on to try 
and lead R. W. into saying the lewd acts occurred much more recently. Referring to when 
it happened, R.W. states that it happened in kindergarten (Pg 9, line 10), then in 
preschool (Pg 9, line 13). Finally, the Prosecutor asks, "Has it happened since you were 
in first grade?" (Pg 9, lines 14-15). R.W. nods her head and then, at the prompting of the 
Prosecuting Attorney, says ''Yes.'' (pg 9, line 18). 
The responses by R. W. to questioning about events that supposedly occurred on 
Novmeber 30 and December 1, 2004, draw into question the competency ofR.W. at the 
time she testified before the Grand Jury. Competency to testifY to a particular occurrence 
depends on ability of witness to perceive, recollect and communicate with reference to 
the occurrence. State v. Johnson, 447 P.2d 10(1968). 
In this case, even though the Prosecuting Attorney attempted to guide R.W. into 
telling the Grand Jury the acts she was describing occurred a little over a week prior to 
the hearing, R.W. persisted in saying they happened when she was four years old, which 
would have been two years prior. It was only after the Prosecuting Attorney lead R. W. to 
the point where R.W. had to answer in a particular way, did R.W. affirm that lewd 
conduct occurred against her while she was in first grade. The need to have R. W. say 
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lewd acts occurred more recently was in order to bring R.W. 's testimony in conformity 
with the charges in the Superceding Indictment. 
Because R.W. 's ability to recollect past events (supposedly happening only a little 
over a week ago) was severely diminished, and she only provided testimony that lewd 
acts occurred "in fIrst grade" after an enormous about of leading by the Prosecuting 
Attorney, then insufficient evidence was presented to support a fInding ofprobable cause. 
Therefore, the Amended Superceding Indictment should be dismissed. 
Testimony of Don Peck 
Detective Don Peck of the Nampa Police Department testifIed about the 
investigation that his department had conducted in relation to this matter. However, 
statements were made by Detective Peck which were either hearsay statements, not 
relevant, statements about illegally seized items, or presented without proper foundation. 
First in lines 2 through 3 on page 12 of the Grand Jury Transcript, the Prosecutor 
asked, "And where did you receive the complaint or the allegations Mr. Watkins? How 
did that happen? The question in itself is not relevant to begin with. Don Peck's 
responded by saying, "I was contacted by ShannonWatts with the Department of Health 
and Welfare. She had been contacted by the school counselor a Iowa Elementary Schoo~ 
stating that [R.W.] had disclosed sexual abuse." (pg 12 lines 4-7). The portion about 
R.W. disclosing sexual abuse is clearly double hearsay. The fact that Detective Peck 
mentioned the Department of Health and Welfare and the school counselor was a clear 
attempt to give legitimacy and support to R.W.'s claims by suggesting that the school 
counselor and Health and Welfare would not pursue false allegations made by a six year 
old. 
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Second, from line 10 through 24 of page 12 of the Grand Jury, the Prosecuting 
Attorney asks questions about, and Detective gives answers to, what else was done to 
investigate RW.'s allegations. This included testimony of at least two other interviews 
and two physical exams done at CARES. Once again, because no substantive 
information was presented by Detective Peck from any of these interviews or exams, 
simply asking about them is not relevant. However, as alleged above, the mere mention 
of all these interviews and exams can have only one purpose and that is to give more 
legitimacy to RW. 's testimony. The unstated but clear argument is that the State would 
not be seeking a Grand Jury Indictment unless they had done extensive investigation and 
we were sure that the defendant had committed a crime. 
Third, on page 13, lines 11 through 15 of the Grand Jury Transcript, Detective 
Peck talks about items seized during a search of Defendant's apartment. He included in 
that list a "used condom", which the police did not have authority to seize. He also 
mentions a Japanese animated video, which by itself had no relevancy to the Grand Jury. 
However, Detective Peck goes on to say". . . that they contain nudity and talk about 
school girls." (pg 13, lines 14-15). That last statement was hearsay. Moreover, even if it 
was not hearsay, it was 404(b) evidence that was not appropriate to be presented to the 
Grand Jury. 
Fourth, on page 13, lines 17-23 ofthe Grand Jury Transcript, Detective Peck talks 
about using an alternative light source and seizing seven pairs ofRW.'s panties. Neither 
the Prosecuting Attorney nor Detective Peck lays nearly enough foundational testimony 
to allow him to testify about the alternative light source. Furthermore, Detective Peck 
said that when the police find a different wave of light on a garment, ''We don't know 
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what that means." (pg 13, lines 21-22). But, he then goes on to say, ''Typically, it means 
either bodily fluid or something of that nature." (pg 13, lines 22-23). On that same page, 
and on page 14 of the transcript, Detective Peck admits that they don't have the lab 
results back yet on the panties. 
Once again, because Detective Peck was no qualified as an expert in alternative 
light sources, and there were no conclusive results from the testing on the panties at that 
time, this testimony should not have been presented to the Grand Jury. Frankly, it was 
speculative at best. The only purpose in presenting it to the jury was to bolster the 
testimony ofR.W. who appears had difficulty recollecting what had happened to her. 
Fifth, on page 14, lines 8 and 9, the Prosecuting Attorney asked, "Did you have an 
opportunity to talk to Mr. Watkins about the allegations [R.W.] had made?" Detective 
Peck eventually says, "He didn't want to speak very much." (pg 14, lines 11-12). The 
Prosecutor then asks, "Did he make any admissions about touching [R.W.]" (pg 14, line 
13). The reply was, ''No. The closest he came was in an interview with Detective 
Sutherland." (pg 14, lines 14-15). 
This is a situation where Detective Peck violates Defendant's Fifth Amendment 
Right under the United States Constitution and the rules of evidence by commenting 
defendant's right to remain silent. The insinuation to the jury is that Defendant had 
something to hide. Furthermore, by talking about possible admissions made to Detective 
Sutherland by Defendant, which Detective Peck did not witness first-hand and thus is 
hearsay, he is also suggesting that the Defendant almost confessed to committing the 
alleged crime but is still trying to hide his culpability. 
In summary, nearly all of Detective Peck's testimony should not have been 
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presented to the Grand Jury. It was full of hearsay, incomplete information, improper 
comments about the defendant, or testimony that was not relevant at the time of the 
Grand Jury. Futhermore, all of these errors were conducted in front of the prosecutor 
who did not object or limit the scope of impermissible evidence being heard and 
considered by the grand jury. Taking each impermissible portion of Detective Pecks's 
testimony individually, the effect may not be significant. However, considering all the 
inappropriate evidence together, it demonstrates improper conduct by the prosecutor in 
the presentation of the evidence in this case to the grand jury in violation of Defendant's 
due process rights. Therefore, therefore the Amended Superceding Indictment should be 
dismissed. 
Generally, prosecutorial misconduct will require dismissal only when it reaches the 
level ofa constitutional due process violation. Maldonado v. State, 93 N.M. 670, 604 
P.2d 363 (1979); State v. Hall, 235 N.W.2d 702 (Iowa 1975), appeal after remand, 249 
N.W.2d 843 (Iowa 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 822,98 S.Ct. 66, 54 L.Ed.2d 79 (1977). 
In order to be entitled to dismissal of an indictment on due process grounds, the 
defendant must affirmatively show prejUdice caused by the misconduct. State v. Kruse, 
100 Idaho 877,606 P.2d 981 (1980); Hall, supra. "A dismissal is a drastic remedy and 
should be exercised only in extreme and outrageous situations, and therefore, the 
defendant has a heavy burden." 
"In the sense of a grand jury proceeding, ''prejudicial effect" means the defendant 
would not have been indicted but for the misconduct. Hall, supra; People v. Jackson, 64 
I11.App.3d 307,21 I11.Dec. 238, 381 N.E.2d 316 (1978). To determine whether 
misconduct gives rise to a dismissal, a reviewing court will have to balance the gravity 
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and the seriousness of this misconduct with the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the 
probable cause finding. At one extreme, the misconduct can be so outrageous that 
regardless ofthe extent of probable cause evidence, dismissal will be required. At the 
other extreme, the misconduct may be so slight, that it becomes unnecessary to question 
the independent judgment of the grand jury. In the middle of these extremes, the court 
must examine the totality of the circumstances to determine whether the indictment 
should be dismissed. As stated above, the burden rests with the criminal defendant to 
make an initial showing that the misconduct rises to the level ofprejudice. Absent the 
showing ofprejudice, a reviewing court will not second guess the grand jury. However, 
once the defendant does afftrmatively prove prejudice, the court must dismiss." State v. 
Edmonson, 113 Idaho at 237 (1987). 
Tbnelinessof~otion 
As stated earlier in this brief: although due process concerns related to a charging 
document may be valid, they are waived unless raised before trial. State v. Jones, 101 
P.3d 699 (2004). The first trial in this particular case was held in August and September 
of 2005. However, because of defects in that first trial proceeding, this matter was 
remanded for a new trial. It should also be noted that the Court allowed an Amended 
Superceding Indictment in this matter on May 18, 2010. 
Defense counsel argues that because a new trial has been set in this matter, then 
all time limits and deadlines related to this matter begin anew as well. By vacating the 
outcome of the previous trial and remanding this matter for a new trial, the Idaho 
Supreme Court has essentially caused both parties and the Court to conduct a completely 
new trial. Thus, in the second trial scheduled for June of this year, the State is not 
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allowed to simply rely on the transcript of the first jury trial. It must call all of its desired 
witnesses again and even though they will most likely testify consistently with their 
previous trial testimony. Also, if appropriate, the State may add witnesses to testify at 
trial. It is not merely bound by the persons who testified in the first trial. The same goes 
for the defense in this matter. 
Also, because Defendant's trial will be a new trial, it is the belief of defense 
counsel that any stipulations between the parties at the previous trial are not binding. In 
addition, any evidentiary rulings by the previous trial court are not binding as well. 
Since the entire trial must be redone, then it stands to reason that any deadlines 
associated with the trial must be redone as well. If that is not the case, then the time 
limits for having legitimate arguments about evidentiary issues, whether or not defendant 
has received due process, amending witness lists or exhibits, etc. have already expired 5 
years ago. Ifwe take this to the ultimate degree, then the Plaintiff should not have been 
allowed to amend its Supreceding Indictment because it rested its case in September of 
2005. 
Because Defendant has filed this Motion prior to his retrial, and it raises issues of 
the due process in the grand jury proceedings in this case, defense argues that it is timely 
a Motion and should not be dismissed due to lack of time lines. 
CONCLUSION 
In summary, Defendant's due process rights were violated when the Plaintiff 
presented R.W. as a witness because she was unable to recollect with a certain degree of 
accuracy alleged lewd acts committed upon her by Defendant. As far as is known, the 
Prosecuting Attorney did not advise the Grand Jury about the standards for a witness to 
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be competent. Furthermore, Detective Peck presented, in five different instances, 
testimony at the Grand Jury Proceedings that was completely inappropriate. The net 
effect of this inappropriate testimony was that Defendant's due process rights were 
violated. Now, Defendant has filed a timely Motion to Dismiss the Indictment in this 
matter in order to remedy the situation. 
Defendant respectfully requests that the Court find its favor and issue an Order 
Dismissing the Grand Jury Indictment with prejudice. 
DATED this 2 J1"day of May, 201 
Assistant Public Defender 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE: 
I hereby certify that on the Ufday of May 2010, I served a true and correct copy 
of the within Motion for Modification ofa No Contact Order and Notice of Hearing upon 
the individual(s) names below in the manner noted: 
)!.. By hand delivering copies of the same to the office(s) of the attomey(s) indicated below. 
o 
John Bujak 
Canyon County Prosecutors Office 
1115 Albany St. 
Caldwell, ID 83605 
Assistant Pub ic Defender 
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MARK J. 'MIMURA 
CANYON COUNTY PUBLIC DEFENDER 
LARY G. SISSON 
510 Arthur Street 
Caldwell, Idaho 83605 
Telephone; (208) 639-4610 
Facsimile: (208) 639-4611 
Idaho State Bar No. 6072 
Attorneys for Defendant 
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CANYON COUNTY CLERK 
J DRAKE. OEPuiY 
IN rHE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff: 
vs. 
VANCE A. WATKINS, 
Defendant. 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
ss. 
County of Canyon ) 
Case No. CR-2004-26831-C 
AFFIDAVIT OF VANCE A. 
WATKINS IN SUPPORT OF 
DEFENDANT'S FIRST MOTION 
TO SUPPRESS 
I, Vance A. Watkins, being first duly sworn, upon oath, deposes and says: 
1. I am making this affidavit based upon my personal knowledge and/or belief. 
2. I am the defendant in this matter. 
3. On December 1, 2004, I was placed in handcuffs and taken into custody by a 
member of the Nampa Police Department at my residence located at 1717 
Sunnyridge, Building 1, Apartment B in Nampa, Idaho. 
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4. 1 was then transported to the Nampa Police Department and placed into an 
interrogation room. 
5. While in the interrogation room a female detective, whose name 1 do not 
remember, read me my Miranda rights and then asked me if 1 understood them. 
6. 1 said, "Yes and 1 want a lawyer. " 
7. The detective then threw a phone book on the table in front of me. 
8. 1 looked at the phone book and then 1 looked at her and said, "What you just read 
said that if 1 can't afford a lawyer one would be appointed. Well, 1 can't afford 
one, so 1 need one appointed." 
9. The detective ignored my second request for an attorney and began to interrogate 
me. 1 was eventually interrogated by two other detectives before being forced by a 
court order to provide a DNA sample. 
10. While 1 was being interrogated, 1 did not feel free to leave the Nampa Police 
Department. 1 also felt that 1 had no choice but answer the questions of the police. 
11. On December 2, 2004, 1 was brought back to the same police station by a member 
of the Nampa Police Department for the purpose of taking a polygraph test. 
12. 1 was once again read my Miranda rights and 1 said, "I asked for a lawyer when 1 
was here last night and was denied. What makes today any different?" 
13. The law enforcement officer, who 1 believe was the polygrapher, asked me, "So, 
you want a lawyer." 1 replied, "Yes." 
14. At that point the polygraph test was not continued and the police sent me home 
with Detective Terry. 
AFFIDAVIT OF VANCE A. WATKINS IN 
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15. On the ride home, Detective Terry asked me questions, particularly about my sex 
life. 
16. Because I was confmed to a police car during my ride home and that the Nampa 
Police Department was my only ride to get home at that point, I felt as I was 
being subjected to a custodial interrogation and did not have the ability to refuse to 
answer Detective Terry's questions. 
FURTHER YOUR AFFIANT SAYETH NAUGHT. 
DATED this ~ day of May, 2010. 
Ik~ VANCE A. WA NS 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this :<<f day of May 2010. 
AFFIDAVITOFVANCEA. WATKINS IN 
SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT'S FIRST 
MOTION TO SUPPRESS 
Notary Public for Idaho 
Residing at: CtA~U'c::' C eN N~ 
My Commission EXires: I"" 3.- Oiy 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certifY that on theZ 'S"~ayofMay, 2010, I served a true and correct copyofthe within and 
foregoing document upon the individual(s) named below in the manner noted: 
~y delivering copies of the same to the courthouse box of the attomey(s) indicated below. 
Canyon County Prosecutor's Office 
1115 Albany Street 
Caldwell, Idaho 83605 
AFFIDAVITOFVANCEA. WATKINS IN 
SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT'S FIRST 
MOTION TO SUPPRESS 
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MARK J. MIMURA 
CANYON COUNTY PUBLIC DEFENDER 
LARY G. SISSON 
510 Arthur Street 
Caldwell, Idaho 83605 
Telephone: (208) 639-4610 
Facsimile: (208) 639-4611 
Idaho State Bar No. 6072 
Attorneys for Defendant 
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CANYON COUNTY CLERK 
J DRAKE, DEPUTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff: 
vs. 
VANCE A. WATKINS, 
Defendant. 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
ss. 
County of Canyon ) 
Case No. CR-2004-26831-C 
AFFIDAVIT OF VANCE A. 
WATKINS IN SUPPORT OF 
DEFENDANT'S SECOND 
MOTION TO SUPPRESS 
I, Vance A. Watkins, being ftrst duly sworn, upon oath, deposes and says: 
1. I am making this affidavit based upon my personal knowledge and/or belief. 
2. I am the defendant in this matter. 
3. On and/or between October ( 2004 and December ~ 2004, my residence was 
1717 Sunnyridge, Building 1, Apartment B in Nampa, Idaho. 
4. On or about December 1, 2004, members of the Nampa Police Department 
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searched my aforementioned residence and seized a number of items that were 
located in my apartment. 
5. Prior to their search, I did not give consent to the Nampa Police Department, or 
any law enforcement officer, to search my residence located at 1717 Sunnyridge, 
Building 1, Apartment B in Nampa, Idaho. 
6. Also, prior to their search, I did not give consent to the Nampa Police Department, 
or any law enforcement officer, to seize any item from my residence located at 
1717 Sunnyridge, Building 1, Apartment B in Nampa, Idaho. 
7. I have never given consent for any law enforcement officers to search 1717 
Sunnyridge, Building 1, Apartment B in Nampa nor to seize any item therefrom. 
8. My belief that law enforcement officers searched my residence located at 1717 
Sunnyridge, Building 1, Apartment B in Nampa, Idaho is supported by Search 
Warrant number SW-1847, a copy of which is marked and attached to this affidavit as 
Exlubit A and incorporated herein. 
9. My belief that law enforcement officers seized items without my permission from my 
residence is supported by Return to Search Warrant number SW-1847, a copy of 
which is marked and attached to this affidavit as Exlubit B and incorporated herein. 
FURTHER YOUR AFFIANT SAYETH NAUGHT. 
DATED this ?4 day of May, 2010. 
AFFIDAVIT OF VANCE A. WATKINS IN 
SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT'S SECOND 
MOTION TO SUPPRESS 
~L-f/~~2-
VAN2f3 A. W~S 
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SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this c'f day of May 2010. 
Notary Public for Idaho 
Residing at: ~~~CN COJt=~ 
My Commission Expi es: I" 3,- (:) I Y 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certifY that on the Z 'S'tyofMay, 2010, I served a true and correct copy of the within and 
foregoing document upon the individua1(s) named below in the manner noted: 
¢BY delivering copies of the same to the courthouse box ofthe.attomey(s) indicated below. 
Canyon County Prosecutor's Office 
1115 Albany Street 
Caldwell, Idaho 83605 
AFFIDAVITOFVANCEA. WATKINS IN 
SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT'S SECOND 
MOTION TO SUPPRESS 
Assistant Public Defender 
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DAVID L. YOUNG 
CANYON COUNTY PROSECUTING ATTORNEY 
Canyon County Courthouse 
1115 Albany Street 
Caldwell, ID 83605 
Telephone: (208) 454-7391 
EXHIBIT A 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE TInRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON 
MAGISTRATE DIVISION 
IN THE MATTER OF THE APPLICATION ) 
FOR A SEARCH WARRANT OF THAT ) 
CERTAIN efPm.-TM:eN\ ,1l> LV tT!fr; ) 
=s bP: V,LDC5. \ ) 
----------------------------------=------) LOCATEO .M" .. nil S'ut-l .... j It
'
DC:s6) "Ft-QEs-. ) 
I} /sff5,. ) 
----------~~-----------------------------------------) IN CANYON COUNTY, IDAHO. ) 
-------------------------------------------------------------) 
CASENO.SW- 1~7 
SEARCH WARRANT 
CANYON COUNTY, STATE OF IDAHO 
"' . ..-~ I:> ~tC... TO: Jj"" ,. , OR ANY SHERIFF, CONSTABLE, MARSHAL, 
POLICEMAN, PEACE OFFICER OR LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICER IN CANYON 
COUNTY, STATE OF IDAHO 
tJ'-'4 I~'w· ~ s 
SEARCH ARRANT ~ 
~ 
.&..:::.f:~~ ____ .to-wit:S:-"0V-~ 
fovv 
Canyon County, State of Idaho. 
YOU ARE THEREFORE COMMANDED at any time of the day or night to 
make immediate search of the above described premises for the property described above and to 
seize the property described above. 
Return to this Warrant is to be made to the above entitled Court within ten (10) 
days from the date hereto. 
GWEN UNDER MY HAND AND DATED this 
$? 
/ day of 
SEARCH WARRANT 2 
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MARK J. MIMURA 
CANYON COUNTY PUBLIC DEFENDER 
LARY G. SISSON 
510 Arthur Street 
Caldwell, Idaho 83605 
Telephone: (208) 639-4610 
Facsimile: (208) 639-4611 
Idaho State Bar No. 6072 
Attorneys for Defendant 
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OANYQN COUNTY OL.!RK 
M lUSH, OEPUTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
VANCE A. WATKINS, 
Defendant. 
Case No. CR-2004-26831-C 
BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF MOTIONS 
TO SUPPRESS AND MOTIONS IN 
LIMINE 
COMES NOW Defendant, by and through his attorneys of record, the Canyon 
County Public Defender's Office and hereby provides the following legal and factual 
support and argument in support of Defendant's First Motion to Suppress, Defendant's 
Second Motion to Suppress, Defendant's First Motion in Limine and Defendant's Second 
Motion in Limine in this matter 
THIS MOTION is based on the pleadings, papers, records and files in the above 
entitled action including the transcript from the Grand Jury Proceedings. 
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
On December 1, 2004, R.W., the six year old daughter of Defendant, went to 
school to her elementary school and disclosed to a school counselor that she had been 
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sexually abused by her father. R W. was later that same day interviewed by a case 
worker from the Department of Health and Welfare while a law enforcement officer from 
the Nampa observed the interview through a one-way mirror. 
In short, during her interviews RW. stated that Defendant had vaginal and/or anal 
contact with R W. using his penis on November 30, 2004. She also stated that Defendant 
caused her to have oral contact with Defendant's penis on the morning of the December 
1, 2004. Finally, R W. indicated that this type of sexual contact had been occurring for 
the last two years - since she moved to Idaho. On the other hand, during her interviews 
RW. did not disclose the use ofa condom, an eye dropper, or any type of numbing 
substance by Defendant when these sexual encounters occurred. 
Based on the disclosures by R W., the Nampa Police Department sought for, and 
was given, Search Warrant number SW-1847 in order search Defendant's residence and 
seize potential evidence. The Search Warrant was issued and executed on December 1, 
2004. The Nampa Police seized a number ofitems from Defendant's residence. This 
included a used condom found in a trash can in the kitchen as well as an eye dropper and 
a bottle of Anbesol l from a drawer in Defendant's night stand. These three items were 
not on the list of items in the Search Warrant that were to be seized from Defendant's 
residence. 
Also, on December 1, 2004, Defendant was placed in handcuffs and transported 
to the Nampa Police headquarters for interrogation. While in the interrogation room a 
female detective, whose is believed to be Brandy Sutherland, read Defendant his 
Miranda rights and then asked me if he understood them. Defendant replied by saying, 
1 Anbesol is an oral pain relief medicine for such things as toothaches, canker sores, cold sores, etc. 
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"Yes and I want a lawyer." The detective then threw a phone book on the table in 
front of Defendant. Defendant looked at the phone book and then looked at the 
detective and said, "What you just read said that if I can't afford a lawyer one would be 
appointed. Well, I can't afford one, so I need one appointed." The detective ignored 
Defendant's second request for an attorney and began to interrogate him. Defendant 
was eventually interrogated by two other detectives before being forced by a court 
order to provide a DNA sample. 
On December 2, 2004, Defendant was brought back to the same police station 
by a member of the Nampa Police Department for the purpose of taking a polygraph 
test. He was once again read his Miranda rights. In response, Defendant said, "I asked 
for a lawyer when I was here last night and was denied. What makes today any 
different?" The law enforcement officer, who Defendant believes was the polygrapher, 
asked him, "So, you want a lawyer." Defendant replied, "Yes." At that point the 
polygraph test was not continued and the police sent Defendant home with Detective 
Terry. On the ride home though, Detective Terry continued to ask Defendant 
questions, particularly about his sex life. 
On December 8, 2004 a Criminal Complaint was filed against Defendant and an 
Arrest Warrant issued. That same day, the alleged six year old victim in this case, plus 
Detective Don Peck ofthe Nampa Police Department, testified during a Grand Jury 
Proceeding. As a result the Grand Jury issued a one count Superceding Indictment for 
Lewd Conduct with Minor Child Under Sixteen. The Arrest Warrant was returned on 
December 10, 2004. 
Defendant was arraigned in the District Court on the Superceding Indictment on 
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December 22, 2004. Presumably, Defendant entered a not guilty plea on the Superceding 
Indictment. Eventually, a jury trial was held in this matter from August 30, 2005 thru 
September 6,2005. A jury found Defendant guilty of Lewd Conduct with Minor Child 
Under Sixteen. Defendant was sentenced on December 28,2005 to a minimum of fifteen 
(15) years fixed and an indeterminate period oflife with the Idaho Department of 
Corrections. 
On January 27,2006, Defendant appealed his Judgment and Conviction to the 
Idaho Supreme Court. On January 25,2010, the Canyon County District Court received 
a Remittitur from the Idaho Supreme Court overturning Defendant's conviction and 
remanding the matter back to the Canyon County District Court for a new trial. On 
January 29, 2010, the Court scheduled a Scheduling Conference in front of Judge Hoff 
for February 4,2010. However, on February 2,2010, Defendant's attorney filed a 
Motion and Affidavit to Disqualify Judge Hoff. A hearing was held on the Motion on 
February 9,2010. The next day the Court issued an Order disqualifying Judge Hoffand 
assigning the case to Senior Judge Morfitt. 
On February 11, 2010, Plaintiff filed a Motion to Disqualify Judge Morfitt. That 
Motion was granted on February 17, 2010. Consequently, on February 19, 2010, District 
Court Judge Thomas J. Ryan was assigned to preside over this case. A Status Conference 
was held in the matter on March 8, 2010. On that date, a Pre-Trial Conference was set 
for March 18, 2010 and a Jury Trial for June 21,2010. 
On May 13,2010, Plaintiff filed a Motion to Amend Indictment and set a hearing 
for the Pre-Trial Conference. Defense counsel did not take a position on Plaintiffs 
Motion to Amend. Therefore, the Court allowed the filing ofthe Amended Indictment. 
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At the hearing, defense counsel stated its intention to file several pre-trial motions. The 
Court stated it would hear pretrial Motions on May 27, 2010. 
Subsequently, on May 21,2010, defense counsel filed, among other documents, 
two Motions to Suppress and two Motions in Limine in this matter. 
ARGUMENT 
First Motion to Suppress 
If a defendant in custody invokes his or her Fifth Amendment right to counsel 
upon being read Miranda rights, police must cease the interrogation until an attorney is 
present. Police may not re-initiate an interrogation with a defendant who has requested 
counsel; this prohibition applies even if the interrogation is about an offense that is 
unrelated to the subject ofthe initial interrogation. Interrogation, for Miranda purposes, 
must reflect a measure of compulsion above and beyond that inherent in custody itself; it 
refers not only to express questioning but also to any words or actions on the part of the 
police that the police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating 
response. State v. Bagshaw, 141 Idaho 257, 108 P.3d 404 (Id App 2004). 
Concerning the issue of whether a custodial interrogation took place, the United 
States Supreme Court in Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 100 S.Ct. 1682,64 L.Ed.2d 
297 (1980), set out the test for determining whether a suspect has been interrogated in 
violation ofthe standards set out in Miranda, supra. The Court in Innis stated, ''the term 
'interrogation' under Miranda refers not only to express questioning, but also to any 
words or actions on the part ofthe police (other than those normally attendant to arrest 
and custody) that the police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating 
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response from the suspect." State v. Monroe, 103 Idaho 129,645 P.2d 363 (1982) citing 
Innis, 446 U.S., at 301, 100 S.O., at 1689,64 L.Ed.2d at 308. 
Even though a defendant may waive his right to counsel and respond to interrogation, 
the United States Supreme Court stated in Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 101 S.Ct. 
1880,68 L.Ed.2d 378 (1981) that, 
"We now ho Id that when an accused has invoked his right to have counsel 
present during custodial interrogation, a valid waiver of that right cannot 
be established by showing only that he responded to further police-
initiated custodial interrogation even if he has been advised of his rights. 
We further hold that an accused, such as Edwards, having expressed his 
desire to deal with the police only through counsel, is not subject to further 
interrogation by the authorities until counsel has been made available to 
him, unless the accused himself initiates further communication, 
exchanges or conversations with the police." 451 U.S., at 484, 101 S.Ct., 
at 1884. 
However, Edwards only deals with resumption ofvalid interrogations which have 
been stopped by a request for counse1. It does not deal with the continuing effect ofa 
denial of the right to counse1. That question is governed by the doctrine of fruit ofthe 
poisonous tree. Under this doctrine, police may not benefit from the fruits of their illegal 
conduct. The fruits ofthat conduct must be suppressed. State v. Smith, 119 Idaho 96, 803 
P.2d 1002 (1990). See Taylor v. Alabama, 455 U.S. 1014, 102 S.Ct. 1707, 72 L.Ed.2d 
131 (1982). 
In this particular matter, on December 1, 2004, Defendant was taken from his home, 
place in handcuffs, and driven to the Nampa Police Headquarters. He was then placed in 
an interrogation room. Defendant was not given access to a telephone or any other means 
by which he could communicate with anyone else. Later, after being read his Miranda 
rights by one ofthe detectives, Defendant invoked clearly and unequivocally invoked his 
right to speak with an attorney. That request was not honored. Instead, not only did the 
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first detective continue to ask Defendant questions, but two other detectives also 
questioned Defendant presumably because he was not giving them the answers they 
wanted. 
Clearly, based on the definition of a custodial interrogation found in State v. 
Bagshaw, defendant was subject to a custodial interrogation. The fact that Defendant 
was later released does not make the actual interrogation non-custodial. The questioning 
tactics by the police, where they tell Defendant that they know what he supposedly did, 
and their repeated accusations that he molested his daughter and was lying about it, and 
the fact that they read to Defendant the Miranda warning in the first place, strongly show 
that the police were acting and talking in a way to elicit a confession from Defendant. 
Even ifthe Court does not believe that Defendant was subjected to a custodial 
interrogation on December I, 2004, the ruling in Edwards v. Arizona is clear that if a 
suspect expresses his desire to deal with the police only through counsel, he is not subject 
to further interrogation by the authorities until counsel has been made available to him, 
unless the accused himself initiates further communication, exchanges or conversations 
with the police." 451 U.S., at 484, 101 S.Ct., at 1884. The ruling does not distinguish 
between custodial or non-custodial interrogations. According to Edwards, all 
interrogations must stop until a suspect has had an opportunity to access legal counselor 
he initiates further communications with the police. 
Both on December I, 2004 and again on December 2, 2004, Defendant clearly 
and unequivocally invoked his right to an attorney. Defendant's request was ignored on 
December 1 st and questioning by the police simply continued. On December 2nd, the 
Nampa police officer sent Defendant home with Detective Terry providing the 
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transportation after Defendant invoked his right to an attorney. However, Defendant was 
in a confined area with no one else to talk to but Detective Terry. More importantly, 
Detective Terry began questioning Defendant about his sex life. This was a calculated 
attempt by Detective Terry to elicit incriminating information about Defendant, which 
was later used against Defendant at his first trial. 
Because the Nampa Police violated Defendant's right to counse~ the remedy for such 
violations is clear. According to State v. Smith, 119 Idaho 96, 803 P.2d 1002 (1990). and 
Taylor v. Alabama, 455 U.S. 1014, 102 S.Ct. 1707, 72 L.Ed.2d 131 (1982), the 
continuing effect of denial of counsel is governed by the doctrine of fruit of the 
poisonous tree. Under this doctrine, police may not benefit from the fruits of their illegal 
conduct. The fruits of that conduct must be suppressed. 
In short, Defendant was placed in two situations where he was the subject of a 
custodial interrogation by police. In each instance, Defendant proclaimed his desire to 
have legal counsel present during his questioning. Both times the police ignored his 
requests and continued to interview Defendant anyway. Because Defendant's rights 
under the 5th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and Article I, Section 13 rights ofthe 
Idaho Constitution were violated, the remedy for such violations is to not allow Plaintiff 
to use during trial any statements made by Defendant during his interrogations on 
December 1 and December 2, 2004. 
Second Motion to Suppress 
Search warrants must describe the evidence to be seized. State v. Fowler, 106 
Idaho 3,11, 674 P.2d 432, 440 (Id App. 1983). See also U.S. Const. amend. IV; Marron 
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v. United States, 275 U.S. 192,48 S.Ct. 74,72 L.Ed. 231 (1927); Idaho Const. art. I, § 
17; State v. Wolf, 102 Idaho 789, 640 P.2d 1190 (Ct.App.1982). 
The police, however, are not limited to seizing only those items specifically 
described in the warrant, State v. Fowler, 106 Idaho 3,11, 674 P.2d 432, 440 (Id App. 
1983); Johnson v. United States, 293 F.2d 539 (1961), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 888, 84 
S.Ct. 167, 11 L.Ed.2d 118. See also State v. O'Campo, 103 Idaho 62, 644 P.2d 985 
(Ct.App.1982). Instead, all that is required is that an item seized bear "a reasonable 
relation to the purpose of the search." State v. Fowler, 106 Idaho 3,11, 674 P.2d 432, 440 
(Id App. 1983); Mesmer v. United States, 405 F.2d 316, 319 (10th Cir.1969). 
When a defendant challenges a seizure, he has the burden of showing that the 
items seized were beyond the scope ofthe warrant. Once he has made an initial showing, 
the burden shifts to the state to demonstrate a legal justification for the seizure. Ringel, 
Searches & Seizures § 20.4. The most common legal justification for the seizure of items 
not covered by the search warrant is that the items were in plain view. State v. Fowler, 
106 Idaho 3,12, 674 P.2d 432, 441 (Id App. 1983). 
The plain view doctrine consists ofthree elements: (1) at the time of the officer's 
observation he must be in a place where he had a legal right to be; (2) the items seized 
must be in "plain view"; and (3) the incriminating nature ofthe items must be 
immediately apparent. State v. Fowler, 106 Idaho 3,12, 674 P.2d 432, 441 (Id App. 
1983) citing Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 91 S.Ct. 2022,29 L.Ed.2d 564 
(1971); State v. Pontier, 95 Idaho 707, 518 P.2d 969 (1974). The third element of the 
plain view doctrine requires that an officer ofreasonable caution, under the cumulative 
facts of the case, recognize the items as probably being related to criminal activity. State 
BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT'S 9 
MOTIONS TO SUPPRESS AND MOTIONS 
IN LIMINE 
000046 
v. Fowler, 106 Idaho 3,12, 674 P.2d 432, 441 (ld App. 1983) citing United States v. 
Chesher, 678 F.2d 1353 (9th Cir.1982); United States v. Blake, 484 F.2d 50 (8th 
Cir.1973). 
In this particular case, while executing a search warrant, the Nampa Police 
Department seized a used condom, an eye dropper and a bottle of Anbesol from 
Defendant's place of residence. As shown by Defendant's Affidavit in Support of the 
Second Motion to Suppress, and Exhibits A and B attached and incorporated into that 
Affidavit, the three aforementioned items were not listed on the search warrant but 
certainly seized by the police. In fact, the used condom was tested by Plaintiff for DNA 
and the results became a major portion ofthe evidence against Defendant during his first 
trial. Because the seizure ofthose three items was beyond the scope of the search 
warrant, the State must demonstrate a legal justification for the seizure. 
It is anticipated that Plaintiffwill argue that the "Plain View" doctrine justifies the 
seizure of the condom, eye dropper, and Anbesol. The most problematic portion ofthe 
plain view doctrine is the element that requires that the incriminating nature of the seized 
items must be immediately apparent. In other words, an officer of reasonable caution, 
under the cumulative facts ofthe case, must recognize the items as probably being related 
to criminal activity. 
Up to the point where the Nampa Police executed the search warrant in this 
matter, they knew that R. W. had stated that Defendant had vaginal and/or anal contact 
with R. W. using his penis on November 30, 2004. She also stated that Defendant caused 
her to have oral contact with Defendant's penis on the morning ofthe December 1, 2004. 
During her interviews with various agencies, R.W. even described what Defendant's 
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penis looked like. On the other hand, during her interviews R.W. did not disclose the use 
of a condom, an eye dropper, or any type of numbing substance by Defendant when these 
sexual encounters occurred. 
It is unclear whether the custodial interrogation of Defendant took place before or 
after the execution of the search warrant. If execution ofthe search warrant occurred 
after Defendant's interrogation, it also unclear if the officers executing the search warrant 
were aware of any statements made by Defendant during the interrogation. It is certain 
that officers executing the search warrant had no information about defendant's sex life 
other than allegations made by R. W. In order words, law enforcement did not know if 
Defendant had a female friend, or multiple female friends, with whom Defendant had 
sexual relations, if he used a condom when he had sexual relations with others, ifit was 
Defendant's practice to have sexual relations in his apartment or somewhere else, and so 
forth. 
Consequently, when the Nampa Police seized the used condom from the trash in 
the kitchen of Defendant's residence, they were guessing as to whether the condom was 
probably related to criminal activity. As stated earlier, the victim had, up to that point, 
said nothing that would indicate a condom was used by Defendant. In fact, R.W. 
strongly implied that a condom had not been used. The police knew nothing about 
Defendant's sexual habits or preferences. For all they knew, the condom could have been 
used during a consensual and legal sexual encounter between Defendant and someone 
else. Based on those circumstances and cumulative facts (and missing facts), an officer 
of reasonable caution could not have recognize the condom as probably being related to 
criminal activity. Therefore, the plain view doctrine does not justify seizure of the 
BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT'S 11 
MOTIONS TO SUPPRESS AND MOTIONS 
IN LIMINE 
000048 
condom and it, along with any DNA testing from the condom and any photographs or 
mention of the condom during a trial in this matter, must be suppressed. 
If seizure of the condom is untenable in this matter, then without a doubt seizure 
of the eye dropper and Anbesol bottle were, without a doubt, improper. Once again, 
R.W. in all of her interviews on December 1,2004, never mentioned the use ofan eye 
dropper and/or Anbesol or some other numbing compound when she alleged lewd 
conduct by Defendant. In differentiating from the condom, both eye droppers and 
Anbesol have legitimate uses that are not sexually related. In fact, it is extremely 
unusua~ perhaps even far-fetched, to even think or suggest that such items would be 
related to lewd conduct. As stated before, the police also had no information from 
Defendant as to why he might have such items in his nightstand drawer. Perhaps if the 
police had asked him and Defendant was unable to come up with a plausible explanation 
as to purpose of having those two items, then that would have given them justification for 
seizing them. 
However, based on those circumstances and cumulative facts (and missing facts), 
an officer of reasonable caution could not have recognize the eye dropper and the 
Anbesol as probably being related to criminal activity. Therefore, the plain view doctrine 
does not justifY seizure ofthe eye dropper and the Anbesol. Thus, these two items, along 
with any photographs or mention of them during a trial in this matter, must be 
suppressed. 
First Motion in Limine 
A two-pronged analysis is applied to determine the admissibility of evidence of 
prior bad acts. First, the evidence must be relevant to a material disputed issue 
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concerning the crime charged, other than propensity. State v. Moore, 120 Idaho 743, 745, 
819 P.2d 1143, 1145 (1991); State v. Medina, 128 Idaho 19,24,909 P.2d 637,642 
(Ct.App.1996). "Relevant" evidence means evidence having a tendency to make the 
existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more 
probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence. I.R.E. 401. The second 
step in the analysis is the determination of whether the probative value of the evidence is 
substantially outweighed by unfair prejudice. State v. Atkinson, 124 Idaho 816, 819, 864 
P.2d 654,657 (Q.App.1993). 
In State v. Cook, 144 Idaho 784, 171 P.3d 1282 (Id App 2007). the State sought to 
introduce evidence that Cook had supplied two minors methamphetamine, more than one 
year prior to the incidents he was actually charged with in his case before the court. 
Cook had been charged with Statutory Rape and several counts of Delivery of a 
Controlled substance in that matter. 
The Idaho Court of Appeals determined that the 404(b) evidence was admissible 
during trial. Its rationale is as follows: 
"Cook's intent was not genuinely at issue in this case. In State v. Stoddard, 
105 Idaho 533, 537, 670 P.2d 1318, 1322 (Ct.App.1983), this Court 
discussed whether Rule 404(b) evidence that the defendant had previously 
stolen a vehicle was admissible to prove intent in a case where he had 
been charged with stealing a different automobile. In holding the evidence 
inadmissible for this purpose, we noted it was the type of case where the 
act charged against the defendant itself characterizes the offense; thus, 
guilty intent was proven by proving the act, and evidence 0 f other crimes 
was not necessary or admissible to establish the accused's intent. We cited 
Fallen v. United States, 220 F.2d 946 (5th Cir.1955), where the court 
therein stated that if the defendant had in fact altered the serial numbers on 
two cars, there was "no real question of his criminal intent" in disposing of 
them on the black market. Stoddard, 105 Idaho at 537,670 P.2d at 1322!. 
See also State v. Alsanea, 138 Idaho 733, 740, 69 P.3d 153, 160 
(Ct.App.2003) (citing Stoddard in concluding prior bad acts were not 
relevant to prove the defendant's intent); State v. Roach, 109 Idaho 973, 
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974-75, 712 P.2d 674, 675-76 (Ct.App.1985) (relying on Stoddard to 
conclude intent was not at issue where Roach's defense was that he did not 
commit the act, not that he committed the act with innocent intent)." State 
v. Cook, 144 Idaho 784, 788-789, 171 P.3d 1282, 1286-1287 (Id App 
2007). 
In State v. Roach, 109 Idaho 973, 712 P.2d 674 (ld App 1985), the State sought to 
introduce prior uncharged sexual crimes committed by Defendant upon the minor victim 
and·sexual misconduct between Defendant and victim's mother. Cook was charged in his 
case with Lewd and Lascivious Conduct. One of the State's arguments was that because 
Lewd and Lascivious Conduct is a specific intent crime, the defendant's prior bad acts 
should be allowed during Cook's trial to prove his specific intent. In that case, the Idaho 
Court of Appeals held: 
"It is not always easy to determine when intent is an issue. State v. Proud, 74 
Idaho 429, 262 P.2d 1016 (1953). In the present case, applying the specific 
intent label does not help the analysis. As in Stoddard, we believe the intent 
is adequately shown by proof ofthe act. Roach's defense was that he did not 
commit the act. He does not, as well he could not, contend that he committed 
the act with innocent intent. See State v. Maylett, 108 Idaho 671, 701 P.2d 
291 (Ct.App.1985) (Burnett, 1., specially concurring). The trial judge 
impliedly recognized this when refusing to give lesser included offense 
instructions to the jury. The judge stated that 'it's a question of whether they 
believe the evidence. Not a question ofwhat-what it constitutes. Ifthey 
believe it, that's what it is [Le., lewd and lascivious conduct] .... ' Roach never 
contended that he committed the acts but with innocent intent or mental 
defect, nor did he have an alibi defense. We do not believe that intent was 
sufficiently at issue to allow the questioned evidence as probative of intent. 
State v. Roach, 109 Idaho 973, 975, 712 P.2d 674, 676 (Id App 1985) 
Plaintiffhas filed a Notice oflntent to use during trial what is believed to be prior 
bad acts, wrongs, and/or crimes committed by Defendant. Briefly put, Plaintiff wants to 
introduce into evidence the fact that workers from the Idaho Department of Health and 
Welfare went to the residence of Defendant and R.W. and when they did so, they found 
Defendant without a shirt on and R.W. wearing little or no clothing. 
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First, Defendant contends that the evidence that Plaintiff seeks to introduce is not 
relevant. If Defendant did in fact speak with two separate workers without a shirt on at 
his own residence, does not by itself suggest any intent to commit lewd acts on R. W. or 
any other child. Also, coupling that with testimony that R. W. was not completely dressed 
when the workers made their visits is also not enough to show that Defendant had, or 
intended to have, sexual conduct with R. W. 
If the two employees from Health and Welfare had enough evidence to believe 
that Defendant was committing lewd acts upon R. W. when each one visited, then they 
could have sought the assistance oflaw enforcement andlor the courts to remove R. W. 
from the home. They did not seek that remedy because they lacked enough to show that 
such sexual misconduct. Consequently, these prior acts are not sufficient to make the 
existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more 
probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence. Hence, they are not 
relevant. 
This case is very similar to the situation in State v. Roach. Even though Lewd 
Conduct with a Minor Under 16 is a specific intent crime, intent is not an issue in this 
case. Based on the statements and previous testimony ofR. W., there is no legitimate way 
that Defendant can claim that any contact he may have had with R. W. was a mistake or 
an accident. His only real defense it that he did not do what R. W. and Plaintiff claims he 
did. Therefore, because intent is not sufficiently at issue in this case, the probative value 
ofthe 404(b) evidence sought by Plaintiff is substantially outweighed by the danger of 
unfair prejudice. As a result, it must not be allowed to be presented to a jury during a 
trial in this matter. 
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Second Motion in Limine 
"Relevant Evidence" means evidence having any tendency to make the 
existence of any fact that is of consequence to the detennination of the action more 
probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence. LR.E.401. 
All relevant evidence is admissible except as otherwise provided by these rules 
or by other rules applicable in the courts of this state. Evidence which is not relevant is 
not admissible. LR.E. 402. 
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is 
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or 
misleading the jury, or by considerations ofundue delay, waste of time, or needless 
presentation of cumulative evidence. LR.E. 403 
Photographs showing the contemporaneous scene of a crime or appearance of 
a person are generally admissible in the discretion of the trial court, unless the 
photograph is so inflammatory that its probative value is outweighed by the prejudice 
which might result from its inflammatory nature. State v. Carter, 103 Idaho 917, 655 
P.2d 434 (1981). 
It is believed that Plaintiff will seek to introduce during trial a picture ofR.W. 
when she was six years old. Defendant seeks to exclude such a photograph on two 
grounds. The first grounds is that the picture is not relevant. 
It is conceded that in order to prove that Defendant committed Lewd Conduct 
with a Minor Under 16, the State must prove that R.W. was under the age of16 at the 
time the alleged acts occurred. R.W. is approximately 12 years old and still far from 
being 16 years of age. Also, presumably R.W., or someone familiar with R.W.'s age 
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or date ofbirth, will testify that R W. was six years old during the last three months of 
2004. Therefore, unless R W. has matured in such a way that a jury would have 
difficulty believing she was six years old in late 2004, then a picture of her at age 6 is 
not relevant. 
Such a picture does not have " ... any tendency to make the existence of any 
fact that is of consequence to the determination ofthe action more probable or less 
probable than it would be without the evidence" (emphasis added). Evidence which 
is not relevant is not admissible. I.RE. 402. 
Even ifthe Court determines that a photo ofRW. when she was six years old 
is relevant in this matter, it still must be excluded because its probative value is 
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or 
misleading the jury, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence. The photograph 
that Plaintiff seeks to introduce does not purport to show accurately how R W. looked 
shortly after the lewd acts were allegedly committed against her. The photograph also 
does not purport to show physical injuries sustained by RW. at the hands of 
Defendant. 
What the picture does show is a typical, cute 6 year old girl. Undoubtedly, 
Plaintiff desires to use that picture to make arguments that are designed to arouse the 
passions and prejudices of the jury and to elicit their sympathy toward the alleged 
victim. By using a photograph in such a way the danger of unfair prejudice 
substantially outweighs the minimal probative value of the picture itself In addition, 
dangers that the jury will be confused as to the real issues in the case, or they will be 
mislead, increase dramatically. As stated above, a picture ofRW. at age 6 is also a 
BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT'S 17 
MOTIONS TO SUPPRESS AND MOTIONS 
IN LIMINE 
000054 
needless presentation of cumulative evidence about her age at the time these events 
allegedly occurred. 
Because a photograph ofR.W. at age 6 is not relevant in this matter, and even 
if it is relevant, its probative value is substantially outweighed by the dangers 
associated with it being presented to a jury, Defendant requests that the Court issue an 
order excluding its presentation during the jury trial in this case. 
Timeliness of Motions to Suppress 
Rule 12(d) ofthe Idaho Criminal Rules (ICR) states: 
"Motion date. Motions pursuant to Rule 12(b) must be filed within twenty-
eight (28) days after the entry of a plea of not guilty or seven (7) days 
before trial whichever is earlier. In felony cases,-such motions must be 
brought on for hearing within fourteen (14) days after filing or forty-eight 
(48) hours before trial whichever is earlier. The court in its discretion may 
shorten or enlarge the time provided herein, and for good cause shown, or 
for excusable neglect, may relieve a party of failure to comply with this 
rule." 
A court may not arbitrarily enlarge or shorten the filing requirements of the rule. 
To permit a court to do so without the required exempting factors would emasculate the 
intent of the rule. Pretrial motions are just that, motions to be disposed of prior to trial. 
Bringing such motions at the last minute unfairly deprives the responding party 
opportunity to gather evidence to meet the merits of the movant's arguments. State v. 
Alanis, 109 Idaho 884, 712 P.2d 585 (1985). 
A review ofthe limited Idaho case law regarding the filing of untimely pretrial 
motions center around whether there was "good cause shown" or "excusable neglect" for 
filing the late motions. Without such a presentation, then it is not proper for a trial court 
to hear such motions. State v. Dice, 887 P.2d 1102 (Id App 1994). 
First, this case was remanded back to the District Court in Canyon County for 
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retrial after he successfully appealed his Judgment of Conviction issued in 2005. From 
January 25,2010 (the date the Court filed the Remittitur) until February 19, 2010, this 
case was assigned to three different judges. Two of the judges disqualified themselves as 
a result of Motions to Disqualify filed by both the State and Defendant. From 
approximately January 25,2010 until April 1, 2010, the attorney in the Canyon County 
Public Defender's Office assigned to handle Defendant's case also changed three times. 
As a result, Defendant's current attorney had only been working on Defendant's case for 
approximately 50 days when before filing the two Motions to Suppress in this matter. 
Second, during the process of preparing to represent Defendant, his current 
counsel focused on getting up-to-speed with the facts and potential evidence in this 
matter. Current defense counsel discovered that there were over 400 pages of discovery, 
approximately 10 total audio and video recordings, four days of trial transcripts, and 
approximately 20 exhibits entered into the first jury trial in this matter. Therefore, 
reviewing the work that was done, or should have been done, by previous legal counse~ 
was not a priority. Current counsel did not initially review Defendant's case in order to 
determine whether there were any viable suppression motions because it was assumed 
that the three previous attorneys were thorough and had explored whether or not there 
were any viable suppression motions. 
Third, when defense counsel met with Defendant during the last week of April of 
201 0, he discovered that there may be a viable suppression motion as to statements made 
by defendant to law enforcement. Although Defendant denied any wrong doing during 
two custodial interrogations, defense counsel discovered from Defendant that some of his 
statements had been used against him at trial.· Defense counsel was not aware of that 
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problem, and that potential suppression issue, prior to that meeting. 
Fourth, sometime in 2005 the previous trial attorney received a copy ofthe search 
warrant related to this matter. When current defense counsel found a copy of the search 
warrant, which was buried among other pleadings in the case file he inherited, the search 
warrant was illegible. After contact the deputy prosecuting attorney assigned to this case, 
it became clear that neither party had a legible copy of the search warrant. Defense 
counsel, on his own initiative, secured a copy ofthe search warrant on May 19, 2010. At 
that time it was immediately clear that the officers executing the search warrant exceeded 
their scope by seizing items not listed on the search warrant. As a result, defense counsel 
filed Defendant's Second Motion to Suppress. Until May 19, 2010, defendant's attorney 
did not know if he had a viable suppression motion with regards to items seized from the 
defendant. 
In summary, defense counsel believes that the information related to the four 
points above demonstrate that there is good cause for the late filing of both Motions to 
Suppress in this matter. At the very least, defense counsel argues that excusable neglect 
has been shown. Therefore, Defendant and his attorney request that the Court listen to 
and rule on both Motions to Suppress. 
CONCLUSION 
Defendant respectfully requests that the Court grant his two Motions to Suppress 
and two Motions in Limine and issue Orders consistent with those pleadings. 
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DATED this #(P -{( day of May, 2010. 
L 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE: 
I hereby certify that on the Zit t-day of May 2010, I served a true and correct copy 
of the within Briefupon the individual{s) names below in the manner noted: 
~ By hand delivering copies of the same to the office{s) ofthe attomey{s) indicated below. 
John Bujak 
Canyon County Prosecutors Office 
1115 Albany St. 
Caldwell, ID 83605 
... 
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bm ~.~_E-,"9.M. 
JOHN T. BUJAK MAY 2 6 2010 
CANYON COUNTY PROSECUTING ATTORNEY 
Canyon County Courthouse 
1115 Albany Street 
Caldwell, Idaho 83605 
Telephone: (208) 454-7391 
CANYON COUNTY CLERK 
S ROGERS, DEPUTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON 
THE STATE OF IDAHO CASE NO. CR2004-26831 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
PROSECUTING ATTORNEY'S 
FIRST SUPPLEMENTAL 
RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR 
DISCOVERY 
VANCE WATKINS 
Defendant 
COMES NOW, the Plaintiff, the State of Idaho, and submits the following First 
Supplemental Response to Request for Discovery: 
That the Plaintiff, the State of Idaho, has complied with the Request by submitting the 
following information, evidence and materials: 
1. Statement of Defendant; Statement of Co-Defendant; Defendant's Prior Criminal 
Record; Documents and Tangible Objects; Reports of Examinations and Tests; 
and Police Reports: 
(a) Refer to photo attached numbered 424 .. 
IN ADDITION TO THE ENUMERATED OR SPECIFIC ITEMS, THIS 
RESPONSE INCLUDES ANY OTHER PHYSICAL EVIDENCE LISTED 
IN THE REPORTS. 
PROSECUTING ATTORNEY'S 1 
FIRST SUPPLEMENTAL 
RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR DISCOVERY 
000059 OR1Gfr~AL 
2. State Witnesses 
Name and Address 
Chris Rowe, Nampa Police Department 
Claudia Currie-Mills, SANE Solutions 
Prior Felony Record 
None 
Unknown 
AND ANY OTHER WITNESS LISTED IN THE REPORTS 
ANY LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS LISTED AS POTENTIAL WITNESSES 
WILL BE CALLED AS EXPERT WITNESSES HAVING SPECIALIZED TRAINING 
AND EXPERIENCE IN LAW ENFORCEMENT. OFFICERS' EXPERT OPINIONS 
AND ANY DATA SUPPORTING THE SAME IS CONTAINED IN THE POLICE 
REPORTS PROVIDED IN DISCOVERY. A COPY OF A DISCLOSED OFFICER(S)' 
QUALIFICATIONS, IN THE FORM OF A CURRICULUM VITAE, WILL BE 
PROVIDED UPON REQUEST. 
DATED This 6 day of May, 2010. 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing instrument was served 
upon the attorney for the defendant, the Canyon 
County Public Defender, by placing said 
instrument in their basket at the Clerk's Office, 
on or about the qs day of May, 2010. 
PROSECUTING ATTORNEY'S 2 
FIRST SUPPLEMENTAL 
RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR DISCOVERY 
By: 
JOHN T. BUJAK 
Prosecuting Attorney 
Canyon County, Idaho 
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JOHN T. BUJAK 
CANYON COUNTY PROSECUTING ATTORNEY 
Canyon County Courthouse 
MAY 26 2010 
CANYON COUNTY CLERK 
M BUSH, DEPUTY 
1115 Albany& 
Caldwell, Idaho 83606-0668 
Telephone: (208) 454-7391 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON 
THE STATE OF IDAHO 
Plaintiff, 
VANCE WATKINS, 
Defendant. 
) 
) CASE NO. CR2008-26831 
) 
) STATE'S BRIEF IN SUPPORT 
) OF 404(b) EVIDENCE 
) 
) 
) 
----------------------------) 
COMES NOW, Erica M. Kallin, Deputy Prosecuting Attorney for Canyon County, State 
of Idaho, and hereby submits the following Brief in Support of 404(b) Evidence. 
The State intends to present evidence that the Defendant engaged in sexual contact with 
R.W., the named victim, while in Idaho. The State does not intend to introduce this evidence to 
show the defendant's criminal propensity but rather to prove opportunity, intent, plan, common 
scheme and absence of mistake pursuant to Rule 404(b) of the Idaho Rules of Evidence (I.R.E.) 
I.R.E. Rule 404(b) states: 
STATE'S BRIEF IN SUPPORT 
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Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to 
prove the character of a person in order to show that the person 
acted in conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible for 
other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, 
preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or 
accident, provided that the prosecution in a criminal case shall file 
and serve notice reasonably in advance of trial, or during trial if the 
court excuses pretrial notice on good cause shown, of the general 
nature of any such evidence it intends to introduce at trial. 
The use of 404(b) evidence has been upheld for years. In fact, the court, in State v. 
Hammock, 18 Idaho 424, 110 P. 169 (1910), determined that the use of 404(b) evidence is often 
necessary because the touching stems out of a common scheme. 
Any evidence of other crimes which developed was so intimately 
and inseparably connected with the circumstances of this specific 
offense as to render it admissible as a part of the common criminal 
design, all of which was necessarily admissible ... 18 Idaho at 429, 
110 P. at 170. Cited in State v. Moore, 120 Idaho 743, 746, 819 
P.2d 1143, 1146 (Idaho,1991) 
The Idaho courts have routinely held that 404(b) evidence is relevant especially in sex 
crime cases to show a common scheme, plan or common criminal design. State v. Tolman" 121 
Idaho 899, 828 P.2d 1304 (1992). 
In State v. Grist, 147 Idaho 49, 205 P.3d 1185 (2009), the Idaho Supreme court ruled that 
cases of a sexual nature are to be treated the same as all other types of cases when applying 
I.R.E. 404(b) analysis. The court reiterated that a two-tiered analysis must be undergone to 
determine if 404(b) evidence is admissible. 
First, the trial court must deteI1J).ine if there is sufficient evidence to establish the other 
.<l 
crime or wrong as fact. The trial court must also determine whether the fact of another crime or 
STATE'S OBJECTION TO 
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wrong, if established, would be relevant. ... Second, the trial court must engage in a balancing 
under LR.E. 403 and determine whether the danger of unfair prejudice substantially outweighs 
the probative value of the evidence. Grist 147 Idaho at 52. 
Grist also reiterated the need for corroboration in sex crime cases. "Corroborative 
evidence in sex crime cases involving youthful victims is often times necessary to establish the 
credibility of a young child." Too often the determination of the case rests strictly upon 
establishing that the victim's testimony is more credible then that of the alleged perpetrator." Id 
53. However, corroborative evidence or evidence of a common scheme must go to 
corroboration, not to establish propensity evidence. 
Here the State is seeking to introduce all sexual acts between the victim, R. W. and the 
defendant. The victim disclosed that the defendant engaged in touching outside of the time 
alleged in the Indictment. Specifically, R.W. testified in front of the Grand Jury the touching 
happened when she was four. Additionally, the Defendant did not make any admissions to 
engaging in sexual touching with R.W. Proving the Defendant had the requisite sexual intent is 
\ I 
an essential element of the crime. To show that sexual intent, the State must rely, in part, on the 
Defendant's common scheme, motive and opportunity to touch R.W. Additionally, the 
Defendant told law enforcement that he has difficulty obtaining an erection and the only time he 
has an erection is at night, when he might have touched R.W. The State further has to show that 
the touching was not a mistake or accident. Falling within the 404b realm is the acts observed by 
Department of Health and Welfare worker Kristi Moore. Ms. Moore went to the Defendant's 
home on two separate occasions. On both occasions, R.W. was not dressed (she was instructed 
STATE'S BRIEF IN SUPPORT 
OF 404(b) EVIDENCE 3 
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to get dressed by the Defendant) and the Defendant was wearing only shorts. This evidence goes 
to the plan and opportunity of the Defendant to engage in sexual touching with R.W. None of 
this evidence is too remote in time, as the State intends to focus on conduct between R.W. and 
the Defendant after they moved to Idaho. 
The second tier for the court to weigh is whether the probative value is substantially 
outweighed by the unfair prejudice to the defendant. This balancing process is left to the sound 
discretion ofthe trial judge. State v. Abel, 104 Idaho 865, 664 P.2d 772 (1983); State v. Roach, 
supra. State v. Marks, 120 Idaho 727, 731,819 P.2d 581,585 (Idaho App., 1991). The mere fact 
that evidence is probative makes it prejudicial to the defendant. As such, the question becomes 
whether the prejudice substantially outweighs the probative value. Because of the similarities 
between these incidents, i.e., time, place, opportunity and the fact it is the same victim, it has 
been upheld by the courts of Idaho that the probative value of the evidence substantially 
outweighs any danger of unfair prejudice. In fact, the Court in State v. Parmer, 147 Idaho 210, 
207 P.3d 186 (Idaho App. 2009), indicated that often the prejudice can be cured with a limiting 
instruction. The State would ask this court give a limiting instruction and has provided one in its 
proposed jury instructions. As such, the danger of unfair prejudice would be minimized. 
This court should hold that testimony of sexual acts with the alleged victim, as well as the 
observations by Health and Welfare are admissible for 404b purposes. 
DATED This ()~ day of May, 2010. 
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Deputy Prosecuting Attorney 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing Response To 
Defendant's Second Motion in Limine was served upon the attorney for the Defendant, the 
Canyon County Public Defender, by placing said instrument in their basket at the Clerk's Office 
on or about this Q5 day of May, 2010 
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Prosecuting Attorney 
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Supreme Court ofIdaho, 
Boise, June 2008 Term. 
STATE of Idaho, Plaintiff-Respondent, 
v. 
Harold E. GRIST, Jr., Defendant-Appellant. 
No. 33652. 
Jan. 29, 2009. 
Rehearing Denied April 20, 2009. 
Background: Defendant was convicted in the District Court, Second Judicial District, Nez Perce County, Jeff M. Brudie, 1., 
of seven counts of lewd conduct with a minor under age 16, two counts of sexual battery of a minor, and one count of sexual 
abuse of a child under age 16. Defendant appealed. 
Holdings: The Supreme Court, Horton, J., held that: 
ill trial court erred in admitting evidence of defendant's prior, uncharged sexual misconduct without making determination 
that there was sufficient evidence to establ ish such prior misconduct, or articulating whether it deemed evidence admissible 
as probative of common scheme or plan or as corroborative of victim's testimony; and 
ru evidence of uncharged misconduct may not be admitted pursuant to the rule of evidence governing admission of other 
crimes, wrongs, or acts when its probative value is entirely dependent upon its tendency to demonstrate the defendant's 
propensity to engage in such behavior; overruling Slate v. Moore, 120 Idaho 743,819 P.2d 1143; Stale v. Tolman, 121 
Idaho 899,828 P.2d 1304. 
Vacated and remanded. 
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Jones, J., concurred specially with opinion. 
West Headnotes 
ill Criminal Law 110 ~1153.1 
ill Criminal Law 
I I OXXIV Review 
J IOXXIV(N) Discretion of Lower Court 
11 Ok 1153 Reception and Admissibility of Evidence 
II Ok 1153. J k. In general. Most Cited Cases 
Supreme court reviews a trial court's decision to admit evidence for abuse of discretion, examining whether: (J) the trial 
court correctly perceived the issue as discretionary; (2) the trial court acted within the outer bounds of its discretion and with 
applicable legal standards; and (3) the trial court reached its decision through an exercise of reason. 
ill Criminal Law 110 C;;:;>369.2(1) 
JJ.Q Criminal Law 
II OXVlI Evidence 
J I OXVII(F) Other Offenses 
I I 0k369 Other Offenses as Evidence of Offense Charged in General 
I I 0k369.2 Evidence Relevant to Offense, Also Relating to Other Offenses in General 
I JOk369.2(l) k. In general. Most Cited Cases 
Criminal Law 110 ~374 
ill Criminal Law 
II OXVlI Evidence 
11 OXVII(F) Other Offenses 
II 0k374 k. Proof and effect of other offenses. Most Cited Cases 
In determining the admissibility of evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts offered for a permitted purpose, the trial court 
must first determine whether there is sufficient evidence to establish the other crime or wrong as fact, and whether the fact of 
another crime or wrong, if established, would be relevant. Rules of Evid .. Rule 404(b) . 
.Ql Criminal Law 110 C;;:;>369.2(1) 
ill Criminal Law 
IIOXVII Evidence 
II OXVII(F) Other Offenses 
II 0k369 Other Offenses as Evidence of Offense Charged in General 
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II Ok369 .2 Evidence Relevant to Offense, Also Relating to Other Offenses in General 
II Ok369.2( I) k. In general. Most Cited Cases 
Criminal Law 110 ~374 
llQ Criminal Law 
IIOXVTI Evidence 
110XVII(F) Other Offenses 
II 0k374 k. Proof and effect of other offenses. Most Cited Cases 
Evidence oftmcharged misconduct must be relevant to a material and disputed issue concerning the crime charged, other than 
propensity; such evidence is only relevant ifthe jury can reasonably conclude that the act occurred and that the defendant was 
the actor. Rules ofEvid .. Rule 404(b) . 
.w Criminal Law 110 ~369.2(1) 
1 10 Criminal Law 
II OXVTI Evidence 
J I OXVII(F) Other Offenses 
II Ok369 Other Offenses as Evidence of Offense Charged in General 
II Ok369.2 Evidence Relevant to Offense, Also Relating to Other Offenses in General 
II 0k369.2( I) k. In general. Most Cited Cases 
In determining the admissibility of evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts offered for a permitted purpose, after 
determining that there is sufficient evidence to establish the other crime or wrong as fact, and that the fact of another crime or 
wrong, if established, would be relevant, the trial court must engage in a balancing, and determine whether the danger of 
unfair prejudice substantially outweighs the probative value of the evidence. Rules ofEvid .. Rules 403, 404{b). 
1.£ Criminal Law 110 €;;;>369.2(1) 
ill Criminal Law 
IIOXVII Evidence 
I 10XVIf(F) Other Offenses 
II 0k369 Other Offenses as Evidence of Offense Charged in General 
) 10k369.2 Evidence Relevant to Offense, Also Relating to Other Offenses in General 
11 0k369.2( I) k. In general. Most Cited Cases 
Balancing necessary to determine whether the danger of tmfair prejudice substantially outweighs the probative value of 
evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is committed to the discretion of the trial judge. Rules of Evid., Rules 403, 404(b). 
l.Ql Criminal Law ItO ~369.2(l) 
ill Criminal Law 
IIOXVII Evidence 
110XVJI(F) Other Offenses 
11Ok369 Other Offenses as Evidence of Offense Charged in General 
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I I 0k369.2( I) k. In general. Most Cited Cases 
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Trial court must determine considerations of admissibility of evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts on a case-by-case 
basis. Rules ofEvid., Rules 403, 404(b). 
ill Criminal Law 110 <C=:>374 
ill Criminal Law 
IIOXVIl Evidence 
J J OXVII(F) Other Offenses 
II 0k374 k. Proof and effect of other offenses. Most Cited Cases 
(Formerly 11 Ok695 .5) 
Trial court erred in admitting evidence of defendant's prior, uncharged sexual misconduct with his ex-wife's daughter, in 
prosecution for seven counts of lewd conduct with a minor under age 16, two counts of sexual battery of a minor, and one 
count of sexual abuse of a child under age 16, without making determination that there was sufficient evidence to establ ish 
such prior misconduct, or articulating whether it deemed evidence admissible as probative of common scheme or plan or as 
corroborative of victim's testimony. Rules ofEvid., Rule 404(b). 
rn Criminal Law 110 <C=:>369.2(S) 
ill Criminal Law 
llOXVTI Evidence 
110XVTI(F) Other Offenses 
110k369 Other Offenses as Evidence of Offense Charged in General 
II Ok369.2 Evidence Relevant to Offense, Also Relating to Other Offenses in General 
110k369.2(3) Particular Offenses, Prosecutions for 
110k369.2(5) k. Sex offenses; offenses relating to children. Most Cited Cases 
Criminal Law 110 <C=:>372(7) 
ill Criminal Law 
II0XVn Evidence 
110XVII(F) Other Offenses 
II 0k372 Acts Part of Series Showing System or Habit 
II 0k372(7) k. Incest, rape, and other sex offenses. Most Cited Cases 
Evidence offered for the purpose of corroboration in a prosecution involving a sex offense against a child must actually 
serve that purpose; the courts must not permit the introduction of impermissible propensity evidence merely by relabeling it 
as corroborative or as evidence of a common scheme or plan. Rules of Evid., Rule 404(b ). 
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ill Criminal Law 
IIOXVII Evidence 
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1 I OXVII(F) Other Offenses 
11 Ok369 Other Offenses as Evidence of Offense Charged in General 
II Ok369.8 k. In prosecutions for rape and incest. Most Cited Cases 
Evidence of uncharged sexual misconduct may not be admitted pursuant to the rule of evidence governing admission of other 
crimes, wrongs, or acts when its probative value is entirely dependent upon its tendency to demonstrate the defendant's 
propensity to engage in such behavior; overruling State v. Moore. 120 Idaho 743. 819 P.2d 1143; Stale v. Tolman. 121 
Idaho 899. 828 P.2d 1304. Rules of Evid., Rule 404(b). 
1.!.Ql Criminal Law 11 0 ~369.2(5) 
1J.Q Criminal Law 
I 10 XVII Evidence 
11 OXVII(F) Other Offenses 
11Ok369 Other Offenses as Evidence of Offense Charged in General 
II0k369.2 Evidence Relevant to Offense, Also Relating to Other Offenses in General 
11 0k369.2(3) Particular Offenses, Prosecutions for 
IIOk369.2(5) k. Sex offenses; offenses relating to children. Most Cited Cases 
Rules of evidence require that trial courts treat the admission of evidence of uncharged misconduct in child sex crime cases 
no differently than the admission of such evidence in other cases. Rules of Evid., Rule 404(b). 
**1186 Molly J. Huskey, State Appellate Public Defender, Boise, for appellant. Justin Curtis argued. 
Hon. Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney General, Boise, for respondent. Daniel Bower argued. 
HORTON, Justice . 
.... 50 This appeal arises from Harold Grist's conviction for seven counts of lewd conduct with a minor under the age of 
sixteen, two counts of sexual battery of a minor, and one count of sexual abuse of a child under the age of sixteen. Grist 
argues that the district court improperly admitted evidence relating to prior uncharged sexual misconduct. We vacate and 
remand for further proceedings and a new trial. 
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
A jury convicted Grist of sexually abusing his live-in girlfriend's daughter, J.M.O., over a period of eight years. The abuse 
started shortly after Grist and J.M.O.'s mother moved in together when J.M.O. was ten years old. Grist would have lM.O. sit 
on his lap while he rubbed his pelvis against her. The abuse progressed as J.M.O. grew older. Eventually, Grist started to 
touch J.M.O.'s breasts, buttocks, and vagina. Grist would *51 **1187 also force J.M.O. to undress for him. The abuse 
stopped when J.M.O. moved out of the house after she graduated from high school. 
Prior to trial, the State filed a motion pursuant to I.R.E. 404(b) to admit evidence of prior uncharged acts of sexual 
misconduct as evidence of a common scheme or plan. The evidence indicated that Grist previously sexually abused his 
ex-wife's daughter, AW. The district court permitted A.W. to testify, finding the evidence to be relevant to Grist's "alleged 
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. conduct." A. W. testified that she lived with Grist from ages eight until thirteen and that Grist would ask her to sit on his lap 
or lay and cuddle with him During this time, Grist would touch A. W.'s breasts and buttocks. The jury convicted Grist of all 
ten charged counts relating to his conduct with 1.M.O. Grist timely appealed. 
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
ill We review a trial court's decision to admit evidence for abuse of discretion. State v. Field. 144 Idaho 559, 564, 165 
PJd 273,278 (2007) (citing State v. Robinett. 141 Idaho 110, 112, 106 P.3d 436, 438 (2005)). In this review, we examine 
whether: (1) the trial court correctly perceived the issue as discretionary; (2) the trial court acted within the outer bounds of 
its discretion and with applicable legal standards; and (3) the trial court reached its decision through an exercise of reason. 
Sun Valle)' Shopping Ctr .. Inc. v. Idaho Power Co .. 119 Idaho 87, 94, 803 P.2d 993, 1000 (1991) (citing State v. Hedger, 
liS Idaho 598, 600. 768 P.2d 1331. 1333 ( 1989». 
III. ANALYSIS 
Grist asks this Court to overturn State v. Moore, 120 Idaho 743. 819 P.2d 1143 (] 991), and Stale v. Tolman. 121 Idaho 899, 
828 P.2d 1304 (1992), which permit a trial court to admit evidence of uncharged sexual misconduct in child sex crime cases, 
pursuant to Idaho Rule of Evidence 404(b ). Grist argues that Idaho courts have treated the admission of evidence pursuant to 
I.R.E. 404(b) in child sex crime prosecutions differently than other cases under Rule 404{b). Grist argues that the admission 
of evidence of uncharged sexual misconduct by a defendant has evolved into a blanket exception that turns on whether the 
case involves allegations of sexual misconduct with a child. Grist asks this Court to hold that the admissibility of evidence 
pursuant to I.R.E. 404(b) in child sex crime cases is subject to the same analysis under I.R.E. 404(b) as other cases. 
We decline to overrule Moore and Tolman in their entirety. However, as these decisions have been interpreted as creating 
an exception in child sex cases to the prohibition of character evidence, we find it necessary to revisit a theoretical 
underpinning for the introduction of uncharged misconduct in cases involving the sexual abuse and exploitation of children. 
We further clarifY that the admission of LR.E. 404(b) evidence in a child sex case is subject to the same analysis as the 
admission of such evidence in any other case. Any decision from this Court or the Court of Appeals that suggests that 
evidence offered in a case involving an allegation of sexual misconduct with a child should be treated differently than any 
other type of case is no longer controlling authority in Idaho's courts. 
Grist is not the first person to point out that Idaho courts appear to distinguish child sex crime cases from other cases for 
purposes ofLR.E. 404(b). Professor Lewis notes the following in his treatise on trial practice in Idaho: 
[I]n sex crime prosecutions, particularly those involving minors, the courts have used a variety of rationales to justifY the 
admission of evidence of a defendant's uncharged deviant sexual misconduct, including admission on the issue of 
credibility, to corroborate the victim's testimony, to show plan or intent, and on the issue of identity. Indeed, the evidence 
has been held to have been properly admitted so often that it seems to constitute a special exception to the character 
evidence prohibition. 
D. CRAIG LEWIS, IDAHO TRIAL HANDBOOK 2D ED., § 13: I (2005) (emphasis added). Although this Court has not 
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'expressly stated that there is a distinction between child sex crime cases and other cases for purposes ofI.R.E. 404(b), FNI 
the Court of Appeals has *52 **1188 found that our decisions in Moore and Tolman create such a distinction. In State v. 
Wood. 126 Idaho 241, 880 P.2d 771 (Ct.App.1994), the Court of Appeals stated "we understand our Supreme Court's rul ings 
in Moore and Tolman to be limited in their application to sexual abuse cases where other similar incidents of sexual 
misconduct by the defendant with the same or similar victims tends to corroborate a child victim's version of the charged 
incident." [d. at 247. 880 P.2d at 777. 
FN I. This Court acknowledged the apparently discrepant treatment of such cases in Field: 
In sex crime prosecutions involving minors, the admission of uncharged deviant sexual misconduct has in many 
cases been "difficult to square ... with the character evidence prohibition." D. Craig Lewis, Idaho Trial 
Handbook, § 13.9 (1995). The explanation may "be found in the unstated belief that sexual deviancy is a 
character trait of especially powerful probative value for predicting a defendant's behavior, and that relaxation of 
the propensity evidence ban is warranted in these cases." [d. 
144 Idaho at 569-70, 165 P.3d at 283-84. 
A. I.R.E. 404(b) admissibility standard 
Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person to show action in conformity 
therewith. LR.E. 404(b); Field 144 Idaho at 569, 165 P.3d at 283. This rule has its source in the common law. The common 
law rule was that "the doing of a criminal act, not part of the issue, is not admissible as evidence of the doing of the criminal 
act charged." See WIGMORE, CODE OF EVIDENCE, 3D ED., p. 81; see a/so, Old Chiefv. US.! 519 U.S. 172, 181-82, 
I 17 S.C!. 644. 650-51. 136 L.Ed.2d 574. 588-89 (1997) (noting that Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b) reflects the common 
law).FN2 
FN2. Idaho Rule of Evidence 404(b) is substantially identical to F.R.E. 404(b). 
The policy underlying the common law rule was the protection of the criminal defendant. See 22 WRIGHT & GRAHAM, 
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: EVIDENCE, § 5239. pp. 436-439. "The prejudicial effect of [character 
evidence] is that it induces the jury to believe the accused is more likely to have committed the crime on trial because he is a 
man of criminal character." Slate v. Wrenn, 99 Idaho 506, 510, 584 P.2d 123 I, 1235 (1978). Character evidence, therefore, 
takes the jury away from their primary consideration ofthe guilt or innocence of the particular crime on trial. 1£1. The drafters 
of I.R.E. 404(b) were careful to guard against the admission of evidence that would unduly prejudice the defendant, while 
sti II allowing the prosecution to present probative evidence. 
illlli Admissibility of evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts when offered for a permitted purpose is subject to a 
two-tiered analysis. First, the trial court must determine whether there is sufficient evidence to establish the other crime or 
wrong as fact. M. CLARK, REPORT OF THE IDAHO STATE BAR EVIDENCE COMMITTEE, C 404, p. 4 (4th 
Supp.1985) (citing us. v. Beechu/n. 582 F.2d 898 (5th Cir.I978) (en banc), cert denied, 440 U.S. 920, 99 S.Ct. 1244, 59 
L. Ed.2d 472 (1979); Us. v. O'Brien, 618 F.2d 1234, 1239 (]til Cir.1980», The trial court must also determine whether the 
fact of another crime or wrong, if established, would be relevant. Jd, Evidence of uncharged misconduct must be relevant to 
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·a material and disputed issue concerning the crime charged, other than propensity. Field 144 Idaho at 569. 165 P.3d at 283 
(citing I.R.E. 404(b); Moore, 120 Idaho at 745,819 P.2d at 1145). Such evidence is only relevant if the jury can reasonably 
conclude that the act occurred and that the defendant was the actor. Beechum. 582 F.ld at 912-13. 
[4][5](6) Second, the trial court must engage in a balancing under I.R.E. 403 and determine whether the danger of unfair 
prejudice substantially outweighs the probative value of the evidence. M. CLARK, REPORT OF THE IDAHO STATE BAR 
EVIDENCE COMMIITEE, C 404, p. 4 (4th Supp.1985); Stale v. Sheahan. 139 Idaho 267, 275, 77 P.3d 956, 964 (2003) 
(citing State v. Law. 136 Idaho 721, 726, 39 P.3d 661, 666 (Ct.App.2002); State v. Cannady. 137 Idaho 67,72,44 P.3d 
1122, 1127 (2002); I.R.E. 403). This balancing is committed to the discretion of the trial judge. Field. 144 Idaho at 569, 165 
P.3d at 283. The trial court must determine each of these considerations of admissibility on a case-by-case basis. M. 
CLARK, REPORT OF THE IDAHO STATE BAR EVIDENCE COMMIITEE, C 404, p. 4 (4th Supp.1985). 
**1189 ill *53 In the instant case, the district court admitted evidence of Grist'S prior, uncharged sexual misconduct with his 
ex-wife's daughter. When ruling on the admission of this evidence, the district court expressed discomfort with the status of 
I.R.E. 404(b) jurisprudence in Idaho, stating: 
Well, I have had the opportunity to review Moore along with a number of other cases that have addressed this issue and, 
well, I'll tell [you] that I'm not really comfortable with the analysis of Moore. but I'm certain certainly I think stuck with the 
state of appellate law regarding these kinds of issues. 
I think that there has largely been a class of cases that have developed that are unique to sexual abuse cases. And I'm-I 
think that I'm bound to follow that. 
I think the evidence submitted to me by way of the offer of proof from the state is relevant to a material disputed issue in 
this matter, that is, defendant's alleged conduct, and though certainly prejudicial to the defense, I believe that the probative 
value would substantially outweigh the danger of that unfair prejudice. 
In reaching this decision, the district court acted without benefit of our subsequent decision in Field, in which we cautioned 
"there must be limits to the use of bad acts evidence to show a common scheme or plan in sexual abuse cases." 144 Idaho at 
570. 165 P.3d at 284, The district court correctly observed that precedent from this Court and the Court of Appeals is 
binding upon the district courts in Idaho. Slate v. Guzman. 122 Idaho 981. 986, 842 P.2d 660, 665 (1992). Although the 
district court was applying controlling precedent from the appellate courts of this state, the district court did not determine 
whether there was sufficient evidence to establish as fact Grist's prior uncharged sexual misconduct with A. W. nor did the 
district court articulate whether the evidence was probative because it demonstrated the existence of a common scheme or 
plan or because it tended to otherwise corroborate J.M.O.'s testimony. 
As will be discussed in the following section, trial courts must carefully scrutinize evidence offered as "corroboration" or as 
demonstrating a "common scheme or plan" in order to avoid the erroneous introduction of evidence that is merely probative 
of the defendant's propensity to engage in criminal behavior. Accordingly, we vacate the judgment of conviction and remand 
for a new trial. We do not decide the admissibility of the evidence at issue in this case. The district court will make that 
determination on remand in exerc ise of its discretion. 
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.B. Corroboration 
Prior to this Court's decision in State v. Byers. 102 Idaho 159, 627 P.2d 788 (198l), a defendant could not be convicted of a 
sex crime unless other evidence corroborated the victim's allegations. In Bvers. we rejected the corroboration requirement in 
sex crime cases. 102 Idaho at 165.627 P.2d at 793. Prior to ~ evidence of prior uncharged sexual misconduct was one 
avenue of providing corroborating evidence. Moore, 120 Idaho at 745-46. 819 P.2d at 1145-46. Nevertheless, in Moore. 
despite our abandonment of the corroboration requirement in prosecutions for sexual offenses, this Court held that although 
corroborating evidence "is no longer mandatorily required in all sex crime cases, corroborating evidence may still be 
relevant, particularly in sex crime cases involving minor victims." 120 Idaho at 746, 819 P.2d at 1146 (footnote omitted). 
We explained this conclusion as follows: "Corroborative evidence in sex crime cases involving youthful victims is often 
times necessary to establish the credibility of a young child. Too often the determination of the case rests strictly upon 
establishing that the victim's testimony is more credible than that of the alleged perpetrator." 14 
rn In this case, the State argues that Grist's prior acts of uncharged sexual misconduct corroborate J.M.O.'s testimony. This 
is a legitimate argument under Moore and its progeny. However, we wish to emphasize that evidence offered for the purpose 
of "corroboration" must actually serve that purpose; the courts of this state must not permit the introduction of impermissible 
propensity evidence merely by relabeling it as ** 1190 *54 "corroborative" or as evidence of a "common scheme or plan." 
The verb "corroborate" is defined as follows: 
To strengthen; to add weight or credibility to a thing by additional and confirming facts or evidence. The testimony of a 
witness is said to be corroborated when it is shown to correspond with the representation of some other witnesses, or to 
comport with some facts otherwise known or established. 
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, 31 I (5th ed.l979). 
L2l Although we can envision instances in which evidence of uncharged misconduct will tend to reinforce the credibility of a 
witness without reliance on the impermissible theory of the defendant's propensity to engage in such misconduct, we will not 
attempt to identifY all circumstances in which such evidence properly may be admitted. Rather, we will identifY the instance 
in which such evidence may not be admitted: Evidence of uncharged misconduct may not be admitted pursuant to I.R.E. 
404(b) when its probative value is entirely dependent upon its tendency to demonstrate the defendant's propensity to engage 
in such behavior. 
Moore demonstrates the impermissible reasoning of which we warn. In Moore, this Court attempted to explain the manner in 
which uncharged misconduct may serve as corroboration, quoting from a UCLA law review article: 
[A]dmission of corroborative evidence serves the dual purpose of reducing the probability that the prosecuting witness 
is lying, while at the same time increasing the probability that the defendant committed the crime. 
Other Sex Offenses, 25 UCLA L.Rev. 261,286 (1977). 
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In our view, the theoretical tmderpinning of the admissibility of uncharged misconduct for purposes of "corroboration" as 
articulated in Moore is indistinguishable from admitting such evidence based upon the accused's propensity to engage in such 
behavior based upon his or her past behavior. Although we have consistently stated that use of character evidence to 
demonstrate a propensity to commit crime is impermissible, see, e.g. State 1'. Yakovac. 145 Idaho 437. 445, 180 P.3d 476, 
484 (2008), our explanation in Moore could have just as easily been stated as follows: "If the defendant has committed 
another sex offense, it is more probable that he- committed the offense for which he is charged, thus reducing the probability 
that the prosecuting witness is lying, while at the same time increasing the probability that the defendant committed the 
crime." The tmstated premise in Moore is simply this: "If he did it before, he probably did it this time as well." This 
complete reliance upon propensity is not a permissible basis for the admission of evidence oftmcharged misconduct. 
We do not overrule Moore in its entirety. Moore correctly states: "Where relevant to the credibility of the parties, evidence 
of a common criminal design is admissible." 120 Idaho at 746, 819 P.2d at 1146. This statement is consistent with I.R.E. 
404(b)'s recognition that evidence may be admissible for certain purposes, including "preparation, plan, knowledge, [and] 
identity," which purposes are most frequently grouped together tmder the rubric of "common scheme or plan." In Tolman, we 
cautioned against an expansive interpretation of "common scheme or plan," stating: "We do not suggest today that any and all 
evidence of prior sexual misconduct is admissible in sex crime cases merely by placing it tmder the rubric of corroborative 
evidence of a common scheme or plan." 121 Idaho at 90S, 828 P.2d at 1310. In Field we again cautioned "there must be 
limits to the use of bad acts evidence to show a common scheme or plan in sexual abuse cases." 144 Idaho at 570, 165 P.3d 
at 284. 
Although we have not done so recently, subsequent to our adoption of the Idaho Rules of Evidence in 1985, we provided 
guidance as to when evidence of other bad acts may properly be admitted. In State v. Pizzuto, 119 Idaho 742, 810 P.2d 680 
.L!.2W, overruled on other grounds by State v. Card 121 Idaho 425, 825 P.2d 1081 (1991 ), we stated that such evidence 
may be admissible "if relevant to prove ... a common scheme or plan embracing the commission of two or more crimes so 
related to each other that *55 **1191 proof of one tends to establish the other, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or 
accident." {d. at 750-S1, 810 P.2d 680,688-89 (1991) (emphasis added) (citing I.R.E. 404(b); State v. Wrenn. 99 Idaho 
506,584 P.2d 1231 (I 978); State v. Walker. 109 Idaho 3S6, 707 P.2d 467 (Ct.App.1985)), FN3 We once again caution the 
trial comts of this state that they must carefully examine evidence offered for the purpose of demonstrating the existence of a 
common scheme or plan in order to the determine whether the requisite relationship exists, 
FN3. The statement in Pizzuto identifYing the permissible use of evidence of tmcharged misconduct was first 
articulated prior our adoption of the Idaho Rules of Evidence. However, the adoption of I.R.E. 404(b) was not 
expected or intended to change existing Idaho law. M. CLARK, REPORT OF THE IDAHO STATE BAR 
EVIDENCE COMMITTEE, C 404, p. 4 (4th Supp.198S). 
Idaho Rule of Evidence 101(b) provides that the Idaho Rules of Evidence "govern all actions, cases and proceedings in the 
courts of the State of Idaho." In our view, there is no principled basis for relaxing application of these rules to facilitate 
prosecution of a single class of criminal offenses. We continue to recognize that, in appropriate cases, evidence of uncharged 
misconduct may be probative as reflecting a common scheme or plan or to otherwise corroborate the testimony ofa witness. 
However, the scope of evidence that may properly be admitted pursuant to I.R.E 404(b) is no greater in sex crime cases than 
it is for any other type of case. The trial courts of this state must carefully scrutinize evidence offered under I.R.E. 404(b) for 
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.purposes of "corroboration" as demonstrating a "common scheme or plan" in order to determine whether such evidence 
actually serves the articulated purpose or whether such evidence is merely propensity evidence served LIp under a different 
name. 
As the district court determined that the proffered evidence was governed by a body oflaw unique to sexual abuse cases, we 
vacate the judgment and remand for proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Il.QJ We clariJY that the Idaho Rules of Evidence require that trial courts treat the admission of evidence of uncharged 
misconduct in child sex crime cases no differently than the admission of such evidence in other cases. Accordingly, we 
vacate the judgment of conviction and remand for further proceedings and a new trial consistent with this opinion. 
Chief Justice EISMANN, Justices BURDICK and J. JONES concur. W. JONES, J. specially concurring: 
I concur with the majority opinion; however, I write separately because I fail to see the clariJYing picture that the majority 
seeks to paint. 
I completely agree that "complete reliance upon propensity [evidence] is not a permissible basis for the admission of 
evidence of uncharged misconduct." But, I disagree that this Court's opinion in State v. Moore requires any clarification. 
This Court in Moore clearly stated that I.R.E. 404(b) does not allow for the admission of "[o]ther crimes, wrongs or acts" 
unless the evidence is offered for another purpose such as, "proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, 
knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident." State v. Moore, 120 Idaho 743. 745 n. 2. 819 P.2d 1143. 1145 n. 2 
Ll2W; LR.E. 404(b). A very clear test was outlined in Moore: 
A two-tiered analysis is used to determine the admissibility of evidence concerning uncharged misconduct. First, the 
evidence must be relevant to a material and disputed issue concerning the crime charged. Second, the court must determine 
whether the probative value of the evidence is outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice to the defendant [pursuant to 
I.R.E.403]. 
Stale v. Moore. 120 Idaho 743.745.819 P.2d 1143.1145 (1991). Therefore, the trial court is to engage in three steps: (I) 
whether the evidence of another crime, wrong or act is being offered for a purpose other than to prove acting in conformity 
therewith; (2) whether the evidence is relevant to a material*56 **1192 and disputed issue; FN-I and (3) whether the 
probative value of the evidence is outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. In Moore, the court did in fact engage in 
such an analysis: (I) Moore had been accused of prior sexual misconduct by abusing other young females and it was being 
offered to show a common scheme or plan to sexually exploit an identifiable group in an identifiable manner; (2) the 
evidence was relevant because it corroborated the victim's story and the defendant had called the victim's credibility into 
question; and (3) the probative value of offering the testimony outweighed any danger of unfair prejudice. FN5 
FN4. In Moore, the Court found the evidence relevant because the defendant was contesting the victim's credibility. 
The Court found that corroboration evidence that verifies the victim's story as relevant because of the degree of 
corroboration. That is, the other crimes showed the defendant exploits "young female children living within his 
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household." Moore, 120 Idaho at 745,819 P.2d at 1145. 
FN5. As noted in the dissenting opinion, the majority in Moore only did a conclusory analysis of whether the 
probative value of the evidence outweighs any danger of unfair prejudice. In most cases the probative value will be 
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice; a court must engage in some form of analysis of how the probative 
value outweighs the prejudice. 
This Court has also cautioned against an overly broad reading or interpretation of the principles of I.R.E. 404(b) in relation 
to child sex abuse cases. "We do not suggest today that any and all evidence of prior sexual misconduct is admissible in sex 
crime cases merely by placing it under the rubric of corroborative evidence of a common scheme or plan." State v. To/man. 
121 Idaho 899, 905, 828 P.2d 1304, 1310 (1992). The Court of Appeals heeded that cautionary statement and interpreted 
Moore and Tolman "to be limited in their application to sexual abuse cases where other similar incidents of sexual 
misconduct by the defendant with the same or similar victims tends to corroborate a child victim's version of the charged 
incident." State v. Wood. 126 Idaho 241,247. 880 P.2d 771. 777 (Ct.App. 1994), This interpretation was made in error. The 
evidence would be admissible under the test in any circumstance where evidence of other crimes, acts or wrongs is being 
offered for a purpose other than to prove acting in conformity therewith. In instances of sexual abuse cases the court must 
engage in the same analysis pursuant to I.R.E. 404(b) and I.R.E. 403. Therefore, I concur with the majority's conclusion that 
"trial courts [must] treat the admission of evidence of uncharged misconduct in child sex crime cases no differently than the 
admission of such evidence in [any] other case[ ]." 
Idaho,2009. 
State v. Grist 
147 Idaho 49, 205 P.3d I 185 
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Background: Defendant was convicted in a jury trial in the District Court, Fourth Judicial District, Ada County, .lQ.dJ2. 
Horton, J., of lewd conduct with a minor child under 16. Defendant appealed. 
Holdings: The Court of Appeals, Perry, J., held that: 
ill district court made requisite findings on other crimes, wrongs, or acts evidence so as to support admission, and 
(2} testimonial evidence from witnesses regarding inappropriate sexual contact by defendant with them in course of massage 
was relevant. 
Affirmed. 
Gutierreb J., dissented. 
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Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove a defendant's criminal propensity; however, such 
evidence may be admissible for other purposes. Rules of Evid" Rule 404(b). 
ill Criminal Law €=> 1158.11 
IIOk1158.11 Most Cited Cases 
Appellate court will treat the trial court's factual determination that a prior bad act has been established by sufficient 
evidence as it does all factual findings by a trial court; it defers to a trial court's factual findings if supported by substantial 
and competent evidence in the record. 
lJl Criminal Law €=> 1134.49(6) 
I lOki 134.49(6) Most Cited Cases 
Whether evidence is relevant is an issue of law; therefore, when considering admission of evidence of prior bad acts, 
appellate court exercises free review of the trial court's relevancy determination. 
til Criminal Law €=> 1147 
1 10k 1147 Most Cited Cases 
When a trial court's discretionary decision is reviewed on appeal, the appellate court conducts a multi-tiered inquiry to 
determine: (I) whether the lower court correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) whether the lower court acted 
within the botmdaries of such discretion and consistently with any legal standards applicable to the specific choices before 
it; and (3) whether the lower court reached its decision by an exercise of reason. 
1£ Criminal Law €=>374 
I I0k374 Most Cited Cases 
(Formerly I IOk695.5) 
In considering the admissibility of other crimes, wrongs, or acts evidence, a trial court must determine that there is sufficient 
evidence to support a reasonable conclusion that the act occurred and that the defendant was the actor; and a trial court must 
articulate a separate finding that sufficient evidence exists to support a reasonable conclusion that the act occurred. Rules of 
Evid., Rule 404(b) . 
.w Criminal Law ~374 
I I0k374 Most Cited Cases 
(Formerly 110k695.5) 
District court made requisite findings on other crimes, wrongs, or acts evidence so as to support admission in prosecution for 
lewd conduct with minor child tmder 16; court made finding that there was adequate showing that defendant committed prior 
bad acts of engaging in inappropriate sexual contact tmder guise of legitimate massage techniques, court articulated purpose, 
other than propensity, for admission of evidence, to show common scheme or plan, absence of mistake or accident, and 
intent, and court fotmd that probative value was not substantially outweighed by danger of unfair prejudice because any 
prejudicial effect could be cured by limiting instruction. Rules ofEvid .. Rule 404(b). 
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Appellate court will not address an issue not preserved for appeal by an objection in the trial court; however, it may 
consider fundamental error in a criminal case, even though no objection was made at trial. 
ill Criminal Law ~1036_J(8) 
II Okl 036.1 (8) Most Cited Cases 
Defendant failed to preserve for appellate review claim regarding any variances between actual testimony of some of other 
bad acts witnesses and content of their testimony alleged in state's notice of intent, where no contemporaneous objection was 
raised by trial cOlUlsel at time that any deviations became apparent in testimony. Rules ofEvid .. Rule 404(b) . 
.I..2l Criminal Law ~374 
11Ok374 Most Cited Cases 
It is not the district court's burden to sua sponte strike the testimony when any variances between the actual testimony of some 
of the other bad acts 
witnesses and the content of their testimony alleged in the state's notice of intent become apparent; rather, the trial court must 
strike the testimony in response to objections raised by opposing counsel that such testimony varied from the offer of proof 
upon which the district court previously relied in its other bad acts admissibility determination. Rules of Eyid .. Rule 404(b). 
illl Criminal Law €:;:;:::;>371 (9) 
II0k371(9) Most Cited Cases 
Testimonial evidence from witnesses regarding inappropriate sexual contact by defendant with them in course of massage 
was relevant to show that his contact with victim was not by accident or mistake and that he had requisite intent to sexually 
gratifY either victim or himself. Rules ofEvid., Rule 404(b). 
ll1l Criminal Law ~371 (9) 
110k371(9) Most Cited Cases 
prostitution, 
Testimony of prior bad acts witnesses in trial for lewd conduct with minor under 16 years of age was not rendered irrelevant 
for purpose of showing absence of mistake or accident by fact they were allegedly assaulted by defendant as adults. 
I.J1l Criminal Law ~l036.1(8) 
110kI036.1(8) Most Cited Cases 
Defendant failed to preserve for appellate review claim regarding consensual nature of some of contact during course of 
massage testified to by two witnesses in prosecution for lewd conduct with minor child under 16 which also occurred during 
massage by defendant; one witness was subject of state's second motion in limine prior to retrial, at hearing on motion, trial 
counsel made no objection to, nor any mention of, witness' testimony being inadmissible because it related to consensual 
activity, and, during witness' testimony during retrial, no objection was made when testimony was elicited regarding these 
encounters. 
1..Ul Criminal Law ~1043(1) 
1 10k 10430) Most Cited Cases 
When a trial court unqualifiedly rules on the admissibility or inadmissibility of evidence prior to trial, no further objection at 
trial is required in order to preserve the issue for appeal. 
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Appellate court will not address an issue not preserved for appeal by an objection in the trial court. 
Uil Criminal Law ~369.2(5) 
110k369.2(5) Most Cited Cases 
Uil Criminal Law <£:;=>673(5) 
IIOk673(5) Most Cited Cases 
Testimonial evidence from witnesses regarding inappropriate sexual contact by defendant with them in course of massage 
was not substantially outweighed by danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or waste of time in prosecution for 
lewd conduct with minor child under 16 which also occurred during massage by defendant; district court's findings 
demonstrated its conscious regard that such evidence inherently ran risk of becoming improper propensity evidence, court 
found that limiting instruction hel ped to ensure that jury considered evidence only for its proper purposes, and district court 
reiterated instruction again at conclusion of trial. Rules ofEvid., Rules 403, 404(b). 
l.!M Criminal Law ~1130(5) 
1 lOki 130(5) Most Cited Cases 
Defendant waived for appellate review claim that district court abused its discretion by refusing trial counsel's request for 
additional time to prepare for two witnesses added prior to retrial; no argument was made or authority presented supporting 
proposition that nearly one month of time was inadequate for defense counsel to prepare for testimony of two additional 
witnesses. 
1111 Criminal Law C:;::::>1130(5) 
1 1 OkI130(5) Most Cited Cases 
A party waives an issue on appeal if either authority or argument is lacking. 
J.!!J. Criminal Law C:;::::>665(3) 
I IOk665(3) Most Cited Cases 
Allowing one of two additional witnesses to testifY at retrial after witness had attended portions of first trial did not violate 
district court's exclusionary order entered before first trial prohibiting all prospective witnesses from being present in 
courtroom or otherwise receiving any information pertaining to testimony of other witnesses; witness who was source of 
allegation of error was not included as potential witness in first trial, thus witness was not subject to district court's 
exclusionary order and order was not violated by witness' presence at that proceeding . 
.l.!.2J. Criminal Law ~1036.1(9) 
I lOki 036. 1 (9) Most Cited Cases 
Defendant failed to preserve for appellate review claim that district court abused its discretion by sustaining state's hearsay 
objection to testimony concerning statements he made during police interrogation or publishing of recording to jury; at 
hearing on state's motion in limine prior to defendant's retrial, district court ruled that evidence of defendant's statements 
would not be admissible by defense, defense counsel made no specific objection at that time, only argument raised by trial 
counsel as to admissibility of statements concerned rule governing admission by party-opponent hearsay exception, and 
district court properly denied admission of statements on this basis, and no other argument was made by trial counsel 
regarding rule governing remainder of or related writings or recorded statements or rule governing prior statement by 
witness hearsay exception. Rules ofEvid., Rules 106, 80 I (d)( I, 2). 
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Error, if any, by district court sustaining state's hearsay objection to testimony concerning statements defendant made during 
police interrogation or publishing of recording to jury, was not fundamental error as defendant testified at trial and had 
adequate opportunity to explain or put statements in proper context. 
**189 Jones & Swartz, PLLC, Boise, for appellant. Darwin Overson argued. 
Hon. Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney General; Kenneth K. Jorgensen, Deputy Attorney General, Boise, for respondent. 
Kenneth K. Jorgensen argued. 
PERRY, Judge. 
*213 James Zane Parmer appeals from his judgment of conviction for lewd conduct with a minor child under sixteen. For the 
reasons set forth below, we affirm. 
I. 
FACTS AND PROCEDURE 
Parmer provided massage services to K.R., a fourteen-year-old female, to treat her for migraine headaches and leg pain. 
K.R. reported that, at one session, Parmer was using a vibrating device to relieve tension in the muscles of her inner thigh 
when he placed the device in a position to cause her sexual arousal. Additionally, she reported that Parmer had also engaged 
in manual-genital contact. Parmer was arrested and charged with lewd conduct with a minor child under sixteen. I.e. § 
18-1508. 
The state filed a notice of intent, pursuant to I.R.E. 404(b), to use evidence in the form of testimony from eight witnesses 
regarding similar inappropriate sexual touching during massages provided by Parmer. The state then filed a motion in limine 
for the district court to rule on the admissibility of the witnesses' testimony under I.R.E. 403 and 404Cb). After a hearing, the 
district court held that the testimony of seven of the eight witnesses would be admissible for the purposes of showing a 
common scheme or plan, intent, or absence of mistake or accident and that any prejudicial effect of such testimony could be 
cured by a limiting jury instruction. Six of the witnesses testified at Parmer's trial. Counsel for Parmer also attempted to 
elicit testimony from a police officer regarding statements that Parmer made during an interrogation, and the district court 
sustained the state's hearsay objection. The trial resulted in a hungjury. 
In preparation for Parmer's retrial, the state then filed another notice of intent to use Rule 404(b) evidence in the form of 
testimony from two additional witnesses regarding inappropriate sexual contact by Parmer with them in the course of a 
massage. A second motion in limine was filed and after a hearing, the district court ruled that the testimony would be 
admissible on the same grounds as the six witnesses who testified at the first trial. Additionally, the district court held that 
counsel for Parmer could not make any reference to nor publish the recording of statements made by Parmer during a police 
interrogation because the statements were hearsay. The district court had previously sustained the state's hearsay objection to 
these statements in the first trial. 
**]90 *214 At the retrial, testimony was presented from the eight witnesses. The jury found Parmer guilty, and the district 
court sentenced him to a unified term of twenty years, with a minimum period of confinement of seven years. Parmer appeals, 
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• challenging the district court's orders granting the state's motions in limine as to the Rule 404(b) witnesses and prohibiting 
Parmer's counsel from presenting any evidence of Parmer's statements during the police interrogation. 
n. 
ANALYSIS 
A. Rule 404(b) Evidence 
Parmer raises several issues concerning the admission of testimony regarding his prior bad acts. First, Parmer alleges that 
the district court abused its discretion by determining that the Rule 404(b) witnesses could testifY based only on the state's 
offer of proof to the court concerning the subject matter of the proposed witnesses' testimony. Second, Parmer alleges that the 
Rule 404(b) evidence was irrelevant. Third, he alleges that the prejudicial effect of the testimony of eight prior bad acts 
witnesses substantially outweighed any probative value of the evidence. Fourth, he alleges that the district court abused its 
discretion by refusing trial counsel's request for additional time to prepare for the two Rule 404(b) witnesses added prior to 
the retrial. Lastly, he alleges that the district court abused its discretion by allowing one of the two additional Rule 404(b) 
witnesses to testifY at the retrial after that witness had attended portions of the first trial. 
[1][2](3] Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove a defendant's criminal propensity. L.R£., 
404(b); State v. Needs. 99 Idaho 883, 892, 591 P.2d 130, 139 (1979); State v. Winkler, 112 Idaho 917, 919, 736 P.2d 1371. 
1373 (Ct.App.1987). However, such evidence may be admissible for a purpose other than that prohibited by I.R.E. 404(b). 
Stale v. Avila, 137 Idaho 410, 412, 49 PJd 1260,1262 (Ct.App.2002). In determining the admissibility of evidence of prior 
bad acts, the Supreme Court has utilized a two-tiered analysis. The first tier involves a two-part inquiry: (I) whether there is 
sufficient evidence to establish the prior bad acts as fact; and (2) whether the prior bad acts are relevant to a material 
disputed issue concerning the crime charged, other than propensity. State v. Grist, 147 Idaho 49,52,205 P.3d t 185, 1188 
(2009). We will treat the trial court's factual determination that a prior bad act has been established by sufficient evidence as 
we do all factual findings by a trial court. We defer to a trial court's factual findings if supported by substantial and 
competent evidence in the record. State v. Porter, 130 Idaho 772, 789, 948 P.2d 127, 144 (1997). Whether evidence is 
relevant is an issue of law. State v. Atkinson, 124 Idaho 816, 819, 864 P.2d 654, 657 (Ct.App.1993). Therefore, when 
considering admission of evidence of prior bad acts, we exercise free review of the trial court's relevancy determination. Id 
The second tier in the analysis is the determination of whether the probative value of the evidence is substantially 
outweighed by unfair prejudice. Grist, 147 Idaho at 52, 205 P.3d at 1188. When reviewing this tier we use an abuse of 
discretion standard. Id. 
[:ll When a trial court's discretionary decision is reviewed on appeal, the appellate court conducts a multi-tiered inquiry to 
determine: (I) whether the lower court correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) whether the lower court acted 
within the boundaries of such discretion and consistently with any legal standards applicable to the specific choices before 
it; and (3) whether the lower court reached its decision by an exercise of reason. State v. Hedger. 115 Idaho 598, 600, 768 
P.2d 1331, 1333 (1989). 
l. State's offer of proof 
Parmer alleges that the district court abused its discretion by determining that the Rule 404{b) witnesses could testify based 
only on the state's offer of proof to the court concerning the content of the proposed witnesses' testimony. He argues that there 
must be a factual predicate established on the record before a ruling on admissibility is made. Furthermore, he argues that, 
even if the district court correctly relied on the *215 **191 state's offer of proof, the district court erred by failing to strike 
000083 
http://web2. westlaw . ntiprintstream.aspx?sv=Spl it&rs=WL W ... 
. portions of witness testimony which varied from the alleged testimony purported in the offer of proof The state responds that 
this issue was not preserved for appeal by timely objection, it is unsupported by legal authority, or that it is an incorrect 
statement of the law because the very purpose of the offer of proof is to enable the district court to rule on the admissibility 
of proffered evidence. 
Recently, the Supreme Court in Grist, reviewed a district court's admission of Rule 404(b) evidence in a trial for lewd 
conduct with a minor under sixteen. In that case, the district court found: 
"I think the evidence submitted to me by way of the offer of proof from the state is relevant to a material disputed 
issue in this matter, that is, defendant's alleged conduct, and though certainly prejudicial to the defense, I believe 
that the probative value would substantially outweigh the danger of unfair prejudice." 
Grist, 147 Idaho at 53, 205 P.3d at 1189. The Supreme Court held that the district court did not make a proper 
determination as to whether there was sufficient evidence to establish the prior bad acts as fact but did not specifically 
identi1)t a proper method for establishing prior bad acts as fact. The quoted language from the district court in that case 
referred to a reliance on an offer of proof concerning the proffered testimony. However, the Supreme Court did not condemn 
the reliance on an offer of proof in the initial presentation of the testimony to be elicited at trial for purposes ofa Rule 404(b) 
determination. In that case, the district court failed to make such a finding at all and, instead, ruled only on the relevance and 
the balancing of the prejudicial effect and probative value. 
ru Reliance on an oral or written offer of proof in determining the admissibility of Rule 404(b) evidence is one way that a 
district court can make the requisite initial finding that a prior bad act is established as fact. A trial court may also rely on 
affidavits, stipulations by the parties, live testimony, or may hold more extensive evidentiary hearings for each witness in 
advance of trial. In any event, the Supreme Court has held that these considerations of admissibility must be made on a 
case-by-case basis by the trial court. Ttl. at 52, 205 P.3d at 1188. The Supreme Court has not articulated what standard of 
proof is required for the trial court to factually establish the prior bad acts. However, the Court did hold that such evidence 
would only be relevant if the jury could reasonably conclude that the act occurred and that the defendant was the actor. /d. at 
52, 205 P.3d at 1188. It would be illogical to place a higher burden on the trial court's preliminary analysis of the 
admissibility of the proffered evidence under Rule 404(b). Therefore, in considering the admissibility of evidence under 
Rule 404(b), a trial court must determine that there is sufficient evidence to support a reasonable conclusion that the act 
occurred and that the defendant was the actor. The holding of Grist also disfavors an implied acceptance that sufficient 
evidence exists to establish a prior bad act as fact by mere virtue of the trial court's determination of the probative value of 
the evidence. Rather, a trial court must articulate a separate finding that sufficient evidence exists to support a reasonable 
conclusion that the act occurred. 
Wlln this case, the state filed a notice of intent to use Rule 404(b) evidence before each trial in which it identified the 
potential witnesses and to what each would testi1)t. The district court then held a hearing at which time counsel for both 
parties had an opportunity to argue the content of the witnesses' testimony, the relevance, and the prejudicial effect. Based on 
the information contained in the state's notice of intent as well as the argument heard at both hearings, the district court ruled 
on the admissibility of the evidence. The district court was acting without the benefit of the Grist opinion which, as we have 
noted above, requires a trial court to articulate a separate factual finding that sufficient evidence exists to support a 
reasonable conclusion that the act occurred. Nevertheless, we conclude that the district court made the required findings in 
this case. Following argument at the hearing on the state's motion in limine prior to the first trial, the district court, after *216 
* * 192 excluding the testimony of one witness that did not pass Rule 404(b) muster, found: 
As to the remainder of the testimony--that is, the testimony of [the seven remaining witnesses]--l am satisfied that, based 
upon the State's offer that there's more than adequate showing that, under the guise of whether it was characterized as a 
massage or physical therapy, that the defendant is engaging in otherwise legitimate contact with the apparent purpose of 
engaging in inappropriate sexual contact. 
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I am satisfied, based upon the showing, that the testimony of those individuals is admissible under [404] for purposes of 
showing a common scheme or plan, or absence of mistake, or absence of accident. And significantly, I find that it would be 
relevant as to the requisite intent to gratifY the sexual desires of either the purported victim or of the accused. 
My requirement then is to step to the 403 analysis. The danger of the 403 concern that I have is the propensity concern, of 
course, the very real concern is that a jury might hear such evidence and take the inappropriate logical step of: Well, ifhe 
did it before, then he did it in this instance. 
However, I am satisfied that those concerns about inappropriate use of the evidence for propensity purposes can be 
addressed by a limiting instruction instructing the jury that the testimony of [the seven witnesses] is only admissible for the 
I imited purposes of showing a common scheme or plan, absence of mistake or accident, or the requisite intent. 
First, the district court made the required finding that there was an adequate showing that Parmer had committed the prior 
bad acts of engaging in inappropriate sexual contact under the guise of legitimate massage techniques. Second, the district 
court articulated the purpose, other than propensity, for admission of the evidence--to show common scheme or plan, absence 
of mistake or accident, and intent. Thus, the district court satisfied the two steps of the first tier in the Rule 404(b) 
admissibility analysis. Next, the district court satisfied the second tier of the analysis by finding that the probative value was 
not substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice because any prejudicial effect could be cured by a limiting 
instruction. 
At the hearing on the state's motion in limine prior to the second trial, the district court also made the requisite findings 
relative to the two additional Rule 404(b) witnesses. 
As to the offer of [the two additional witnesses'] testimony, I am satisfied that this evidence is probative. There is a danger 
of unfair prejudice, but I think that unlike a sexual relationship with a minor child, that this testimony is capable of being 
addressed by means of the limiting instruction of the form that was given to the jury as it related to the six 404(8) 
witnesses in the first case. 
As to the probative value, I am satisfied that allegations by these individuals, if bel ieved by a trier of fact that the 
defendant engaged in inappropriate sexual contact in the context of physical therapy, is relevant to those issues that I 
previously admitted .... in terms of demonstrating motive, opportunity, intent or absence of mistake or accident. 
Again, the district court was acting without the benefit of the Supreme Court's recent holding in Grist which disfavors the 
implied acceptance that sufficient evidence exists to establish a prior bad act as fact by mere virtue of the trial court's 
determination of the probative value of the evidence. However, while the quoted language may appear to make the 
disfavored implication, we conclude that the district court adequately made the requisite factual findings in this case, unlike 
the district court in Grist. 
First, the district court satisfied the first tier of the analysis in finding that the testimony, if believed by the jury, demonstrated 
that Parmer engaged in inappropriate sexual contact. The district court then referenced the proper purposes, other than 
propensity, to be served by the admission of the Rule 404(b) evidence--namely, motive, opportunity, intent, or absence of 
mistake or accident. Second, the district court again satisfied the second tier of the analysis by weighing the probative value 
versus the danger of unfair *217 **193 prejudice and determining that any danger of unfair prejudice could be mitigated by a 
1 i miting instruction. 
Parmer contends, in effect, that the district court should have held a mini-trial for each witness to determine whether Parmer 
was, in fact, guilty of such offense based on a prescribed standard of proof. This option was available to the district court if 
it was not satisfied through other methods that sufficient evidence existed to establish the prior bad acts as fact. However, the 
district court was satisfied by the state's offer of proof and the argument presented at the hearings on the state's motions in 
I imine that such evidence existed to support a reasonable conclusion that the acts occurred. To require the district court to 
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. conduct further intensive inquiry when the evidence presented had already sufficiently met the court's satisfaction would be 
an unnecessary waste of judicial time and resources. The required factual predicate can be adequately met initially by 
representations of counsel in the offer of proof Thereafter, if the actual testimony of the witness fails to comport with the 
standards of the Rules of Evidence and with the content upon which the district court made its admissibility determination, 
the district court may instruct the jury to disregard all or any part of the witness' testimony. 
IlJIBl Parmer points to several variances between the actual testimony of some of the Rule 404(b) witnesses and the content 
of their testimony alleged in the state's notice ofintent. However, no contemporaneous objection was raised by trial counsel 
at the time that any deviations became apparent in the testimony. This Court will not address an issue not preserved for 
appeal by an objection in the trial court. Slale v. Rozajewski, 130 Idaho 644. 645. 945 P.2d 1390. 1391 (Ct.App.1997). 
However, we may consider fundamental error in a criminal case, even though no objection was made at trial. fcl 
Fundamental error has been defined as error which goes to the foundation or basis of a defendant's rights, goes to the 
foundation of the case or takes from the defendant a right which was essential to his or her defense and which no court could 
or ought to permit to be waived. State v. Babb, 125 Idaho 934, 940, 877 P.2d 905, 911 (1994). 
f2l This Court has held, regarding an allegation of prosecutorial misconduct, that an error only rises to the level of 
fimdarnental error if it is "so egregious or inflammatory that any ensuing prejudice could not have been remedied by a 
curative jury instruction." State v. Timmons. 145 Idaho 279. 287. 178 PJd 644. 652 (Ct.App.200n In this case, had trial 
counsel objected to the testimonial variances and a curative instruction been given by the district court, any alleged prejudice 
could have been averted. Parmer argues that the district court, in its gatekeeper function, should have struck any testimony 
that varied from the offer of proof when such variances became apparent. However, the United States Supreme Court has 
held, regarding evidence which is preliminarily admitted conditional to the proving ofa fact at trial: 
Often the trial court may decide to allow the proponent to introduce evidence concerning a similar act, and at a later point 
in the trial assess whether sufficient evidence has been offered to permit the jury to make the requisite finding. If the 
proponent has failed to meet this minimal standard of proof, the trial court must instruct the jury to disregard the evidence. 
Huddleston v. United States, 485 U.S. 681, 690, 108 S.Ct. 1496, 150 I, 99 L.Ed.2d 771, 782 (1988) (footnote omitted). The 
Court then clarified that it is "not the responsibility of the judge sua sponte to insure that the foundation evidence is offered; 
the objector must move to strike the evidence if at the close of the trial the offeror has failed to satisfY the condition." Id. at n. 
L. quoting 21 C. WRIGHT & K. GRAHAM, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 5054 (1977). Thus, it was not 
the district court's burden to sua sponte strike the testimony when any variances became apparent. Rather, the trial court must 
strike the testimony in response to objections raised by opposing counsel that such testimony varied from the offer of proof 
upon which the district court previously relied in its Rule 404(b) admissibility determination. 
Therefore, the district court did not abuse its discretion by determining that the Rule *218 ** 194 404(b) witnesses could 
testilY based only on the state's offer of proof to the court concerning the content of the proposed witnesses' testimony. 
Furthermore, we conclude that the district court was not required to sua sponte strike portions of testimony that varied from 
the state's offer of proof and that any error caused by the variances in testimony was not properly preserved for appeal and 
does not rise to the level of fundamental error. 
2. Relevance of Rule 404(b) evidence 
LL.Ql Parmer argues that the district court erred by determining that the Rule 404(b) evidence was relevant for the purpose of 
showing a common scheme or plan, intent, and absence of mistake or accident. He contends that the prior bad acts were too 
dissimilar to the present offense to be admissible for that purpose. Specifically, Parmer contends that all but one of the 
witnesses was allegedly victimized as an adult and the method of each alleged assault varied from case to case, including 
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• some consensual encounters. Additionally, Parmer argues that absence of mistake or accident was not at issue until after he 
testitied and therefore, it was error to allow the state to present this evidence in its case-in-chief. 
The state responds that the evidence was relevant to show a common scheme that, during the course of therapeutic massages, 
Parmer would sexually assault female victims. Therefore, this evidence made it more probable that Parmer possessed the 
required sexual intent when he allegedly inappropriately touched K.R. and the touching was not a result of accident or 
mistake. The state further argues that age differences and variances in the manner by which Parmer inappropriately touched 
his victims do not make the evidence irrelevant. As to any consensual encounters, the state responds that they were initiated 
by Parmer during the course of a therapeutic massage and, therefore, are still relevant to show that he possessed the requisite 
state of mind when he committed the alleged acts in this case. 
liU As stated above, we exercise free review over a district court's relevancy determination. Atkinson, 124 Idaho at 819, 
864 P.2d at 657. The Idaho Supreme Court has held that age differences between adult and child victims at the time of a 
sexual battery does not render the evidence of prior bad acts irrelevant. State v. Cardell. \32 Idaho 217,220, 970 P.2d 10, 
13 () 998). The facts of Cardell are nearly indistinguishable from this case. Cardell was a masseuse who was accused of 
committing a sexual battery on a sixteen-year-old client. The district court in that case allowed testimony from other former 
clients of Cardell who testified to similar inappropriate touching during massages given to them. On appeal, Cardell argued 
that the prior bad acts witnesses were all adults at the time that he allegedly committed a battery upon them and, therefore, 
their testimony was irrelevant in a prosecution for sexual battery ofa minor. The Supreme Court held: 
The testimony of the adult massage clients was relevant to whether Cardell's touching of R.S.'s vaginal area was 
accidental. These women were asked at trial whether they believed that the touching of their vaginal areas by Cardell was 
accidental. The adult clients testified that they did not believe the touching was accidental during their massages. This 
testimony was relevant under I.R.E. 404(b) because it tends to show that any touching of R.S.'s vaginal area by Cardell 
during massage therapy was not a mistake or accident, since other clients testified to similar touching. 
Cardell argues that the testimony does not fit within the exceptions in I.R.E. 404(b) because the testimony was not from 
women in the same age category as R.S. Although these women were older than R.S., their testimony was of events during 
a massage given by Cardell which was similar to the testimony ofR.S. The age difference between the victim R.S. and the 
adult massage clients does not render the adults' testimony regarding absence of mistake or accident irrelevant. 
{d. Therefore, the testimony of prior bad acts witnesses in a trial for lewd conduct with a minor under sixteen years of age is 
not rendered irrelevant for the purpose of showing absence of mistake or accident by the fact *219 **195 they were 
allegedly assaulted by Parmer as adults. 
Parmer additionally argues that the variances in the manner by which the Rule 404(b) witnesses were assaulted render their 
testimony irrelevant in the present case. In the context of showing a common plan or scheme, the Supreme Court in Grist 
cautioned that trial courts must carefully examine evidence to determine whether the charged conduct and the prior bad acts 
are so related to each other that proof of one tends to establish the other, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or 
accident. Grist, 147 Idaho at 54-55, 205 P.3d at 1190-91. Such careful examination for the requisite factual similarities is 
not just limited to cases where Rule 404(b) evidence is offered to show a common scheme or plan, but must be conducted 
when evidence is offered for any purpose under Rule 404(b). This ensures that the evidence actually serves the purpose for 
which it is offered. 
During the hearing on the state's motion in limine prior to the first trial, [FN 1] the district court found the testimony to be 
relevant: 
FN I. The district court employed similar reasoning in its analysis of the admissibility of the two additional Rule 
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404(b) witnesses who were allowed to testifY at the retrial. 
I am satisfied that, based on the State's offer that there's more than adequate showing that, under the guise of whether it was 
characterized as a massage or physical therapy, that the defendant is engaging in otherwise legitimate contact with the 
apparent purpose of engaging in inappropriate sexual contact. 
The manner of offensive touching among the Rule 404(b) witnesses varied from kissing, digital-genital and oral-genital 
contact, other touching of the breast and genital areas, as well as Parmer stimulating himself by rubbing or pressing his groin 
against a victim's body. Parmer's argument that the evidence of alleged inappropriate touching in this case is irrelevant 
because it was not accomplished through exactly the same manner is lUlpersuasive. It makes no difference that K.R. alleged in 
this case that Parmer used a massage tool to sexually arouse her and that he digitally penetrated her. Even if, as Parmer 
contends, the prior bad acts are too factually or temporally remote to show a common plan or scheme to victimize massage 
clients, the prior misconduct can still be indicative of an absence of accident or mistake or of Parmer's intent to sexually 
gratifY himself or others through inappropriate sexual touching lUlder the guise of proper massage techniques. The evidence 
was relevant, as fOlUld by the district court, to show that Parmer's contact with K.R. was not by accident or mistake and that 
he had the requisite intent to sexually gratifY either K.R. or himself. 
Parmer attempts to distinguish Cardell from this case. Parmer argues that, in Cardell. the testimony of prior bad acts was 
only allowed in rebuttal after the defendant had testified and placed accident, mistake or lack of intent at issue, not in the 
state's case-in-chief. Idaho Code Section 18-1508 defines lewd conduct with a minor lUlder sixteen: 
Any person who shall commit any lewd or lascivious act or acts upon or with the body or any part or member thereof of a 
minor child lUlder the age of sixteen (16) years, including but not limited to, genital-genital contact, oral-genital contact, 
anal-genital contact, oral-anal contact, manual-anal contact, or manual-genital contact, ... when any of such acts are done 
with the intent of arousing, appealing to, or gratifYing the lust or passions or sexual desires of such person, such minor 
child, or third party, shall be guilty of a felony .... 
The section establishes a specific intent crime requiring the prosecution to prove that Parmer acted with the intent of arousing 
or gratifYing sexual desires within K.R. or himself. Therefore, it was necessary for the state to introduce evidence in its 
case-in-chiefproving that Parmer acted with the requisite sexual intent. 
This Court has previously held that intent is not always sufficiently at issue in a specific intent crime so as to justifY the 
admission of prior bad acts evidence. State v. Roach, 109 Idaho 973, 974-75, 712 P.2d 674, 675-76 (Ct.App.1985) 
("Further, if we were to conclude that intent is always at issue in a trial for a charged specific intent crime, then other crime 
evidence would always be admissible, *220 **196 subject, of course, to the balancing process. We do not believe the intent 
exception goes that far."). In Roach. this Court held that intent was not sufficiently at issue because the defendant contended 
that he did not commit the act in question. The defendant did not contend that he committed the act with innocent intent. In this 
case, however, Parmer's intent to gratifY either the sexual desires of K.R. or himself was squarely at issue. As summarized 
by trial cOlUlSel during closing argument at Parmer's retrial: 
Our main contention ... is that he didn't do this to sexually gratifY himself. He didn't do this to sexually gratifY [K.R.l. Did 
he make a mistake? Did he make a mistake by using that vibrator? ... It's stupid .... 
I am sorry. Any time that you are going to get a vibrator and put it near this area, you are going to get results of stimulation 
going into the groin. It is going to happen. 
Did he intend the results of that? Did he intend to gratifY her? No. Did he intend to sexually gratifY himself? No. That is 
what the case is all about. That's it.... The instruction you get as far as if you find that and you find that he did do it with the 
intent to sexually gratifY himself or her, yeah, you gotta find him guilty. 
Therefore, Roach can be distinguished from this case. The Rule 404(b) evidence was relevant to show absence of mistake or 
accident or Parmer's intent, which was squarely at issue in this case. Accordingly, the evidence was properly admitted, and 
the district court did not err in allowing it to be presented in the state's case-in-chief. 
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illl As to Parmer's arguments regarding the consensual nature of some of the contact testified to by two of the Rule 404(b) 
witnesses, this issue has not been properly preserved for appeal. Parmer argues that two of the witnesses testified to 
consensual encounters. One of the witnesses was a subject of the state's second motion in limine prior to the retrial. At the 
hearing on the motion, trial counsel made no objection, nor any mention, of the witness' testimony being inadmissible because 
it related to consensual activity. During the witness' testimony during the retrial, no objection was made when testimony was 
elicited regarding these encounters. This Court will not address an issue not preserved for appeal by an objection in the trial 
court. Rozaiewski, 130 Idaho at 645.945 P.2d at 1391. 
[I 3][ 14J The second witness who Parmer argues testified to consensual encounters was a subject of the state's first motion in 
limine prior to the first trial. At the hearing on the motion, trial counsel made the following blanket statement regarding 
consensual activities: 
And then I encourage the Court to look at the adult women. I don't know how some of these incidents with adult women 
could be anything other than consensual behavior. I am not saying all of them are that way, but they are claiming, one of 
them is claiming that he crawled up on the therapy table, was kissing them, was fondling them. One claims that he sucked 
her toes; another claims that they French-kissed. 
I don't know how this could be other than consensual behavior, and it is c1early--1 mean, if they are claiming somehow it 
wasn't consensual, I'm not sure how they can make that claim. But if they do, I think the 404 weighing process certainly 
comes into play. 
Trial counsel made no other statement specifically objecting to what encounters were consensual. The witness of whom 
Parmer now complains is not even mentioned. When a trial court unqualifiedly rules on the admissibility or inadmissibility 
of evidence prior to trial, no further objection at trial is required in order to preserve the issue for appeal. State v. Baer. 132 
Idaho 416. 418. 973 P.2d 768. 770 (CtApp.1999). However, in Baer, this Court held that a defendant's motion in limine 
does not preserve an objection for appeal regarding anything related to the subject matter of his motion. In this case, the state 
fi led the motion in limine, but the analysis of Baer is still applicable. Parmer's broad, generalized argument at the hearing on 
the motion in limine did not preserve for appeal his specific objections to the alleged consensual encounters testified to by an 
identified witness. To properly preserve the issue *221 **197 trial counsel had to raise the objection at trial. Not only was 
no objection made, but trial counsel often himself inquired as to the consensual encounters during cross-examination. 
Therefore, the issue was not properly preserved for appeal. This Court will not address an issue not preserved for appeal 
by an objection in the trial court. Rozajewski. 130 Idaho at 645.945 P.2d at 1391. 
We may consider ftmdamental error in a criminal case, even though no objection was made at trial. l4 However, we 
conclude that this allegation of error does not rise to the level offtmdamental error. 
3. Prejudice of Rule 404(b) evidence under .. R.E. 403 
I..Lll Parmer argues that the district court abused its discretion by ruling that the probative value of the Rule 404(b) evidence 
was not substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or waste of time. Specifically, 
Parmer contends that the admission of testimony from eight Rule 404(b) witnesses as compared to only six other witnesses in 
the state's case-in-chiefwas unduly cumulative and confused the issue for which he was on trial. The state responds that the 
district court properly acted within its discretion when it acknowledged the potential danger of prejudice and held that any 
prejudice could be minimized by a limiting instruction to the jury. A lower court's determination under I.R.E. 403 will not be 
disturbed on appeal unless it is shown to be an abuse of discretion. State v. Enno, 119 Idaho 392, 406, 807 P.2d 610, 624 
Ll..22.D; Slate 1'. Clark, 115 Idaho 1056, 1059. 772 P.2d 263. 266 (Ct.App.1989). When a trial court's discretionary decision 
is reviewed on appeal, the appellate court conducts a multi-tiered inquiry to determine: (1) whether the lower court correctly 
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. perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) whether the lower court acted within the boundaries of such discretion and 
consistently with any legal standards applicable to the specific choices before it; and (3) whether the lower court reached its 
decision by an exercise of reason. Hedger. 115 Idaho at 600, 768 P.2d at 1333. 
The question of the number of witnesses testifYing to prior bad acts is a matter of concern under Rule 403 analysis. Since the 
testimony is inherently prejudicial, at some point the number of such witnesses can become excessive and overwhelm the 
probative value of the evidence. This determination is left to the discretion of the trial court. The number of witnesses 
appropriate to establish a common scheme or plan, absence of accident or mistake, or intent will vary with each case. Thus, 
the issue cannot be resolved by drawing an arbitrary line. The Supreme Court in Grist held that trial courts must make such 
admissibility determinations on a case-by-case basis while remaining cognizant of the potential cumulative effect of the 
evidence and its tendency toward proving propensity and bad character. Grist, 147 Idaho at 52, 205 P.3d at 1188. The 
Court warned against the admission of propensity evidence merely under the auspices of an acceptable purpose under Rule 
404(b). Id. at 52, 205 P.3d at 1188. The Supreme Court held that the ultimate risk of such evidence was: "If he did it 
before, he probably did it this time as well." Id. at 54, 205 P.3d at 1190. Therefore, when reviewing the district court's 
discretionary determination we will consider whether the court properly weighed these considerations in its Rule 403 
analysis. 
At the hearing on the motion in limine prior to Parmer's first trial, the district court held: 
The danger of the 403 concern that I have is the propensity concern, of course, the very real concern is that a jury might 
hear such evidence and take the inappropriate logical step of: Well, ifhe did it before, then he did it in this instance. 
However, I am satisfied that those concerns about inappropriate use of the evidence for propensity purposes can be 
addressed by a limiting instruction instructing the jury that the testimony of [the Rule 404(b) witnesses] is only admissible 
for the limited purpose of showing a common scheme or plan, absence of mistake or accident, or the requisite intent. 
The district court followed a similar analysis for the two additional Rule 404(b) witnesses *222 **198 who testified at the 
retrial. The district courfs findings demonstrate its conscious regard that such evidence inherently runs the risk of becoming 
improper propensity evidence. The district court's language even refers to the same flawed logic of which the Supreme Court 
expressed concern in Grist. The district court was aware of the concern regarding the admission of propensity evidence 
under a different name. The district court also treated the Rule 404(b) evidence no differently than with any other crime--the 
kind of disparate treatment which was condemned by the Supreme Court in Grist. In addition, the district court found that a 
Jimiting instruction would help to ensure that the jury considered the Rule 404(b) evidence only for its proper purposes. 
Prior to the testimony of the first Rule 404(b) witness, the district court instructed the jury: 
Ladies and gentlemen, during the course of this trial evidence will be introduced for purpose of showing that the defendant 
committed acts other than that for which the defendant is on trial. Such evidence, if believed, is not to be considered by 
you to prove the defendant's character, or that the defendant has a disposition to commit crimes. 
Rather, such evidence may be considered by you only for the limited purposes of proving the defendant's motive, 
opportunity, intent, plan, or absence of mistake or accident. 
The district court reiterated this instruction again at the conclusion of the trial. We conclude that the district court made a 
reasonable determination within the applicable legal standards. 
Parmer argues why he believes the probative value of the evidence is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair 
prejudice. However, he fails to explain how the district court's decision to remedy the danger through a curative instruction 
was inadequate. In his reply brief, Parmer asserts "a curative instruction to the jury can only go so far to avoid prejudicing 
the defendant when there are so many 404(b) witnesses." No argument is made as to why the instruction fails other than the 
number of Rule 404(b) witnesses made it impossible for the jury to follow the court's instruction. However, we presume that 
the jury followed the district court's instructions. See State v. Kilby, 130 Idaho 747,751,947 P.2d 420, 424 (Ct.App.1997); 
St ate v. Hudwn, 129 Idaho 478, 481, 927 P.2d 451, 454 (Ct.App.1996). Therefore, the district court did not abuse its 
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• discretion when it found that any prejudice could be cured by a limiting instruction to the jury and that the probative value of 
the evidence was not substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. 
4. Inadequate time to prepare for additional witnesses before retrial 
[161[ 171 Parmer alleges that the district court abused its discretion by refusing trial counsel's request for additional time to 
prepare for the two 404(b) witnesses added prior to the retrial. Specifically, Parmer argues that "denial of the motion to 
vacate significantly prejudiced the defense's ability to investigate and prepare to meet the testimony of [the additional 
witnesses] and amounted to an abuse of discretion." That is the extent of Parmer's argument and authority on this issue. The 
state filed the second notice of intent to use Rule 404(b) evidence on July 28, the hearing was held on August 2, and trial was 
set to begin on August 22. Other than the conclusory statement quoted above, no argument is made or authority presented 
supporting the proposition that nearly a month oftime was inadequate for defense counsel to prepare for the testimony of two 
additional witnesses. A party waives an issue on appeal if either authority or argument is lacking. State v. Zichko. 129 Idaho 
259,263, 923 P.2d 966, 970 (1996). Accordingly, we do not further address this issue. 
5. Testimony of witness at retrial after attending first trial 
L.Lru Parmer alleges that the district court abused its discretion by allowing one of the two additional Rule 404(b) witnesses 
to testity at the retrial after that witness had attended portions of the first trial. Specifically, Parmer contends that this was a 
violation of the district court's exclusionary order entered before the first trial and prohibiting all prospective witnesses from 
being present *223 **199 in the courtroom or otherwise receiving any information pertaining to the testimony of other 
witnesses. Additionally, Parmer argues that this should have been a heavily-weighted factor in the district court's balancing 
of unfair prejudice and probative effect under Rule 403. 
The cases and authority cited in support of Parmer's argument refer to situations where a district court's sequestration or 
exclusionary order has actually been violated. However, the witness who is the source of Parmer's allegation of error was 
not included as a potential witness in the first trial. Therefore, the witness was not subject to the district court's exclusionary 
order and that order was not violated by the witness' presence at that proceeding. Parmer cites no authority for the argument 
that a witness who rightfully attends trial proceedings, which later result in a hung jury, is prohibited from testitying at a 
retrial. Additionally, Parmer cites no authority for his contention that the district court was required to consider the 
possibility of tainted testimony in its Rule 403 analysis. Furthermore, Parmer cites no authority for the proposition that he is 
relieved of his burden of demonstrating how the presence of this witness at the first trial resulted in tainted testimony because 
he brought the matter to the district court's attention prior to the retrial. A party waives an issue on appeal if either authority 
or argument is lacking. Zichko, 129 Idaho at 263,923 P.2d at 970. Accordingly, we do not further address this issue. 
B. Parmer's Statements During Police Interrogation 
JJ..2J. Parmer next argues that the district court abused its discretion by sustaining the state's hearsay objection to testimony 
concerning statements that he made during a police interrogation or the publishing of the recording to the jury. He alleges that 
the statements were necessary for the jury to understand other statements that he had made during a confrontation call with 
K.R. and to put them in context. Additionally, he argues that the confrontation call and the interrogation were close in time 
and similar in content. Therefore, he contends that, pursuant to I.R.E. 106, the statements made during the interrogation must 
be considered contemporaneously with the confrontation call recording which had been admitted into evidence. [FN21 
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• Furthermore, Parmer contends that the statements fall under the I.R.E. 801 (d)( I )(8) exclusion from the hearsay rule. [FN3] 
FN2. Idaho Rule of Evidence 106 provides: 
When a writing or recorded statement or part thereof is introduced by a party, an adverse party may require that 
party at that time to introduce any other part or any other writing or recorded statement which ought in fairness to be 
considered contemporaneously with it. 
FN3. Idaho Rule of Evidence 801 (d)( 1) provides that a statement is not hearsay if: 
The declarant testifies at the trial or hearing and is subject to cross-examination concerning the statement, and the 
statement is ... (8) consistent with declarant's testimony and is offered to rebut an express or implied charge against 
declarant of recent fabrication or improper influence or motive .... 
Parmer's arguments concerning the applicability of Rules 106 and 80ICd)(J)(8) are not properly preserved for appeal. At 
Parmer's first trial, defense counsel attempted to elicit testimony from the interrogating officer regarding Parmer's statements 
made during the interrogation. After the state objected on hearsay grounds, trial counsel responded that the statements should 
be allowed because they were Parmer's own statements or admissions. The district court sustained the hearsay objection 
because the Rules of Evidence provide that only admissions of a party-opponent are subject to the exception to the hearsay 
rule. After trial counsel attempted to elicit testimony regarding the interrogation by another method--a DVD recording of the 
interrogation--the state again objected on hearsay grounds and the district court held a bench conference outside of the 
presence of the jury. The district court sustained the state's hearsay objection and later gave its reason for sustaining the 
objection on the record: 
When counsel came forward, I asked for an explanation of a non-hearsay purpose, or an exception to the hearsay rule for 
which the evidence was attempting to be elicited as to the substance of the defendant's *224 **200 interview, or as 
foundational for the defendant's interview with law enforcement officers. 
Counsel was not able to identifY anything beyond that which was stated in terms of: It is a statement of the defendant. In a 
criminal trial, a defendant's statement may be offered by the State under Rule [80J](d)(2), but there is no corresponding 
right for a defendant to introduce his own statements. It was clearly offered for a hearsay purpose. 
At the hearing on the state's motion in limine prior to Parmer's retrial, the district court likewise ruled that evidence of 
Parmer's statements would not be admissible by the defense. Trial counsel for Parmer made no specific objection at that 
time. The only argument raised by trial counsel as to the admissibility of Parmer's statements during the police interrogation 
concerned Rule 801Cd)(2). The district court properly denied the admission of the statements on this basis. No other 
argument was made by trial counsel regarding Rules 106 or 80 I Cd)(1 ). Therefore, any argument that the statements were 
admissible under those rules has not been properly preserved, and we will not address it on appeal. See Roza;ewski. 130 
Idaho at 645,945 P.2d at 1391. 
[20] We may consider fundamental error in a criminal case, even though no objection was made at trial. fd. However, even 
were we to assume error, this does not rise to the level of fundamental error as Parmer testified at the trial and had an 
adequate opportunity to explain or put the confrontation call statements in proper context. 
III. 
CONCLUSION 
The district court did not abuse its discretion by allowing Rule 404(b) witnesses to testifY based only on the state's offer of 
proof to the court concerning the content of the proposed witnesses' testimony. Trial counsel failed to object to any variances 
between the Rule 404(b) witnesses' actual testimony and the state's offer of proof, and the district court was not required to 
sua sponte strike all or any part of the varying testimony. The testimonial variances do not rise to the level of fundamental 
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~ error. The testimony of the Rule 404(b) witnesses was relevant and the district court did not abuse its discretion in finding 
that the probative value was not substantially outweighed by the prejudicial effect. Parmer presents inadequate argument and 
authority to support his argument of inadequate time to prepare for additional Rule 404(b) witnesses prior to his retrial. 
Likewise, Parmer presents inadequate argument or authority to support his argument that the district court abused its 
discretion by allowing a witness to testity at the retrial who had been present at the first trial, when that witness rightfully 
attended portions of the first trial. 
The district court also did not abuse its discretion by denying the admissibility of Parmer's statements made during the police 
interrogation on hearsay grounds when trial counsel argued their admissibility as admissions of a party-opponent. Parmer's 
contention that admission of the statements was justified under other Rules of Evidence is not properly preserved for appeal 
and does not rise to the level of fundamental error. Because we have found no errors that were properly preserved for 
appellate review, the harmless error and cumulative error doctrines do not apply. Therefore, Parmer's judgment of 
conviction for lewd conduct with a minor child under sixteen is affirmed. 
Judge GRATTON, concurs. 
Judge GUTlERREZ, dissents. 
147 Idaho 210, 207 P.3d 186 
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JOHN T. BUJAK 
CANYON COUNTY PROSECUTING ATTORNEY 
Canyon County Courthouse 
1115 Albany& 
Caldwell, Idaho 83606-0668 
Telephone: (208) 454-7391 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON 
THE STATE OF IDAHO 
Plaintiff, 
VANCE WATKINS, 
Defendant. 
) 
) CASE NO. CR2008-26831 
) 
) RESPONSE TO DEFENDANT'S 
) MOTION TO DISMISS 
) 
) 
) 
---------------------------) 
COMES NOW, Erica M. Kallin, Deputy Prosecuting Attorney for Canyon County, State 
ofIdaho, and hereby submits the following Response to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss. 
The Defense attorney, through verbal communication with the State, indicated the 
grounds for the motion to dismiss the indictment is the testimony regarding when the crime 
occurred was not consistent with the time period the victim testified to at Grand Jury. Since the 
Motion to Dismiss is silent as to which part of the Indictment is being challenged, the State is 
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relying upon oral conversations with Defense counsel to file its Response to the Defendant's 
Motion to Dismiss. 
The Defendant is time barred from raising a motion to dismiss 
Idaho Criminal Rule 12(d) states: 
Motions pursuant to Rule 12(b) must be filed within twenty-eight 
(28) days after the entry of a plea of not guilty or seven (7) days 
before trial whichever is earlier ... The court in its discretion may 
shorten or enlarge the time provided herein, and for good cause 
shown, or for excusable neglect, may relieve a party of failure to 
comply with this rule. 
A motion to dismiss is a 12(b) motion. Idaho Criminal Rule 12 requires that a motion to 
dismiss be filed within twenty-eight days of the entry of a plea of not guilty, or seven days before 
trial, whichever is earlier. I.C.R. 12(b), I.C.R. 12(d). A party's failure to meet the deadline 
constitutes a waiver of the motion. I.C.R. 12(f). A court may relieve a party's failure to comply 
with the rule only if the party shows good cause or excusable neglect for the failure. I.C.R. 
12(d); See State v. Gleason, 130 Idaho 586 (Ct. App. 1997); see also State v. Dice, 126 Idaho 
595,597 (Ct. App. 1994). A court may not "arbitrarily enlarge or shorten the filing requirements 
of the rule"; to "permit a court to do so ~ithout the required exempting factors would emasculate 
the intent of the rule." State v. Alanis, 109 Idaho 884, 888 (Idaho 1985). If a party has failed to 
meet the deadline, a court may not hear a motion simply because it appears meritorious. State v. 
Dice, 126 Idaho 595, 597 (Idaho App. 1994). To do so would "eviscerate the purpose of the 
rule." Id. Consequently, if good cause or excusable neglect is not shown by the moving party, 
the court may not hear the motion. Id. 
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In this case, the Defendant entered a plea of not guilty on December 22, 2004. His case 
proceeded to Jury Trial on August 20,2005. Thus, the deadline for the Defendant to file a 
motion to dismiss was January 19,2005, twenty-eight days after the entry of his plea, because 
January 19, 2005 is earlier than seven days prior to the trial. The Defendant has filed a Motion 
to Dismiss the Indictment on May 21,2010. Even if the Defendant was allowed to file any and 
all motions again after remand (which is not consistent with case law), the Defendant was 
arraigned on February 4, 2010 and the time to file motions lapsed on March 4, 2010. Now the 
Defendant is trying to get another bite at the apple 2020 days (5 Yz years) after his first 
arraignment, and 106 days after his arraignment after remand. This is well beyond the time 
proscribed by the statute. Furthermore, a failure to object to defects in an indictment must be 
'l 
raised prior to trial. A failure to raise the issue constitutes a waiver of the issue. Noel v. State, 
113 Idaho 92, 741 P.2d 728 (Ct. App. 1987) 
The Court should thus deny the motion to dismiss for failure to comply with the Idaho 
Criminal Rules. 
Sufficient evidence was presented to the Grand JUry for purposes of probable cause. 
Even if the Court does not find the Motion to Dismiss is barred under ICR 12b, not only 
was there sufficient testimony presented to the Grand Jury but the law does not require as an 
essential element of the crime the State prove when the crime occurred. Idaho Code § 19-1414 
states that "the precise time at which the offense was committed need not be stated in the 
indictment; but it may be alleged to have been committed at any time before the finding thereof, 
except where the time is a material ingredient of the offense." In order for an indictment to be 
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sufficient, the State needs only to present evidence that the offense occurred before the 
indictment was found. I.e. § 19-1418. In State v. Jones, 140 Idaho 41,899 P.3d 881 (Idaho 
App. 2003), the Court addressed this very issue. The Court determined that time is not a material 
element of the crime of Lewd Conduct. 140 Idaho at 887. See also State v. Coleman 128 Idaho 
466, 915 P.2d 29 (Ct. App. 1996). Furthermore, corroboration of a child's testimony is not 
required for purposes of probable cause; rather the State must simply show substantial evidence 
on every material element of the offense charged. See Coleman 128 Idaho at 472 and ICR 
5. 1 (b). 
At Grand Jury, RW. testified. She was asked when the touching occurred. She did 
initially say it happened when she was four. She was then later questioned about other times 
when the touching occurred. RW. testified she was in first grade at the time she testified. The 
prosecutor inquired about touching that occurred since she started first grade. The prosecutor 
asked, "Has it happened since you were in first grade?"(page 9 line 15.) RW. did not make an 
audible response. "You're nodding your head yes? Say yes or no." RW. responded, "Yes." As 
such, it can be implied that school year: starting in August or September, would have been 
during October-December 2004, the time period alleged. RW. also testified as to genital-genital 
touching, genital-oral touching and genital-anal touching occurring at her home. Detective Peck 
testified as to the location of the house and that it is in Canyon County. Because corroboration 
ofR.W.'s statements regarding the touching is not required for purposes of probable cause, there 
was sufficient evidence to support the Indictment for both the essential and non-essential 
elements of the crime. 
STATE'S OBJECTION TO 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION 
IN LIMINE 
H:\Watkins Vance_Resp to DefMO to DM.doc 
4 
000097 
Furthermore, motions to challenge indictments which are tardily filed are liberally 
construed in favor of being valid. State v. Robran, 119 Idaho 285,805 P.2d 491 (Ct. App. 1991.) 
Because the motion to dismiss was filed so far beyond the ICR 12b timeline, the Court should 
construe the indictment as valid. Without any sufficient showing by the defense the indictment 
is not supported by probable cause, the Court should deny the Defendant's motion. 
CONCLUSION 
As such, the State requests the Court deny the Defendant's Motion to Dismiss the 
Indictment as time barred or in the alternative, that sufficient evidence was submitted to the 
Grand Jury on the issue of when the offense occurred. 
DATED This & day of May, 2010. 
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CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing Response To 
Defendant's Motion To Dismiss was served upon the attorney for the Defendant, the Canyon 
County Public Defender, by placing said instrument in their basket at the Clerk's Office on or 
about this ()[j day of May, 2010 
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Defendant was convicted in the District Court, Madison County, Brent Moss, J., on two counts of lewd conduct with minor, 
and he appealed. The Court of Appeals, ~ J., held that: (I) statute tolling limitations period while defendant was out of 
state applied even though defendant was not out of state at time of offense; (2) statute prohibiting commission of any lewd or 
lascivious act upon minor under 16 is not unconstitutionally vague; (3) information was sufficiently specific regarding time 
of alleged offenses; and (4) there was no requirement that victims' testimony be corroborated at preliminary hearing. 
Affirmed. 
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Alan G. Lance, Attorney General; Catherine O. Derden, Deputy Attorney General, Boise, for respondent. Catherine O. 
Derden argued. 
PERRY, Judge. 
In this appeal from his judgment of conviction of two counts of lewd conduct with a minor, Barry Ellis Coleman challenges 
the district court's denial of three separate motions to dismiss. For the reasons explained below, we affirm. 
I. 
PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
Coleman was charged with two counts of lewd conduct with a minor, I.C. § 18-6607, and one count of infamous crime 
against nature, I.e. § 18-6605. The information, which was filed in October 1993, alleged that Coleman had committed the 
crime of lewd conduct with a minor against one of his daughters between January I, 1977, and February 20, 1979 (Count I). 
As to another minor daughter, Coleman was alleged to have committed the crime of lewd conduct between August 8, 1975, 
and February 20, 1979 (Count II), and infamous crime against nature between June 5, 1976, and February 20, 1979 (Count 
JII). Each count of the information also recited circumstances allegedly toll ing the statute of I imitation and authorizing the 
1993 prosecution. 
Coleman, through his counsel, moved the district court for dismissal of the charges, claiming that the prosecution of the 
offenses against him was barred by the statute of limitation, I.C. § 19-402, and was not within the exceptions outlined in ~ 
§ 19-404. Coleman filed a second motion for dismissal wherein he asserted that the statutes criminalizing lewd conduct with 
a minor and infamous crime against nature, as they existed at the time of the alJeged offenses, were unconstitutionalJy vague, 
and that the information suffered from indefiniteness as to the dates when the offenses were committed. Coleman also sought 
dismissal based on the state's failure to present corroborating evidence at the preliminary hearing. All three of the dismissal 
motions were denied. 
Thereafter, Coleman entered a conditional plea of guilty to the two lewd conduct counts, and the infamous crime against 
nature charge was dismissed. As part of the plea agreement, Coleman reserved his right to appeal the denial of his motions to 
dismiss. A judgment of conviction on the two counts of lewd conduct was entered, and Coleman filed a timely appeal. 
11. 
ANALYSIS 
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I. ToIling of the Statute of Limitation 
ill On appeal, Coleman asserts that because the filing of the complaint in his case came more than thirteen years after the 
alleged crimes were committed, it fell outside **31 *469 of the five-year statute of limitation. FNI Coleman argues that his 
case is not governed by I.C. § 19-404, which authorizes a toll ing of the statute of I imitation period and which operates as a 
bar against prosecution unless the statute has been tolled. This issue of the applicability of I.e. § 19-404, therefore, raises 
questions of statutory construction, over which we exercise free review. Sun Valley Co. v. Citv o[Sun Valley. 109 Idaho 
424,428, 708 P.2d 147, 151 (1985); State v. Nelson, 119 Idaho 444, 446, 807 P.2d 1282, 1284 (Ct.App.1991 ). 
FN I. Idaho Code Section 19-402, entitled "Commencement of prosecutions for crimes against children and other 
felonies," states: 
A prosecution for any felony other than murder or any felony committed upon or against a minor child must be 
commenced by the filing of the complaint or the finding of an indictment within three (3) years after its 
commission. A prosecution for any felony committed upon or against a minor child must be commenced within 
five (5) years after the commission of the offense by the filing of the complaint or a finding of an indictment. 
[2][3][4] The task of the court in interpreting the meaning of language contained in a statute is to give effect to the 
legislature's intent and purpose. Sweitzer v. Dean, I 18 Idaho 568, 798 P.2d 27 (1990). It is incumbent upon the court to 
interpret the statute in a manner that will not nullifY it, and it is not to be presumed that the legislature performed an idle act 
of enacting a superfluous statute. ld In construing a statute, the court may examine the language used, the reasonableness of 
proposed interpretations and the policy behind the statute. Umphrey v. Sprinkel, 106 Idaho 700, 682 P.2d 1247 (1983); State 
v. Seamons. 126 Idaho 809, 892 P.2d 484 (CLApp. 1995). 
Ulldaho Code Section 19-404 reads as follows: 
If, when the offense is committed, the defendant is out of the state, the indictment may be found within the term herein 
limited after his coming within the state, and no time during which the defendant is not an inhabitant of, or usually resident 
within, the state is part of the limitation. 
Described as an exception to the limitation period governed by I.C. § 19-402, I.C. § 19-404 provides for tolling of the statute 
of limitation where the defendant is out of the state. See State v. Steens/and, 33 Idaho 529, 195 P. 1080 (1921). "The 
exception being for the benefit of the state, it is incumbent upon the state to show that it obtains." fd., at 533, 195 P. at 1081. 
The state must prove the commission of the offense within the statutory period, or the existence of conditions which preserve 
the right in the state to prosecute after the time limited by the statute of limitation. fel, at 534, 195 P. at 1082. 
Claiming that his alleged crime of lewd conduct with a minor was not committed while he was out of the state, Coleman 
advocates an interpretation of I.e. § 19-404 which would bar a prosecution against him. Coleman asserts that commission of 
the crime while he was out of the state, in col1iunction with a subsequent absence from the state, is required for the five-year 
statute of limitation to be tolled. Such a reading of I.C. § 19-404, however, would render a portion of the statute meaningless. 
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ill In construing a statute, the court has the express duty to give effect to all sections of the statute and not to deprive any 
statutory provisions of their meaning. See George W. Watkins Fami/}' v. lvlessenger. I 18 Idaho 537. 797 P.2d 1385 (1990). 
The Idaho Supreme Court, in Steens/and, recognized the two situations in I.e. § 19-404 which trigger a tolling of the 
limitation of time within which to bring a complaint as "cases where a defendant was absent from the state when the crime 
was committed and when the accused was absent or not usually resident within the state during a portion of the time." 
Steensland, 33 Idaho at 533. 195 P. at 1081. Furthermore, the courts in California have interpreted their identical statute FN2 
to hold that the exception tolling the limitation period "includes the case of the defendant leaving the State after the 
commission of the crime as [well as] the case of his absence at the time of its perpetration, and that it applies to all 
offenses." **32*470Peopte v. McGill, 10 Cal.App.2d 155, 51 P.2d 433, 434 (1935), quoting People v. Monteio, 18 Cal. 
38(1861). 
FN2. Cal.Penal Code § 802 (1872), recodified as § 803 (1981). 
Accordingly, we reject the application onc. § 19-404 in the manner suggested by Coleman. The complaint against Coleman 
alleges that he was in the state at the time he perpetrated the lewd conduct on his young daughters. The allegations also 
indicate that in 1979, Coleman and his family left the state of Idaho. Although by 1993 the five-year period commencing at 
the time of the alleged lewd conduct had passed, I.e. § 19-404 operated to extend the limitation period during the time 
Coleman was "not an inhabitant of, or usually resident within, this state." We conclude, therefore, that the application of.u:;" 
§ 19-404, under the facts of Coleman's case, brought the state's prosecution of Coleman for the lewd conduct charges within 
the parameters of the statute oflimitation set forth in I.e. § 19-402. 
2. Void for Vagueness Challenge 
III Coleman asserts that the substantive criminal statutes under which he was charged were unconstitutionally vague. He 
argues that Idaho Code Section 18-6607, which prohibits the commission of any lewd or lascivious act upon a minor under 
sixteen, is not sufficiently definite, or understandable by the average person, to provide reasonable notice of the conduct 
being proscribed. Making the same argument with respect to I.C. § 18-6605 forbidding infamous crimes against nature, 
Coleman insists that both statutes leave the general public to guess at their meaning and to speculate as to the conduct which 
the statutes seek to punish. 
00 The doctrine of void for vagueness is derived from the due process clause and prohibits holding a person "criminally 
responsible for conduct which he could not reasonably understand to be proscribed." State v. Lopez. 98 Idaho 58 I. 590. 570 
P.2d 259. 268 (1976), quoting United Stqtes v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612. 74 S.Ct. 808,98 L.Ed.989 (1954). Due process is 
violated when a statute which either forbids or requires the doing of an act is written in terms so vague that people of 
common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application. ld, citing Connallv v. General 
Cons/I'. Co .. 269 U.S. 385.46 S.Ct. 126, 70 L.Ed. 322 (1926). 
In 1952, the Idaho Supreme Court held: 
Lewd and lascivious are words in common use and the definitions indicate with reasonable certainty the kind and 
character of acts and conduct which the legislature intended to prohibit and punish, so that a person of ordinary 
understanding may know what conduct on his part is condemned .... [Therefore,] the certainty required by due process is 
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present. 
State v. Evans. 73 Idaho 50,57,245 P.2d 788, 791-92 (1952). After Evans, the Court concluded that the statute was 
sufficiently certain to convey to a person of ordinary understanding an adequate description of the evil intended to be 
proscribed, State v. Harmon. 107 Idaho 73, 78. 685 P.2d 814, 819 (1984); State v. Shannon. 95 Idaho 299.302.507 P.2d 
808. 81 I (1973 ), and was not unconstitutionally vague. State v. SchwartzmWer. 107 Idaho 89. 94, 685 P.2d 830. 835 
(1984 ). We therefore find Coleman's challenge to the constitutional validity ofl.e. § 18-6607 to be unavai ling. 
L2l We also conclude that this appeal with respect to Count III of the information, charging Coleman with infamous crime 
against nature, is not predicated upon either a final order or a judgment of conviction. See State v. Garner. 103 Idaho 468, 
471, 649 P.2d 1224, 1227 (Ct.App.1982). The charge in Court III, which was based upon a violation one. § 18-6605, was 
dismissed as part of the plea arrangement. Accordingly, we decline to review Coleman's challenge to the constitutionality of 
I.C. § 18-6605. 
3. Sufficiency of the Information 
.liQ1 Coleman argues that the information was not sufficiently specific because the offenses charged as Counts I and II 
purportedly took place within a twenty-five-month period and a forty-two-month period, respectively. Further, Coleman 
asserts that his ability to mount a defense was impaired by the delayed filing of the information which resulted from the 
disclosure of these criminal acts only after the victims had become adults. He claims, because the information **33 *471 
was so flawed, that his motion to dismiss should have been granted on this ground. 
[ I J][ 121 Sufficiency of an information ultimately depends on whether it fulfills the basic functions of the pleading instrument. 
S/ate v. Robran. 119 Idaho 285. 805 P.2d 491 (Ct.App.1991 ). Because time is not a material element of the offense oflewd 
and lascivious conduct with a minor, the offense may be alleged to have been committed at any time before the filing of the 
information. State v. Roberts. 101 Idaho 199,200, 610 P.2d 558, 559 (J980). See also I.C. § 19-1414; I.C.R. 7. 
Specifically, in child sexual abuse cases involving evidence of a number of secretive offenses over a period of time, detailed 
specificity in the information as to the times of the offenses is not required. State v. Tavlor. I 18 Idaho 450, 797 P.2d 158 
( Ct.App.1990). 
Il1.l It is generally agreed that the issue is not whether the alleged offense could be described with more certainty, but 
whether there is "sufficient particularity" to enable the accused to "prepare a proper defense." W.R. LAFAVE and J.H. 
ISRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 19.2 (1991), citing State v. Gumm. 99 Idaho 549, 585 P.2d 959 (1978). An 
information need only be specific enough to enable a defendant to prepare a defense and to protect him or her from being 
subsequently prosecuted for the same offense. Roberts. 101 Idaho at 200, 610 P.2d at 559; State v. Banks. I 13 Idaho 54, 740 
P.2d 1039 (Ct.App.1987). The test with regard to latter concern is whether the record shows with accuracy to what extent a 
defendant may plead a former acquittal or conviction. Gumm. 99 Idaho at 555. 585 P.2d at 965. citing State v. O'Neil. 24 
Idaho 582.592. 135 P. 60. 63 (1913). 
As noted above, the charge of lewd conduct with a minor does not contain time as a material element. Roberts. 101 Idaho at 
200,610 P.2d at 559. The information in this case clearly apprised Coleman of the statute he had alJegedly violated and that 
he was charged with lewd and lascivious act or acts with each of his two daughters, between 1976 and 1979, at which time 
his daughters were minors. The information contained every element of the offense charged. Accordingly, the allegations are 
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such that Coleman cannot be charged with the same acts committed during the same time period at issue. Moreover, Coleman 
never suggested any defense of alibi or asserted any prejudice occasioned by the information as drafted. We conclude, 
therefore, that the information was sufficiently specific as to time and protects Coleman's plea of former jeopardy in any 
future prosecution for lewd conduct with his daughters. 
4. Corroboration 
[HJ Finally, Coleman asserts that his motion to dismiss should have been granted by the district court in that neither the 
information nor the state's case at the preliminary hearing included any corroboration evidence of the complaining 
witnesses' testimony, as was required in sex crime cases at the time Coleman committed these offenses. Coleman claims 
there was no other evidence or testimony corroborating the allegations made by his two daughters. Therefore, he argues that 
the charges against him should have been dismissed in response to his pre-trial motion. 
The district court, however, concluded that the corroboration requirement in lewd conduct cases dealt with the level of 
evidence necessary to support a jury verdict and was inapplicable to pre-trial proceedings. In its order, the district court 
denied the motion as being premature. The district court also held that there existed corroborating evidence available for 
presentation by the state at trial. 
The Idaho Supreme Court acknowledged in 1924: 
[M]ost courts have laid down the rule that in the trial o/prosecutions under this statute a person may be convicted of rape 
upon the testimony of the prosecutrix where there is no direct evidence corroborating her testimony only when her 
reputation for truth and chastity are unimpeached and the circumstances surrounding the commission of the offense are 
clearly corroborative of her statements. 
State v. Bowker, 40 Idaho 74, 78,231 P. 706, 707 (1924) (emphasis added). Coleman's reliance on Bowker, however, does 
not support **34 *472 his contention that corroboration is required at the pre-trial stages of the proceedings. The state's 
reliance on State v. Bvers, 102 Idaho 159, 627 P.2d 788 (1981), which abolished the corroboration requirement 
prospectively to all criminal trials commenced thereafter, is also unavailing in its failure to address the issue of 
corroboration at a preliminary hearing. 
[151(161 Whether there is sufficient corroboration is a question for the jury. Slate v. Adair. 99 Idaho 703,707,587 P.2d 
1238, 1242 (I978), overruled on other grounds by Slate v. Bvers. 102 Idaho 159, 627 P.2d 788 (1981 ). The required 
corroboration need only tend to support the victim's testimony that the offense was committed and make it appear probable 
that the accused was the perpetrator. td. at 707, 587 P.2d at 1242, citing State v. Elsen. 68 Idaho 50, 55, 187 P.2d 976, 978 
( 1947), 
ll1l A finding of probable cause, which is to be initially determined at a preliminary hearing, shall be based upon 
substantial evidence upon every material element of the offense charged. I.C.R. 5.lfb). The state, at a preliminary 
examination, is not required to show the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt; it need only prove that a crime was 
committed and that there is probable cause to believe the accused committed it. State v. Greensweig, [02 Idaho 794, 64 [ 
P.2d 340 CCt.App. [982). The long-held justifications for the corroboration requirement in sex crime cases emphasized 
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protection against unjust convictions. See generally Bvers. 102 Idaho 159. 627 P.2d 788. We have uncovered no case law 
mandating corroborative evidence at the preliminary hearing stage of a prosecution, where the burden of proof is probable 
cause, not a reasonable doubt standard. Had Coleman's plea of guilty not forestalled a trial, the state's potentially 
corroborative evidence would have been tested as it was presented to the jury. We uphold the district court's denial of 
Coleman's motion to dismiss on corroboration grounds. 
m. 
CONCLUSION 
Coleman does not prevail in seeking to overturn the district court's denial of his motions to dismiss. We conclude that the 
statute of limitation was tolled during the time Coleman was living outside of Idaho after committing the alleged crimes in 
Idaho. Idaho Code Section 19-404, therefore, as applied in Coleman's case, did not operate to bar the 1993 prosecution for 
crimes committed between 1976 and 1979. We are bound by Idaho precedent holding that the statute defining lewd and 
lascivious conduct is not unconstitutionaily vague. We conclude that the charging information was not flawed in specitying 
the time of occurrence of the crimes. We also conclude that there exists no requirement of corroboration at preliminary 
hearings. 
The judgment of conviction is affirmed. 
WALTERS, C.]., and LANSING, 1., concur. 
Idaho App.,1996. 
State v. Coleman 
128 Idaho 466, 915 P.2d 28 
END OF DOCUMENT 
© 2010 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works. 
000111 
If21 
http://web2.w 
Westlaw Delivery Summary Report for KALLIN,ERICA 
Date/Time of Request: 
Client Identifier: 
Database: 
Citation Text: 
Lines: 
Documents: 
Images: 
Monday, May 24,2010 13:21 Central 
ERlCAKALLIN 
fD-CS 
89 P.3d 881 
842 
o 
i nt/printstream.aspx?s v==Spl i t&pr ft=H ... 
The material accompanying this summary is subject to copyright. Usage is governed by contract with Thomson Reuters, West 
and their affiliates. 
Westlaw. 
89 P.3d 881 
140 Idaho 41,89 P.3d 881 
(Cite as: 140 Idaho 41, 89 P.3d 881) 
H 
Court of Appeals ofldaho. 
STATE ofIdaho, Plaintiff-Respondent, 
v. 
Bobby Dean JONES, Defendant-Appellant. 
No. 28715. 
Oct. 8, 2003. 
Rehearing Denied Dec. I, 2003. 
Review Denied May 12, 2004. 
Defendant was convicted in the District Cow1 of the Fifth Judicial District, Gooding County, R. Barry Wood, J., of lewd 
conduct with minor child under 16, and he appealed. The Cow1 of Appeals, Lansing, C.J., held that: (I) in charging two 
counts oflewd conduct with minor using identical language, State was not charging defendant twice for one single act or for 
continuous course of conduct, but, instead, State was charging defendant for two separate and distinct acts that occurred in 
same manner and during same span of time, and because these events were distinguishable as distinct crimes, each incident 
was properly charged as independent offense; (2) as matter of apparent first impression, State's notice to defendant of its 
intent to offer evidence of other crimes was sufficient to alert the defense to the general nature ofthe additional testimony and 
to thereby avoid surprise; and (3) pattern credibility instructions in the Idaho Civil Jury Instructions (IDJI) and Idaho 
Criminal Jury Instructions (IeJI) did not violate equal protection. 
Affirmed. 
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21 Ok71.4( 12) k. Rape and Other Sex Offenses; Offenses Relating to Minors. Most Cited Cases 
Although general, allegations of the information charging lewd conduct with a child were sufficient, and since preliminary 
hearing eliminated any uncertainty and gave defendant notice of details of charges against him, defendant suffered no 
prejudice from manner in which information pleaded the charges; defendant was fully apprised of the acts he was charged 
with committing at the prel iminary hearing, and during that hearing, the State presented victims' testimony about the 
surrounding circumstances and manner in which offenses were alleged to have been committed. I.C. § 19-1409; Criminal 
Rule 7(b). 
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Information which alleged that offenses of lewd conduct with minor occurred between the spring of one year and the spring 
of the following year, during the fall of that year, and during a 7 year period was proper; time was not material element of 
crime oflewd conduct with minor, victim was between eight and ten years old and it was unrealistic to expect her to be able 
to recall dates specifically given her age and time span over which acts were alleged to have occurred, defendant did not 
show that lack of greater specificity in dates inhibited his ability to defend against charges, and victim's testimony narrowed 
time frame and prevented any prejudice to defendant from lack of specificity in pleading. I.C. §§ 19- 1409, 19- 14 14; Criminal 
Rule 7. 
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Sufficiency of the information depends upon whether it fulfills the basic functions of a pleading instrument by informing the 
defendant of the charges against which he must defend and enabling him to plead an acquittal or conviction in order to avoid 
reprosecution for the same offense. 
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Although an information must contain the essential facts, the State is not required to disclose in the information the evidence 
which it relies upon to prove its case . 
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I 10k I 167( I) k Indictment or Information in General. Most Cited Cases 
Defendant generally cannot be prejudiced by the absence of specific details in the information when those details are either 
already known to the defendant or are provided to him by means other than the information, such as through preliminary 
hearing testimony. 
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Although the alleged incident that constitutes an offense should be set forth with as much specificity as possible, the charges 
may be pleaded generally when the record shows that the State could not plead with any more specificity. 
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21 OV Requisites and Sufficiency of Accusation 
210k71 Certainty and Particularity 
21 Ok7 I .1 k. In General. Most Cited Cases 
Vagueness in the allegations of an information may be cured through preliminary hearing testimony that informs the defendant 
of the details of the State's allegations . 
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The test in determining whether an information is sufficient to protect a defendant from reprosecution is whether the record 
shows with accuracy to what extent a defendant may plead a former acquittal or conviction. 
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21 Ok71.4( 12) k. Rape and Other Sex Offenses; Offenses Relating to Minors. Most Cited Cases 
Defendant did not show that the general nature of the information's allegations left him exposed to reprosecution for alleged 
crimes involving lewd conduct with a minor; transcripts of defendant's preliminary hearing and trial identified the acts that 
were the basis for the charges, and if a second prosecution were ever attempted, defendant could rely upon the record to 
establish that he had already been convicted or acquitted of the crimes. 
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In charging two counts of lewd conduct with minor using identical language, State was not charging defendant twice for one 
single act or for continuous course of conduct, but, instead, State was charging defendant for two separate and distinct acts 
that occurred in same manner and during same span of time, and because these events were distinguishable as distinct crimes, 
each incident was properly charged as independent offense; victim testified to two incidents of manual-genital touching that 
occurred within that time period, victim said that first incident occurred when she was staying overnight at defendant's 
trailer, and victim then described another incident that occurred on another trip to defendant's trailer. 
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The danger ofmultiplicitous charging is that a defendant could be subjected to mUltiple punishments for a single offense . 
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II Ok29(5) Particular Offenses 
I I 0k29( 12) k. Sex Offenses; Obscenity. Most Cited Cases 
Although a series of sexual contacts which occur as part of a single incident constitute only one count of lewd conduct with a 
minor chi Id, a number of sexual acts occurring on separate occasions constitute multiple offenses. I.e. § 18-1508. 
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210kI25(4. J) k. In General. Most Cited Cases 
Count of information charging that defendant engaged in lewd conduct with a minor between 1993 and August 2000 did not 
charge defendant with more than one offense and therefore count was not duplicitous; rather, the count referred to the 
commission of one single act, and while it was true that the evidence presented at trial described multiple such offenses 
occurring within the alleged time frame, this did not create a duplicitous charge .. 
@ Indictment and Information 210 ~125(1) 
£lQ Indictment and Information 
210VI Joinder 
2 10k 125 Duplicity 
21 Ok 125( I) k. In General. Most Cited Cases 
Duplicity refers to the charging of more than one offense in a single count of the charging document. 
J.l.2J.lndictment and Information 210 €==>125(1) 
2 ] 0 Indi ctment and Information 
21 OVI Joinder 
210k125 Duplicity 
21 Ok125( I) k. In General. Most Cited Cases 
A duplicitous charge can prejudice the defendant in the shaping of evidentiary rulings, in producing a conviction on less than 
a unanimous verdict as to each separate offense, in sentencing, in limiting review on appeal, and in exposing the defendant to 
double jeopardy. 
/201 Indictment and Information 210 ~125(4.1) 
2 I 0 Indictment and Information 
210VI Joinder 
21Okl25 Duplicity 
21 OkI25(4) Series of Acts Constituting One or Same Offense 
21 Ok 125( 4.1) k. In General. Most Cited Cases 
One instance of duplicity occurs when the prosecution fails to recognize that each repetition of an act constitutes a separate 
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olfense and therefore includes a series of acts in one count. 
illl Criminal Law 110 C=:>1l67(1) 
ill Criminal Law 
II OXXIV Review 
IIOXXIV(Q) Harmless and Reversible Error 
IIOkl167 Rulings as to Indictment or Pleas 
http://web2. wes 
II Ok1167( I) k. Indictment or Information in General. Most Cited Cases 
Criminal Law 110 ~1l72.6 
ill Criminal Law 
II OXXlV Review 
IIOXXlV(Q) Harmless and Reversible Error 
II Ok 1172 Instructions 
II Okll72.6 k. Inapplicable to Issue or Evidence. Most Cited Cases 
nt/pri ntstream.aspx?sv=Sp I it&prft=H ... 
A variance between the information and the evidence presented at trial or between the information and the jury instructions 
requires reversal of the conviction only when the defendant was deprived of fair notice of the charge against which he must 
defend or was left open to the risk of double jeopardy. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 5. 
1llJ. Criminal Law 110 ~814(1) 
ill Criminal Law 
IIOXX Trial 
IIOXX(G) Instructions: Necessity, Requisites, and Sufficiency 
II Ok814 Application of Instructions to Case 
II Ok8 14( I ) k. In General. Most Cited Cases 
Indictment and Information 210 ~171 
210 Indictment and Information 
210XIl Issues, Proof, and Variance 
21 Okl70 Variance Between Allegations and Proof 
210kl71 k. In General. Most Cited Cases 
Not all variances between the information and the evidence presented at trial or between the information and the jury 
instructions are fatal; there is a marked distinction between a mere variance and a variance which is automatically fatal 
because it amounts to an impermissible constructive amendment. 
1231 Criminal Law 110 C;:::::>1167(1) 
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ill Criminal Law 
1 1 OXXIV Review 
I 10XXIV(Q) Harmless and Reversible Error 
I I Okl167 Rulings as to Indictment or Pleas 
http://web2.westl 
I 10k 1167( I) k. Indictment or Information in General. Most Cited Cases 
Indictment and Information 210 €;:;::>161 (5) 
210 Indictment and Information 
21 OX} Amendment 
2 10k 161 Information 
21 Okl61 (5) k. Accusation in General. Most Cited Cases 
mir,rIT,tinrl ntstream.aspx?sv=Spl it&pr ft= H ... 
Law bars any amendment of the information that would charge the accused with a crime of a greater degree or a different 
nature than that for which the defendant was bound over by the magistrate, and accordingly, where a variance alters the 
information to the extent that the defendant is tried for a crime of a greater degree or a different nature, relief will be 
warranted. I.C. § 19-1420. 
Uillndictment and Information 210 €;:;::>176 
210 Indictment and Information 
2 lOX II Issues, Proof, and Variance 
21 Ok 170 Variance Between Allegations and Proof 
2 I Ok 176 k. Time of Offense. Most Cited Cases 
In prosecution of defendant for lewd conduct with minor, fact that victim testified at the preliminary hearing that the two 
events occurred approximately two weeks apart, but did not refer to that same time frame in testimony at trial was not a fatal 
variance between the allegations of the information and the trial evidence; there was no inconsistency in victim's testimony, 
victim was not required to testifY at trial as to the time lapse between the two incidents, and defendant was not subjected to a 
possible conviction ofa different crime or a crime ofa different nature than that alleged in the information. 
1251 Criminal Law 110 ~374 
ll.Q Criminal Law 
II0XVn Evidence 
II0XVIl(F) Other Offenses 
II 0k374 k. Proof and Effect of Other Offenses. Most Cited Cases 
Infants 211 ~20 
£ll Infants 
111 II Protection 
211k20 k. Criminal Prosecutions Under Laws for Protection of Children. Most Cited Cases 
There was no fatal variance between allegations of the information, charging defendant with lewd conduct with minor, and 
the trial evidence when State presented evidence of two incidents of improper touching of victim that were not the bases of 
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the charges and were not described at preliminary hearing; this testimony was admitted as evidence of other misconduct, and 
after presentation of this evi dence, trial court gave limiting instruction, informing jury that they had just heard evidence that 
defendant committed wrongs other than those for which he was on trial and that this evidence was presented only for limited 
purpose of proving motive or opportunity. Rules of Evid., Rule 404(b). 
llil Criminal Law 110 ~814(7) 
llQ Criminal Law 
IIOXX Trial 
IIOXX(G) Instructions: Necessity, Requisites, and Sufficiency 
IIOk814 Application oflnstructions to Case 
II Ok814(7) k. Time and Place of Offense. Most Cited Cases 
There was no fatal variance between the allegations of the information and the jury instructions because the court added "on 
or about" to the time frame of the offenses alleged in the information, charging defendant with lewd conduct with minor; this 
slight expansion of the time frame did not allow the jury to find defendant guilty of a different offense than that alleged in the 
information. 
1111 Criminal Law 110 ~374 
l.J.Q. Criminal Law 
I I OX VII Evidence 
I 10XVI[(F) Other Offenses 
II Ok374 k. Proof and Effect of Other Offenses. Most Cited Cases 
State's notice to defendant of its intent to offer evidence of other crimes was sufficient to alert the defense to the general 
nature of the additional testimony and to thereby avoid surprise; witnesses were identified in the notice, general type of 
conduct alleged to have been committed was revealed in notice, and this information was sufficient to allow the 
admissibility issue to be raised by defendant, no greater specificity was required, and defendant did not show that more 
specific information would have aided in his defense. Rules of Evid., Rule 404(b). 
1281 Constitutional Law 92 ~3806 
92 Constitutional Law 
92XXVI Equal Protection 
92XXVI(F) Criminal Law 
92k3802 Trial 
92k3806 k. Instructions. Most Cited Cases 
(Formerly 92k250.2(5» 
Criminal Law 110 ~785(3) 
ill Criminal Law 
Il0XX Trial 
IIOXX(G) Instructions: Necessity, Requisites, and Sufficiency 
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110k785 Credibility of Witnesses 
I I Ok785(3) k. Sufficiency in General. Most Cited Cases 
Pattern credibility instructions in the Idaho Civil Jury Instructions (LOJI) and Idaho Criminal Jury Instructions (lCJI) did not 
violate equal protection; although the IDJI credibility instruction was longer and more detailed than the IC]I instruction, in 
substance the two were alike, and defendant did not demonstrate that there was such a substantive difference between the two 
instructions that criminal defendants were disadvantaged, and as a result, defendant showed no disparate treatment of 
criminal defendants. U.S. CA. Const.Amend. 14; Const. Art. I, § 2. 
1l2J. Constitutional Law 92 {:;:;:;;:>3041 
92 Constitutional Law 
92XXVI Equal Protection 
92XXVI(A) In General 
92XXV/(A)5 Scope of Doctrine in General 
92k3038 Discrimination and Classification 
92k3041 k. Similarly Situated Persons; Like Circumstances. Most Cited Cases 
(Formerly 92k2II(I» 
The principle underlying equal protection is that all persons in like circumstances should receive the same benefits and 
burdens of the law. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 14; Const. Art. I. § 2. 
UQJ. Constitutional Law 92 {:;:;:;;:>3041 
92 Constitutional Law 
92XXVI Equal Protection 
92XXVI(A) In General 
92XXVJ(A)5 Scope of Doctrine in General 
92k3038 Discrimination and Classification 
92k3041 k. Similarly Situated Persons; Like Circumstances. Most Cited Cases 
(Formerly 92k211 (I» 
No equal protection analysis is required and no violation of equal protection will be found in situations where the State has 
not engaged in the disparate treatment of similarly situated individuals. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 14; Const. Art. I, § 2. 
Lllllnfants 211 {:;:;:;;:>20 
211 Infants 
211 Il Protection 
211 k20 k. Criminal Prosecutions Under Laws for Protection of Children. Most Cited Cases 
Charge of lewd conduct with minor was supported by sufficient evidence as to the material elements of the crime, and thus, 
defendant was not entitled to judgment of acquittal; the only allegation that defendant claimed the State failed to prove 
beyond a reasonable doubt was the time at which the offense occurred, but time was not a material element to the crime of 
lewd and lascivious conduct with a minor, slight variance between the charge and the evidence as to speci fic date of offense 
was not material, and defendant did not show that lack of notice of specific date prejudiced his defense. 
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ill Criminal Law 
110XX Trial 
1 IOXX(F) Province of Court and Jury in General 
I IOk753 Direction of Verdict 
II Ok753.2 Of Acquittal 
IIOk753.2(3) Insufficiency of Evidence 
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II Ok753.2(5) k. Sufficiency to Warrant Conviction or to Present Jury Question. Most Cited Cases 
A motion for a judgment of acquittal must be granted if there is insufficient evidence to sustain a conviction on the challenged 
offense. Criminal Rule 29. 
UJl Criminal Law 1 10 ~1l34.70 
llQ Criminal Law 
II OXXIV Review 
I IOXXIWL) Scope of Review in General 
II OXXIWL)7 Nature of Decision Appealed from as Affecting Scope of Review 
II Okl134.70 k. In General. Most Cited Cases 
(Formerly 1 IOkI134(8» 
Upon review of the denial of motion for judgment of acquittal, appellate court independently reviews the evidence in the 
record to determine if reasonable minds could conclude that the defendant's guilt on each material element was proven 
beyond a reasonable doubt. 
1341 Infants 211 ~20 
211 Infants 
211 II Protection 
lli.k2.Q k. Criminal Prosecutions Under Laws for Protection of Children. Most Cited Cases 
Sentencing and Punishment 350H ~102 
350H Sentencing and Punisiunent 
350HI Punishment in General 
350HI(E) Factors Related to Offender 
350Hk93 Other Offenses, Charges, Misconduct 
350HkJ02 k. Lack of Significant Prior Record. Most Cited Cases 
Sentencing and Punishment 350H (;:;:;:>116 
350H Sentencing and Punishment 
350HI Punishment in General 
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350HUE) Factors Related to Offender 
350Hkl16 k. Dangerousness. Most Cited Cases 
Sentence oflife imprisonment, with five years determinate, for lewd conduct with a minor under 16 was proper; although this 
was defendant's first felony conviction, there was evidence that the abuse of victims occurred over a number of years, and 
according to a psychosexual evaluation, defendant presented a high risk of reoffending . 
.l.J.2l Criminal Law 110 C=:>1l56.2 
ill Criminal Law 
II OXXIV Review 
IIOXXIV{N) Discretion of Lower Court 
I 10k 1156. I Sentencing 
II Ok1156.2 k. In General. Most Cited Cases 
(Formerly I I Okl14 7) 
When a sentence is imposed within the maximum permitted for the offense, appellate court reviews the sentence for an abuse 
of discretion. 
lJ§l Criminal Law 110 C=:>1141(2) 
lJ..Q Criminal Law 
I 1 OXXIV Review 
1 IOXXIV(M) Presumptions 
1 1 Ok 1 141 In General 
1 lOki 141 (2) k. Burden of Showing Error. Most Cited Cases 
If the sentence is not illegal, the appellant has the burden to show that it is unreasonable, and thus a clear abuse of discretion. 
1371 Sentencing and Punishment 350H C=:>31 
3 SOH Sentencing and Punishment 
350HI Punishment in General 
350HI(B) Extent of Punishment in General 
350Hk31 k. Discretion of Court. Most Cited Cases 
A sentence may represent an abuse of discretion if it is shown to be unreasonable upon the facts of the case. 
(381 Sentencing and Punishment 350H C=:>40 
3 SOH Sentencing and Punishment 
350HI Punishment in General 
350HI(C) Factors or Purposes in General 
350Hk40 k. In General. Most Cited Cases 
A sentence of confinement is reasonable if it appears that the confinement is necessary to accomplish the primary objective 
of protecting society and to achieve any or all of the related goals of deterrence, rehabilitation or retribution applicable to a 
given case. 
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**885 *45 Michael J. Wood, Twin Falls, for appellant. 
Han. Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney General; Lori A. Fleming. Deputy Attorney General, Boise, for respondent. Lori A. 
Fleming argued. 
LANSING, Chief Judge. 
Bobby Dean Jones appeals from the judgment of conviction entered after he was found guilty by a jury of lewd conduct with 
a minor child under sixteen. On appeal, Jones contends that the information filed by the State was defective in several 
respects, that there was a fatal variance between the information**886 *46 and the evidence, and that the prosecutor gave 
insufficient notice of intent to offer evidence of uncharged incidents of inappropriate touching. Jones also asserts that the 
district court erred by using a pattern criminal jury instruction on credibility rather than Jones's proposed instruction, by 
denying Jones's motion for ajudgment of acquittal, and by imposing an excessive sentence. 
I. 
BACKGROUND 
Jones was charged with five counts oflewd conduct with a minor child under sixteen, Idaho Code § 18-1508, for acts he was 
alleged to have committed with two of his granddaughters. Before trial, Jones moved to dismiss the charges, arguing that the 
information failed to alleged sufficient facts to meet the due process requirement of adequate notice and protection against 
double jeopardy, that counts one and two were duplicitous because they charged identical and indistinguishable crimes, and 
that count five was unconstitutional because it charged defendant with multiple criminal acts in one count rather than a single 
criminal act. The district court denied the motion. 
After a trial, a jury found Jones guilty on four of the five counts. The court sentenced Jones to concurrent unified terms of life 
imprisonment, with five years determinate. Jones now appeals. 
II. 
ANALYSIS 
A. Sufficiency of the Information 
L.ll.Ul Jones argues, as he did in his pretrial motion, that the information was insufficient to apprise him of the nature of the 
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charges against him and to protect him from a second prosecution for the same crimes. More specifically, he argues that the 
information identified no particular time, no location, no information on the presence of other witnesses, or any other 
information which might have aided him in identitying the particular incidents for which he was charged. 
Wl±l The sufficiency of an information is a question of law over which we exercise free review. Stale I'. Holcomb, 128 
Idaho 296, 300, 912 P.2d 664, 668 (Ct.App.1995); Stale v. Robran. 119 Idaho 285, 287, 805 P.2d 491. 493 (Ct.App.1991). 
An information is legally sufficient if it contains "a plain, concise and definite written statement of the essential facts 
constituting the offense charged." Idaho Criminal Rule 7(b). See also I.C. § 19-1409; State v. Owen, 129 Idaho 920, 926, 
935 P.2d 183, 189 (Ct.ApD.1997). Ultimately, the sufficiency of the information depends upon whether it fulfills the basic 
functions of a pleading instrument by informing the defendant of the charges against which he must defend and enabling him to 
plead an acquittal or conviction in order to avoid reprosecution for the same offense. State v, Coleman. 128 Idaho 466,471, 
915 P.2d 28,33 (Ct.App.1996); Holcomb. 128 Idaho at 300,912 P.2d at 668. 
liJ.[QJ We first address Jones's argument concerning the lack of specific details in the information regarding how the criminal 
acts were alleged to have been committed. Although an information must contain the essential facts, the State is not required 
to disclose in the information the evidence which it relies upon to prove its case. State v. McKeehan, 91 Idaho 808, 815,430 
P.2d 886, 893 (1967). In addition, a defendant generally cannot be prejudiced by the absence of specific details in the 
information when those details are either already known to the defendant or are provided to him by means other than the 
information, such as through preliminary hearing testimony. Owen. 129 Idaho at 927,935 P.2d at 190. See also Holcomb. 
128 Idaho at 300,912 P.2d at 668. Here, the allegations of the information, though general, are sufficient. 
In addition, Jones was fully apprised of the acts he was charged with committing at the preliminary hearing. During that 
hearing, the State presented the victims' testimony about the surrounding circumstances and the manner in which the offenses 
were alleged to have been committed. The preliminary hearing eliminated any uncertainty and gave Jones notice of the 
details of the charges against him. Therefore, Jones has suffered **887 *47 no prejudice from the manner in which the 
information pleaded the charges. 
LZJl8J Jones's next argument, that the information was insufficient for failure to allege a specific time of the offenses, is also 
without merit. Under I.C. § 19-1414, the "precise time at which the offense was committed need not be stated in the 
indictment; but it may be alleged to have been committed at any time before the finding thereof, except where the time is a 
material ingredient in the offense." Time is not a material element of the crime of lewd and lascivious conduct with a minor. 
State v, Roberts, 101 Idaho 199,200,610 P.2d 558, 559 (1980); State v. Marks, 120 Idaho 727, 729, 819 P.2d 581, 583 
(Ct.App.1991 ). The Idaho Supreme Court has stated that "[a]ny other rule would too often preclude prosecutions in this type 
of case where the victims are minors and where the crimes are not discovered until some time after their commission." 
Roberts, I 0 I Idaho at 200, 610 P.2d at 559. Although the alleged incident should be set forth with as much specificity as 
possible, the charges may be pleaded generally when the record shows that the State could not plead with any more 
specificity. Marks, 120 Idaho at 729, 819 P.2d at 583. 
In the instant case, the information alleged that the offenses occurred between the spring of 1999 and the spring of 2000 
FNI (counts I and II), during the fall 0[2000 (count IV), and between 1993 and August 2000 (count V),- The record shows that 
as to counts I, II and IV, the State could not have pleaded the charges with any greater particularity, The victim, L.J., was 
young, between eight and ten years old, at the time these lewd acts were alleged to have been committed. She frequently 
visited Jones at his home, where the abuse was alleged to have occurred. It is unrealistic to expect her to be able to recall 
dates specifically given her age and the time span over which the acts were alleged to have occurred. Jones has not shown 
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that the lack of greater specificity in the dates somehow inhibited his ability to defend against the charges or subjects him to 
the risk of another prosecution for the same offenses. 
FN I. Jones was found not guilty of count III, so any argument regarding the sufficiency of that charge is moot. 
L2l As to count V, however, the allegation of a seven-year span is not explained by the record, and it appears that the State 
could have narrowed that allegation considerably. This pleading deficiency does not, however, entitle Jones to relief. As 
noted above, vagueness in the allegations of an information may be cured through preliminary hearing testimony that informs 
the defendant of the details of the State's allegations. Here, the victim referenced in count V testified at the preliminary 
hearing, when she was twelve years old, that the offense occurred about three years earlier, when she was eight or nine. This 
testimony narrowed the time frame and prevented any prejudice to Jones from the lack of specificity in the pleading. 
{I 0][ II] Lastly, Jones contends that the information was insufficient to protect him against suffering a second prosecution for 
the same offenses. The test in determining whether an information is sufficient to protect a defendant from reprosecution is 
"whether the record shows with accuracy to what extent a defendant may plead a former acquittal or conviction." Coleman, 
128 Idaho at 471, 9 I 5 P.2d at 33. Transcripts of Jones's preliminary hearing and trial identitY the acts that are the basis for 
the charges in this case. If a second prosecution were ever attempted, Jones could rely upon the record to establish that he 
had already been convicted or acquitted of the crimes. See State v. Windsor. 110 Idaho 410.418 n. I. 716 P.2d 1182. 1190 
n. I (1985). Accordingly, Jones has not shown that the general nature of the information's allegations leaves him exposed to 
reprosecution for these crimes. 
B. Multiplicity of Counts I and II 
LUl Jones next argues that he was improperly charged in counts I and II because those counts are multiplicitous. He contends 
that because the counts are worded identically, they improperly charge him with two counts for what is actually a single 
offense. 
**888 [13][14] *48 Idaho Code § 19-1432 allows for the charging of two or more offenses in the same indictment or 
information if the offenses charged "are of the same or similar character or are based on the same act or transaction or on 
two (2) or more acts or transactions connected together or constituting parts of a common scheme or plan." However, 
multiplicity may occur if a defendant is charged with a single offense in more than one count of the information or the 
indictment. Sanchez v. State. 127 Idaho 709. 713-14. 905 P.2d 642. 646-47 (Ct.App.1995). The danger ofmultiplicitous 
charging is that a defendant could be subjected to multiple punishments for a single offense. State v. A5Jl1ilar, 135 Idaho 894. 
897.26 P.3d 1231. 1234 (Ct.App.2001). 
[ I 5)[ 16] Whether a circumstance encompasses a single offense or multiple offenses depends upon whether there were 
separate and distinct prohibited acts. Miller v. Stare. 135 Idaho 261. 267. 16 P.3d 937. 943 (Ct.App.2000); Sanchez. 127 
Idaho at 713- 14, 905 P.2d at 646-47. This determination requires an inquiry into the "circumstances of the conduct, and 
consideration of the 'intent and objective of the actor.' " State v. Major. III Idaho 410,414,725 P.2d 115, 119 (1986) 
(quoting In re Ward. 64 Cal.2d 672,51 Cal. Rptr. 272, 414 P.2d 400 (1966». Thus, although a series of sexual contacts 
which occur as part of a single incident constitute only one count of lewd conduct under I.e. § 18-1508, a number of sexual 
acts occurring on separate occasions constiMe multiple offenses. Miller. 135 Idaho at 266-67, 16 P.3d at 942-43. 
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In the instant case, counts I and II both alleged that: 
Bobby Dean Jones, during the Spring of 1999 to the Spring of2000, in the County of Gooding, State of Idaho, did willfully 
and lewdly, commit a lewd and lascivious act upon and/or with the body of a minor, L.J., under the age of sixteen years, 
to-wit: eight or nine (8 or 9) years of age, by manual-genital contact, to-wit: by touching L.J. in or upon her vagina with his 
finger, with the intent to arouse, appeal to or gratifY the lust, passion or sexual desire of the defendant and/or said minor 
child. 
In charging counts I and II using identical language, the State was not charging Jones twice for one single act, nor were they 
charging him for a continuous course of conduct. Rather, the State was charging Jones for two separate and distinct acts that 
occurred in the same manner and during the same span of time. L.J. testified to two incidents of manual-genital touching that 
occurred within that time period. She said that the first incident occurred when she and her brother were staying overnight at 
Jones's trailer while A.J. (L.J.'s sister) attended a birthday party. L.J. stated that she was sleeping in the back bedroom when 
Jones came in the room and put his hand on L.J.'s vagina. L.J. then described another incident that occurred on another trip to 
Jones's trailer, this time with A.J. L.J. said that Jones again came into the bedroom, got into the bed with her, and fondled her 
vagina. Because these events were clearly distinguishable as distinct crimes, each incident was properly charged as an 
independent offense. 
C. Count V 
Il1l Jones also contends that the charge contained in count V was "fatally duplicitous" because, at trial, the victim testified 
about mUltiple acts that matched the allegations in the information and that occurred during the time period charged in the 
jnformation. 
[ 18)[ 19][20J Duplicity refers to the charging of more than one offense in a single count of the charging document. Major, III 
Idaho at 414. 725 P.2d at 119; State v. Chapa. 127 Idaho 786. 789. 906 P.2d 636, 639 (Ct.App.1995). See also WAYNE R. 
LA FA VE ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 19.3(c), at 775 (2d ed. I 999). A duplicitous charge can prejudice the 
defendant "in the shaping of evidentiary rulings, in producing a conviction on less than a unanimous verdict as to each 
separate offense, in sentencing, in limiting review on appeal, and in exposing the defendant to double jeopardy." Major. III 
Idaho at 414, 725 P.2d at 119 (quoting WAYNE R. LAFAVE & JEROLD H. ISRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 19.2(e) 
(1984». One instance of duplicity occurs when the prosecution fails to recognize that each repetition of an act constitutes a 
separate offense and therefore includes a **889 *49 series of acts in one count. See Bins v. United Stales, 331 F.2d 390 (5th 
Cir.1964); LAFAVE, CRlMINAL PROCEDURE § 19.3(C), at 776 n. 81. 
Contrary to Jones's assertion, the charge in count V is not duplicitous because the count does not charge him with more than 
one offense; rather, the count refers to the commission of one single act. While it is true that the evidence presented at trial 
described multiple such offenses occurring within the alleged time frame, this does not create a duplicitous charge. FN2 
FN2. When the evidence describes several distinct criminal acts of the type charged, but the defendant is charged 
with only one count, the defendant is entitled to a jury instruction informing the jury that they must agree upon one 
single act committed by the defendant in order to find him guilty. Miller, 135 Idaho at 268, 16 P.3d at 944. Such an 
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instruction was given in this case. 
D. Variance in the Evidence and the Jury Instructions 
[21 ][22][23] Jones also contends that there were fatal variances between the allegations of the information and the trial 
evidence and jury instructions, which resulted in a constructive amendment of the charges. A variance between the 
intormation and the evidence presented at trial or between the information and the jury instructions requires reversal of the 
conviction only when the defendant was deprived offair notice of the charge against which he must defend or was left open 
to the risk of double jeopardy. Slare v. Windsor, 110 Idaho 410, 417-18, 716 P.2d 1182, 1189-90 (1985); Slale v. Brazil, 
136 Idaho 327, 330, 33 P.3d 218, 221 (Ct.App.2001); Stale v. Colwell, 124 Idaho 560,565-66,861 P.2d 1225, 1230-31 
(Ct.App.1993 ). Not all variances are fatal because "there is a marked distinction between a 'mere variance' and a variance 
which is automatically fatal because it amounts to an impennissible 'constructive amendment.'" Colwell, 124 Idaho at 
565-66,861 P.2d 1225, 1230-31 (quoting WAYNE R. LAFAVE & JEROLD H. ISRAEL. CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 19.2 
(1984)). Idaho law bars any amendment of the information that would charge the accused with a crime of a greater degree or 
a different nature than that for which the defendant was bound over by the magistrate. Colwell, 124 Idaho at 566, 861 P.2d at 
l2.ll" See also I.C. § 19-1420. Accordingly, where a variance alters the information to the extent that the defendant is tried 
for a crime of a greater degree or a different nature, reliefwill be warranted. 
L21l Jones first claims that there is a variance with respect to the first two counts of the information, both alleging offenses 
against L.J., because L.J. testified at the preliminary hearing that the two events occurred approximately two weeks apart but 
she did not refer to that same time frame testimony at trial. Contrary to Jones's assertion, this is not a variance, nor is there 
any inconsistency in her testimony. L.J. was not required to testifY at trial as to the time lapse between the two incidents. 
Jones was not subjected to a possible conviction of a different crime or a crime of a different nature than that alleged in the 
information. 
[25] Second, Jones claims there was a variance because the State presented evidence of two incidents of improper touching 
of LJ. that were not the bases of the charges and were not described at the preliminary hearing. He contends that this amounts 
to a fatal variance because the jury could have used this evidence to convict him, thereby resulting in a conviction for a crime 
that he was not charged with. Jones's argument is without merit. This testimony was specifically admitted as evidence of 
other misconduct for purposes that are permissible under I.R.E, 404(b). Immediately after presentation of this evidence, the 
court gave the jurors a limiting instruction, informing them that they had just heard evidence that the defendant committed 
wrongs or acts "other than that for which the defendant is on trial" and that this evidence was presented only for the limited 
purpose of proving motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge or absence of mistake. Given this limiting 
instruction, no fatal variance existed. 
(26] Lastly, Jones argues that the court's instructions to the jury constituted a fatal variance because the court added "on or 
about" to the time frame of the offenses alleged in the information. He contends that **890 *50 this broadened the bases upon 
which Jones might be convicted. We disagree. This slight expansion of the time frame does not allow the jury to find Jones 
guilty of a different offense than that alleged in the information. Jones has identified no fatal variances between the 
information and the evidence or jury instructions. 
E. Rule 404(b) Notice 
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Ull Prior to trial, the State gave Jones written notice of its intent to offer evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts pursuant 
to Rule 404(b) of the Idaho Rules of Eyidence. Specifically, the notice referred to evidence of "prior acts of improper 
touching by the defendant of [L.l., AJ., L.M.] .... " Jones filed a motion in limine to exclude such evidence, asserting that the 
State's notice was insufficient because it did not disclose any details of the anticipated testimony. At the hearing on the 
motion in limine, the State made an offer of proof regarding the testimony of L.M. but the prosecutor said that he did not 
know exactly what testimony would be given by the victims, L.J. and AJ., concerning incidents of uncharged improper 
touching. Jones asked that the court limit the testimony of L.J. and AJ. to those incidents to which they testified at the 
preliminary hearing, but the court refused to do so. Rather, the court chose to reserve ruling on that potential testimony until 
the trial, if and when the State proffered testimony about other incidents. 
During the trial, L.J. testified about two incidents of improper touching which she had not mentioned in the preliminary 
hearing. Jones objected to this testimony, asserting that the State had not provided adequate notice of this Rule 404(b) 
evidence. The court overruled Jones's objection. The court also gave the jury a limiting instruction, stating that the testimony 
was not to be considered as proof of the defendant's character or as proof that the defendant has a disposition to commit 
crimes. On appeal, Jones challenges the district court's ruling that the notice of intent was sufficient. He argues that the State's 
notice did not adequately describe the incidents about which testimony would be given. 
Idaho Rule of Evidence 404(b) provides that evidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts may be admissible at trial for 
purposes of proving matters other than bad character or propensity for crime. However, admissibility is conditioned on the 
prosecution filing and serving "notice reasonably in advance of trial ... of the general nature of any such evidence it intends 
to introduce at trial." I.R.E. 404(b). This Idaho rule is nearly identical to its federal counterpart, Federal Rule of Evidence 
404(b). Because the issue of the extent of disclosure required by I.R.E. 404(b) has never been addressed by Idaho appellate 
courts, we will examine federal authority concerning the notice requirement. 
The committee notes regarding the 1991 amendment to F.R.E. 404(b), which added the notice requirement, are instructive. 
They indicate that the amendment was intended "to reduce surprise and promote early resolution on the issue of 
admissibility," and was not intended to require the prosecution to disclose the names and addresses of its witnesses. The 
committee notes also state that no specific fonn of notice is required and that the committee opted to allow for a generalized 
notice provision which would only require the prosecution to inform the defense of the general nature of the evidence. 
Accordingly, under the federal rules, the notice need not contain specifics but rather may be of a general nature, sufficient 
merely to apprise the defendant of its existence and avoid surprise. 
We observe that the Rule 404(b) notice is not the only mechanism by which a defendant may obtain information about the 
contemplated evidence. If a notice provided by the State contemplates testimony from a witness who was not previously 
disclosed, and if the defendant requested the names of witnesses under I.C.R. 16(b), the State would be obligated to 
supplement its disclosure pursuant to I.C.R. 16(i). Further, if upon receipt of the notice the defendant believes that additional 
information is necessary, additional discovery may be requested under I.C.R. 16(b)(8). The existence of these alternatives 
weighs in favor of allowing considerable generality in Rule 404(b) notice. 
**891 *51 The notice in the present case was sufficient to alert the defense to the general nature of the additional testimony 
and to thereby avoid surprise. The witnesses were identified in the notice, and the general type of conduct alleged to have 
been committed was revealed also. This information was sufficient to allow the admissibility issue to be raised by Jones 
although the trial court elected not to rule on admissibility before the trial. No greater specificity is required by I.R.E. 
404(b). Moreover, Jones has not shown that more specific information would have aided in his defense. The district court 
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committed no error in determining that the notice requirement of I.R.E. 404(b) was met. 
F. Credibility Instruction 
1m Jones next contends that the district court erred in refusing Jones's proposed instruction on credibil ity, which was based 
on the pattern credibility instruction in the Idaho Civil Jury Instructions (lDJI). He argues that the credibility instruction 
provided in the Idaho Criminal Jury Instructions (ICJI), which is the instruction used by the court, gives the jury insufficient 
guidance for the determination of witness credibility. Jones does not assert that the court's instruction misstates the law; 
rather, he contends that the pattern instructions discriminate against criminal defendants because the [OJI credibility 
instruction provides the jury with more direction than does the IClI instruction. According to Jones, this discrimination is 
violative of his right to equal protection. 
[29][30] Equa[ protection of the law is guaranteed by Article I, Section 2 of the Idaho Constitution and by the Fourteenth 
Amendment of the United States Constitution. Northcutt v. Sun Valley Co., 117 Idaho 35 I. 357. 787 P.2d 1159. 1165 ([ 990). 
The principle underlying equal protection is that all persons in like circumstances should receive the same benefits and 
burdens of the law. Bon Appeat Gourmet Foods, Inc. v. State, Dep't o[Employment, 117 Idaho 1002, 1003, 793 P.2d 675, 
676 (l989);Aeschliman v. State, 132 Idaho 397,401, 973 P.2d 749,753 (Ct.App.1999). Accordingly, no equal protection 
analysis is required and no violation of equal protection will be found in situations where the State has not engaged in the 
disparate treatment of similarly situated individuals. Shobe v. Ada County, Bd. or Comm'rs, 130 Idaho 580. 585-86, 944 
P.2d715. 720-21 (1997); Stafe v. ROZlntree, 129 Idaho 146. 151. 922 P.2d [072. 1077 (Ct.App.1996). 
Jones's claim of an equal protection violation is without merit. Although the IDJI credibi Iity instruction is longer and more 
detailed than the ICJI instruction, in substance the two are alike. Jones has not demonstrated that there is such a substantive 
difference between the two instructions that criminal defendants are disadvantaged. As a result, he has shown no disparate 
treatment of criminal defendants. 
G. Motion for Acquittal on Count IV 
[3 I] At the conclusion of the State's case, Jones moved for a judgment of acquittal on all counts. With regard to count IV, 
Jones argued that the State had failed to establish any improper touching in "the fall of2000," as alleged in the information, 
because L.J. testified that the last time that Jones had touched her was on August 8, 2000, two days after her tenth birthday. 
The court denied Jones's motion. On appeal, Jones renews his argument that count IV was unsupported by the evidence 
because the State failed to prove that any lewd conduct occurred in the "fall of2000." 
[32)[331 A motion for ajudgrnent of acquittal under LC.R. 29(a) must be granted if there is insufficient evidence to sustain a 
conviction on the challenged offense. State v. Dietrich. 135 Idaho 870. 873. 26 P.3d 53. 56 (Ct.App.200 I ); State v. 
Gonzalez. 134 Idaho 907, 909.12 P.3d 382. 384 (Ct.App.2000). Upon review of the denial of such a motion, this Court 
independently reviews the evidence in the record to determine ifreasonab[e minds could conclude that the defendant's guilt 
on each material element was proven beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Henry, 138 Idaho 364, 368, 63 P.3d 490. 494 
(Ct.App.2003); Gonzalez, 134 Idaho at 909, 12 P.3d at 384. 
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**892 *52 The only allegation that Jones claims the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt is the time at which the 
offense occurred. However, as we stated above, time is not a material element to the crime of lewd and lascivious conduct 
with a minor. See Coleman, 128 Idaho at 471, 915 P.2d at 33; Marks, 120 Idaho at 729, 819 P.2d at 583. Even if August 8 
may not be considered "fall," this slight variance between the charge and the evidence was not material, and Jones has not 
shown that the lack of notice of the specific date prejudiced his defense. Because the charge in count IV is supported by 
sufficient evidence as to the material elements of the crime, we affirm the district court's denial of Jones's motion for 
judgment of acquittal. 
H. Sentence 
llil Lastly, Jones contends that the sentences imposed by the district court are excessive in light of his advanced age, his 
lack of a prior felony record and the fact that he has strong family support. 
[35)[36J[37)[38] Our standards for appellate review ofa sentence are well settled. When a sentence is imposed within the 
maximum permitted for the offense, we review the sentence for an abuse of discretion. State v. Anderson, 103 Idaho 622, 
623, 651 P.2d 556, 557 (Ct.App.1982). If the sentence is not illegal, the appellant has the burden to show that it is 
unreasonable, and thus a clear abuse of discretion. State v. Brown. 121 Idaho 385, 393. 825 P.2d 482, 490 (1992). A 
sentence may represent such an abuse if it is shown to be unreasonable upon the facts of the case. Slate v. Nice, 103 Idaho 
89, 90, 645 P.2d 323, 324 (I 982). A sentence of confinement is reasonable if it appears that the confinement is necessary "to 
accomplish the primary objective of protecting society and to achieve any or all of the related goals of deterrence, 
rehabilitation or retribution applicable to a given case." State v. Toohill, 103 Idaho 565, 568, 650 P.2d 707, 710 
(Ct.App.1982). 
Although this is Jones's first felony conviction, there is evidence that the abuse of LJ., AJ., and another granddaughter 
occurred over a number of years. According to a psychosexual evaluation, Jones presented a high risk of reoffending. We 
conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in sentencing Jones. 
III. 
CONCLUSION 
Jones has not shown any fatal deficiencies in the information or reversible trial error, and his sentences are not excessive. 
Therefore, the judgment of conviction and sentences are affirmed. 
Judge GUTIERREZ and Judge Pro Tem WALTERS CONCUR. 
Idaho App.,2003. 
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M IUlH, DIP'UTV 
CANYON COUNTY PROSECUTING ATTORNEY 
Canyon County Courthouse 
1115 Albany& 
Caldwell, Idaho 83606-0668 
Telephone: (208) 454-7391 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON 
THE STATE OF IDAHO 
Plaintiff, 
VANCE WATKINS, 
Defendant. 
) 
) CASE NO. CR2008-26831 
) 
) RESPONSE TO DEFENDANT'S 
) FIRST MOTION TO SUPPRESS 
) 
) 
) 
---------------------------) 
COMES NOW, Erica M. Kallin, Deputy Prosecuting Attorney for Canyon County, State 
of Idaho, and hereby submits the following Response to Defendant's First Motion Suppress. 
The Defendant moves for the suppression of his admissions and confessions made to 
Detectives Brandy Sutherland, Angela Weekes and Victor Terry of the Nampa Police 
Department. This motion is based on the interview that took place between the Detectives and 
the Defendant on December 1, 2004. The Defendant has previously filed a Motion to Suppress 
the evidence, as well as the statements the Defendant made during the Detention Order, which 
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was denied by Judge Hoff. This motion should be denied because: 1) it is time bared, 2) 
Miranda[ll requirements were not required because he was not in-custody, and 3) even if the 
Defendant was in custody, the Defendant was properly advised his Miranda rights and never 
invoked. Therefore, his statements were not the result of any constitutional violations, and his 
motion to suppress should be denied. 
The Defendant cannot challenge the statements made during the 
Detention Order, as they are the law of the case. 
The Defendant filed a Motion to Suppress all evidence obtained during the Detention 
Order, including the statements made by the Defendant on June 10,2005. This motion was 
heard by Judge Hoff on August 26, 2005 and was denied. The Defendant did not raise the denial 
of his Motion to Suppress on Appeal. As such, the Court's ruling is now the law of the case on 
that issue. Under the law of the case principle, "on a second or subsequent appeal the courts 
generally will not consider errors which arose prior to the first appeal and which might have been 
raised as issues in the earlier appeal." Jarman v. Hale, 122 Idaho 952, 956, 842 P.2d 288,292 
(Ct. App. 1992); Capps v. Wood, 117 Idaho 614, 618, 790 P.2d 395,399 (Ct. App. 1990). This 
doctrine discourages piecemeal litigation and is consistent with the analogous doctrine of res 
judicata. Jarman, 122 Idaho at 956,842 P.2d at 292; Capps, 117 Idaho at 618, 790 P.2d at 399. 
The law of the case principle operates to preclude a party from raising issues which could have 
been, but which were not, raised in thelfirst appeal. See Capps, 117 Idaho 614, 790 P.2d 395 (Ct. 
App. 1990). As such, the Defendant is barred from arguing any of the statements made. 
[I) Miranda v. Arizona. 384 U.S. 436(1966). 
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The Defendant is time barred from filing any motions pursuant to ICR 12. 
Idaho Criminal Rule 12(d) states: 
Motions pursuant to Rule 12(b) must be filed within twenty-eight 
(28) days after the entry of a plea of not guilty or seven (7) days 
before trial whichever is earlier ... The court in its discretion may 
shorten or enlarge the time provided herein, and for good cause 
shown, or for excusable neglect, may relieve a party of failure to 
comply with this rule. 
A motion to suppress is a 12(b) motion. Idaho Criminal Rule 12 requires that a motion to 
suppress be filed within twenty-eight days of the entry of a plea of not guilty, or seven days 
before trial, whichever is earlier. I.C.R. 12(b), I.C.R. 12(d). A party's failure to meet the 
deadline constitutes a waiver of the motion. I.C.R. 12(f). A court may relieve a party's failure to 
comply with the rule only if the party shows good cause or excusable neglect for the failure. 
LC.R. 12(d); See State v. Gleason, 130 Idaho 586 (Ct. App. 1997); see also State v. Dice, 126 
Idaho 595, 597 (Ct. App. 1994). A cOl}rt may not "arbitrarily enlarge or shorten the filing 
requirements of the rule"; to "permit a court to do so without the required exempting factors 
would emasculate the intent of the rule." State v. Alanis, 109 Idaho 884, 888 (Idaho 1985). In 
fact, it is abuse of discretion for the court to consider an untimely filed motion to suppress if 
there has not been a finding of good cause or excusable neglect. Id If a party has failed to meet 
the deadline, a court may not hear a motion simply because it appears meritorious. State v. Dice, 
126 Idaho 595, 597 (Idaho App. 1994). To do so would "eviscerate the purpose of the rule." Id. 
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Consequently, if good cause or excusable neglect is not shown by the moving party, the court 
may not hear the motion. Id. 
In this case, the Defendant entered a plea of not guilty on December 22, 2004 in front of 
Judge Culet. His case proceeded to Jury Trial on August 20, 2005. Thus, the deadline for the 
Defendant to file a motion to suppress was January 19,2005, twenty-eight days after the entry of 
his plea, because January 19, 2005 is eatlier than seven days prior to the trial. The Defendant 
filed his first motion to suppress on June 10, 2005 which was 170 days after his arraignment; 
however, the State did not raise a timeliness issue. The Defendant has filed a Motion to 
Suppress on May 21,2010. Even if the Defendant was allowed to file any and all motions again 
after remand (which is not consistent with the case law), the Defendant was arraigned on 
February 4, 2010 and the time to file motions lapsed on March 4, 201 O.Now the Defendant is 
trying to get another bite at the apple 2020 days after his first arraignment, and 106 days after his 
arraignment after remand. This is well beyond the time proscribed by the statute. The Defense 
has made no showing of good cause as to why the time to file motions should be extended by 
1992 days. The Defendant never filed for Post Conviction Relief from his original trial. As 
such, the defendant is bared from arguing excusable neglect or ineffective assistance of counsel 
on the part of his prior attorney. There has been absolutely no showing of good cause or 
excusable neglect, so the Court must deny the motion to suppress. 
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The Defendant was not in custody either for the purposes of 
either the 4th or 5th Amendments 
The Defendant contends that he was in custody for both the purpose of a Fourth 
Amendment Detention and Fifth Amendment Custody. The State disagrees. Therefore, the 
Fourth Amendment issue will be addressed first, followed by analysis of the Fifth Amendment 
argument. 
a. The Defendant was not in custody for lh Amendment purposes 
Generally, there are three types of contacts between law enforcement and private citizens: 
(1) consensual encounter (not a seizure, and therefore no justification is required); (2) 
stop/investigation detention (a seizure justified by reasonable suspicion); and (3) actual arrest 
(a seizure justified by probable cause). See State v. Holcomb, 128 Idaho 296 (Ct. App. 1995); 
State v. Zubizareta, 122 Idaho 823 (Ct. App. 1992); State v. Knapp, 120 Idaho 343 (Ct. App. 
1991); and State v. Zapp, 108 Idaho 723 (Ct. App. 1985). The Defendant's Motion to Suppress 
does not deal with an "actual arrest" contact, but rather whether or not the Detectives contact 
with the Defendant was a consensual contact or a stop/investigative detention. The State 
contends that it was a consensual encounter. 
The landmark cases in the area of consensual encounters are Us. v. Mendenhall, 446 
U.S. 544 (1980) and Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429 (1991). The Court in Bostick clearly noted 
that not all contacts between officers and citizens involve a seizure within the meaning of the 
Fourth Amendment. See Bostick, 501 U.S. 429; Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968); State v. Reese, 
132 Idaho 652 (1999); State v. Nickel, 134 Idaho 610, 7 P.3d 219 (2000); and State v. Clifford, 
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130 Idaho 259 (Ct. App. 1997). An individual is not seized unless their liberty is restrained by 
either an officer's show of authority or use of physical force. California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 
621 (1991); United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544 (1980); Terry, 392 U.S. 1; Reese, 132 
Idaho 652, State v. Cardenas, 143 Idaho 903, 155 P.3d 704 (Ct. App. 2006); and State v. 
Agundis, 127 Idaho 587 (Ct. App. 1995). A consensual encounter is not a seizure and it does not 
implicate the Fourth Amendment. See Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, and Bostick, 501 U.S. 429. 
Therefore, an officer does not need to establish reasonable suspicion or probable cause to justify 
such an encounter. 
A consensual encounter includes situations where an officer approaches an individual on 
the street, in a parked vehicle, or in another public place and engages them in mere conversation 
and asks them questions if they choose to listen. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429; Florida v. Rodriguez, 
469 U.S. 1 (1984); INS v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210 (1984); Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491 
(1983); Clifford, 130 Idaho 259; Zubizareta, 122 Idaho 823 (Ct. App. 1992); and State v. Jordan, 
122 Idaho 771 (Ct. App. 1992). An individual that makes contact with law enforcement, such as 
arriving at a police station on his own accord, falls well below a consensual encounter. Should 
the Defendant raise the issue that this was a detention, the State will discuss that this contact did 
not even arise to the level of a consensual encounter let alone a detention. 
"So long as a reasonable person would feel free to go about his or her business, an 
encounter with a police officer is consensual and the encounter need not be justified by 
reasonable suspicion." Id; Bostick, 501 U.S. 429. "Only when the officer, by means of 
physical force or show of authority, has in some way restrained the liberty of a citizen may [the 
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court] conclude that a 'seizure' has occurred." Terry, 392 U.S. at 19, n. 16.; see also State v. 
Ferreira, 133 Idaho 474,479 (Ct. App., 1999); Reese, 132 Idaho at 653; State v. Pick, 124 Idaho 
601,604 (Ct. App., 1993)Y] In other words, unless the circumstances of the encounter are "so 
intimidating as to demonstrate that a reasonable person would have believed he was not free to 
leave ifhe had not responded," one cannot say that an officer's request results in a seizure within 
the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. Nelson, 134 Idaho at 678; Delgado, 466 U.S. at 216. 
"As a result, a police officer generally does not violate the Fourth Amendment by merely 
approaching an individual on the street or in another public place, by asking if the person is 
willing to answer some questions or by putting questions to him or here if the person is willing to 
listen." Nelson, 134 Idaho at 678; Bostick, 501 U.S. at 434; Zubizareta, 122 Idaho 823, 826 (Ct. 
App. 1992); State v. Osborne, 121 Idaho 520, 523 (Ct. App., 1991). An officer does not violate 
the Fourth Amendment, when an individual approaches the officer and or arranges to meet the 
officer to discuss a matter. Id. Thus, the inquiry in determining whether a seizure occurred is 
whether, under all the circumstances surrounding the encounter, a reasonable person would have 
felt free to leave or otherwise decline the officer's requests and terminate the encounter. 
[2] The State does recognize that when an officer stops and detains an individual they must comply with the 
constitutional standards of reasonableness. See Matter o(Clayton, 113 Idaho 817 (1988); and State v. Waldie, 126 
Idaho 964 (Ct. App. 1995). A person is seized within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment if the officer restrains 
the person's liberty by one of the following means: 
(1) a "show of authority" resulting in "actual submission" by the suspect; or 
(2) application of "physical force" to the suspect's body. 
See Clai(ornia v. Hodad D., 499 U.S. 621 (1991); u.s. v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544 (1980); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 
1 (1968); State v. Reese, 132 Idaho 652 (1999); State v. Harwood, 133 Idaho 50 (Ct. App. 1999); and State v. 
Agundis, 127 Idaho 587 (Ct. App. 1995). 
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, Reese, 132 Idaho at 653; State v. Fuentes, 129 Idaho at 832 (citing Bostick, 501 U.S. at 
437).[3] 
In Mendenhall, the United States Supreme Court stated the following: 
Examples of circumstances that might indicate a seizure, even 
where the person did not attempt to leave, would be the threatening 
presence of several officers, the display of a weapon by an officer, 
some physical touching of the person of the citizen, or the use of 
language or tone of voice indicating that compliance with the 
officer's request might be compelled. 446 U.S. at 554; See also 
State v. Reese, 132 Idaho 652 (1999); State v. Clifford, 130 Idaho 
259,939 P.2d 578 (Ct. App. 1997); and State v. Godwin, 121 Idaho 
491 (1992). 
As stated by Chief Justice Rehnquist in Delgado, while "most citizens will respond to a 
police request, the fact that people do so, and do so without being told they are free not to 
respond, hardly eliminates the consensual nature of the response." 466 U.S. at 216. 
In this case, Watkins was driven to the police station by law enforcement officers. 
Watkins was advised by Detective Sutherland that he was not under arrest. In fact Watkins was 
taken back to his house at then end of the interview after the detention order was executed. At 
no point in time did Sutherland ever coerce Watkins, never did she intimidate him, never did she 
[3] The test to detennine if an officer used authority sufficient to restrain a defendant's liberty is objective, and is 
based on how a reasonable person would have understood the officer's words and actions rather than the defendant's 
perception of whether he was restrained. The proper inquiry is whether, based on the totality of the circumstances 
surrounding the encounter, a reasonable person would feel free to leave or otherwise decline the officer's request 
and tenninate the encounter. See Flordia v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, (1991); Michigan v. Chesternut, 486 U.S. 567 
(1988); U.S. v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544 (1980); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968); State v. Fuentes, 129 Idaho 830 
(Ct. App. 1997); State v. Agundis, 127 Idaho 587 (Ct. App. 1995); State v. Reese, 132 Idaho 652 (1999); Matter of 
Mackey, 124 Idaho 585 (Ct. App. 1993); and State v. Jordan, 122 Idaho 771 (Ct. App. 1992). 
RESPONSE TO DEFENDANT'S 
FIRST MOTION TO SUPPRESS 8 
H:\WORK\CRIMINAL\MO & ORD\Watkins Vance_1st MO to Suppress.doc 
0001.40 
display physical authority and control over him. Hence, nowhere in the Defendant's argument or 
in the audio recording would a reasonable person feel that they were in custody. 
h. The Defendant was not in custody for 5th Amendment Purposes 
Miranda warnings are not required even when a person is questioned at a police station. 
California v. Beheler. 463 U.S. 1121, 103 S. Ct. 3517 (1983); see also U.s. v. Crawford,372 
FJd 1048, 1059 (9th Cir., 2004). The Defendant was not in custody and therefore an anticipatory 
invocation was not binding. 
The Defendant voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently waived his right 
against self-incrimination and right to counsel. 
The Supreme Court has explained that "[t]he critical safeguard" provided by the Miranda 
warnings is the knowledge of "a person's 'right to cut off questioning. ,,, Michigan v. Mosley, 
423 U.S. 96, 103,96 S.Ct. 321 (1975) (quoting Miranda. 384 U.S. at 474,86 S.Ct. 1602); see 
also Thompkins v. Berghuis, 547 F.3d 572,582 (C.A. 6 (Mich.), 2008), cert. granted. The 
safeguards suggested in Miranda were intended to create a "practical reinforcement for the right 
against compulsory self incrimination." See Michigan v. Tucker. 417 U.S. 433, 444, 94 S.Ct. 
2357,2364 (1974). A waiver of Miranda rights need not be explicit but may be inferred from the 
actions and words of a person interrogated. Tague v. Louisiana, 444 U.S. 469, 471, 100 S.Ct. 
652,653 (1980). The question is not one ofform, but whether the defendant, in light of the 
L 
totality of circumstances surrounding his statements, knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily 
waived his Miranda rights. See North Carolina v. Butler. 441 U.S. 369, 373, 99 S.Ct. 1755, 1757 
(1979); United States v. Carra. 604 F.2d 1271, 1274 (10th Cir. 1979), cert. denied 444 U.S. 994, 
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100 S.Ct. 529 (1979); State v. Ybarra, 102 Idaho 573, 634 P.2d 435 (1981); State v. Padilla, 101 
Idaho 713,620 P.2d 286 (1979).141 State v. Mitchell, 104 Idaho 493, 497-498, 660 P.2d 1336, 
1340 - 1341 (1983); State v. Hall, 111 Idaho 827, 727 P.2d 1255 (Ct.App. 1986); State v. Alger, 
115 Idaho 42,45, 764 P.2d 119, 122 (Ct. App. 1988). 
The issue in this case is whether Watkins possessed the capacity to make a voluntary, 
knowing and intelligent waiver. The Court must examine the facts and explore the totality of 
circumstances to determine ifhis waiver was valid. Id.; E.g., Beckwith v. United States, 425 U.S. 
341,96 S.Ct. 1612 (1976). The totality approach inquires into all the circumstances surrounding 
the interrogation. Thus, there is a two-prong inquiry into whether the waiver was (1) voluntary, 
and (2) knowingly and intelligently made. Application of this standard requires evaluation of the 
Defendant's age, experience, education, background, and intelligence, as well as inquiry into 
whether he had (1) the capacity to understand the warnings given him; (2) the nature of his Fifth 
Amendment rights; and (3) the consequences of waiving those rights. See Butler, supra; Fare v. 
Michael C, 442 U.S. 707, 725, 99 S.Ct. 2560, 2572 (1979). 
a. Voluntariness 
The procedure for establishing the voluntariness of a confession has been expressed as 
follows: 
Generally, the prosecution can meet its burden of proving a prima 
facie [case] of voluntariness by eliciting from the interrogating 
officer that the suspect had not been threatened or promised 
anything and appeared to freely decide for himself to forego the 
[4] Miranda itself does not require a written or express waiver. See Butler, supra; State v. Mitchell, 104 Idaho 493, 
497-498,660 P.2d 1336, 1340 - 1341 (1983 
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assistance of counsel and to provide an incriminating statement. If 
the defendant introduces evidence suggesting official overreaching 
and a significant impact of that overreaching upon the suspect, of 
course, the prosecution may well have to respond with more 
detailed and persuasive evidence in order to meet its burden of 
persuasion. State v. Davila, 127 Idaho 888, 891, 908 P.2d 581, 
584 (Ct. App. 1995). 
The voluntariness of a confession need be established only by a preponderance of the 
evidence. Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 168, 107 S.Ct. 515, 522 (1986) (citing Lego v. 
Twomey, 404 U.S. 477, 92 S.Ct. 619 (1972); State v. Culbertson, 105 Idaho 128, 130, 666 P.2d 
1139, 1141 (1983». To determine the voluntariness of a confession, the court must consider the 
effect that the totality of the circumstances had upon the will of the defendant. Arizona v. 
Fulminante,499 U.S. 279, 111 S.Ct. 1246 (1991); Miller v. Fenton, 796 F.2d 598, 604 (3d Cir. 
1986), cert. denied, Miller v. Neubert, 479 U.S. 989, 107 S.Ct. 585 (1986); State v. Mitchell, 104 
Idaho 493, 660 P.2d 1336 (1983). The question in this case is whether the defendant's will was 
overborne when he confessed. See Id; State v. Davila, 127 Idaho 888, 891-892, 908 P.2d 581, 
584 -585 (Ct. App., 1995). "[T]o find a violation of a defendant's due process rights by virtue of 
an involuntary confession, coercive police conduct is necessary." State v. Whiteley, 124 Idaho 
261, 268, 858 P.2d 800, 807 (Ct. App. 1993); State v. Doe, 131 Idaho 709, 713, 963 P.2d 392, 
396 (Ct. App. 1998). 
In this case, the Defendant was never unlawfully coerced or threatened. Furthermore, 
nothing in the record suggests that his will was overborne. To the contrary, Sutherland went 
above and beyond with the Defendant. Never once during the interview did any of the detectives 
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even raise their voices at the Defendant. Never once did they threaten the Defendant. Never 
once did they use unlawfully coercive tactics to illicit an incriminating response. 
During the course of the interview, the Defendant was very amenable to working with the 
detectives. He never showed signs of fear, and never said or implied that he was intimidated. 
As the court in the Davila case stated, if the State can show that the suspect had (1) not 
been threatened, (2) not promised anything, and (3) appeared to freely decide for himselfto 
forego the assistance of counsel, then the statements and confessions are deemed voluntary. The 
Defendant has not alleged, and the record does not reflect, that the State did any of these. 
Nowhere in the interview did the detectives threaten the Defendant, and nothing in the 
Defendant's motion suggests to the contrary. The Defendant also was never promised anything. 
Finally, the Defendant during the course of the interviews never once asked for, or even 
implied, that he wanted an attorney to assist him in the interview. In fact, it wasn't until he 
returned to the police station for a polygraph that he indicated to law enforcement that he wanted 
to speak to his family. Accordingly, the state has established its burden of proving aprimaJacie 
case of voluntariness. 
h. Knowingly and Intelligently 
The factors to be considered in determining whether a suspect knowingly and 
intelligently waived his constitutional rights include: 
(1) Whether Miranda warnings were given; 
(2) The age of the accused; 
(3) The accuser's level of education or low intelligence as well as his background; 
RESPONSE TO DEFENDANT'S 
FIRST MOTION TO SUPPRESS 12 
H:\WORK\CRIMINAL\MO & ORD\Watkins Vance_1st MO to Suppress.doc 
0001.44 
(4) The length of detention; 
(5) The repeated and prolonged nature of the questioning; and 
(6) Deprivation of food or sleep. 
State v. Troy, 124 Idaho 211, 214, 858 P.2d 750, 753 (citing Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 
U.S. 218,226, 93 S.Ct. 2041, 2047 (1973»; State v. Radford, 134 Idaho 187, 191, 998 P.2d 80, 
84 (2000); State v. Doe, 131 Idaho 709;712, 963 P.2d 392,395 (Ct. App. 1998). 
A number of cases address these criteria and provide the context within which this Court 
should evaluate Roberts' arguments. 
First, in State v. Doe, the court found that Doe intelligently waived his rights even 
though: (1) he was a juvenile, (2) he could only read and write at a fourth grade level but had an 
eighth grade education, (3) he demonstrated a lack of sophistication and a low level of 
intelligence, (4) he was on medication, and (5) he had Attention Deficit Disorder. 131 Idaho 
709, 712,963 P.2d 392, 395 (Ct. App. 1998); Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 725, 99 S.Ct. 
2560 (1979); State v. Doe, 130 Idaho 811, 817, 948 P.2d 166, 172 (Ct. App. 1997). 
Another case was State v. Dunn, 134 Idaho 165,997 P.2d 626 (Ct. App. 2000). Dunn 
J. 
was a 25-year-old with Attention Deficit Disorder, who scored in the "mentally deficient range," 
and was deemed to have a drug addiction problem. The court nevertheless found Dunn able to 
give a voluntary, knowingly, and intelligent waiver of Miranda. Id 
Further, in State v. Nguyen, 122 Idaho 151,832 P.2d 324 (Ct. App. 1992), cited by the 
Defendant, the court held that even though Nguyen claimed he had a poor knowledge of the 
English language, he understood enough to knowingly and intelligently waive. 
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In comparison, Watkins is an adult in his mid-thirties. He has had a long life with many 
experiences. He has held employment and attended school. English is his first language. 
Compared to the defendants in Doe, Dunn, Nguyen, Watkins appears to be far more competent to 
intelligently and knowingly understand the warnings and waive them. He acknowledged that he 
understood the Miranda rights and was clearly focused, responsive, and articulate throughout the 
interview. He was able to appropriately ask and answer questions, and never indicated that he 
was confused. There was no suggestion that Watkins was of insufficient intelligence to 
understand the rights he was waiving, or what the consequences of that waiver might be. See 
Fare. Thus, the way in which he responded, the questions he asked, and the conversation that he 
had with the detectives, show that he had sufficient intelligence to understand what was going 
on. 
Therefore, the State has shown a prima facia case that the Defendant made a knowing 
and intelligent waiver. The Defendant, based on the totality of the factors set forth in Troy. 
understood the stakes of the interview. 
c Totality of the Circumstances 
Finally, in light of the totality of circumstances surrounding his statements, the defendant 
knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily waived his Miranda rights. See North Carolina v. 
Butler, 441 U.S. at 373, 99 S.Ct. at 1757; United States v. Carra, 604 F.2d 1271, 1274 (10th Cir. 
1979), cert. denied 444 U.S. 994, 100 S.Ct. 529 (1979); State v. Ybarra, supra; State v. Padilla, 
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supra.f5J State v. Mitchell, 104 Idaho 493, 497-498, 660 P.2d 1336, 1340 - 1341 (1983); State v. 
Hall. 111 Idaho 827, 727 P.2d 1255 (Ct.App.1986); State v. Alger, 115 Idaho 42, 45, 764 P.2d 
119,122 (Ct. App. 1988). 
Upon objective review of the exchange between Sutherland and Watkins, it becomes 
clear that no ambiguity could reasonably be inferred into Roberts' response. The State contends 
that his response, along with his subsequent decisions to ask and answer questions, strongly 
supports the conclusion that -- under the totality of circumstances - Watkins knowingly, 
intelligently, and voluntarily waived his Miranda rights. 
"A valid waiver will not be presumed simply from the silence of the accused after 
warnings are given or simply from the fact that a confession was in fact eventually obtained." 
Miranda. 384 U.S. at 475, 86 S.Ct. 1602. In North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369 (1979) the 
Supreme Court re-affirmed its holding in Carnley v. Cochran. 369 U.S. 506, 516, 82 S.Ct. 884 
(1962), that "[p ]resuming waiver from a silent record is impermissible," but the Court did state 
"in at least some cases [a] waiver can be clearly inferred from the actions and words of the 
person interrogated." Butler, 441 U.S. at 373 & n. 4, 99 S.Ct. 1755. These other actions would 
be nodding one's head, making an affirmative sound, and answering questions and creating a 
dialogue with the interviewer. See Thompkins v. Berghuis, 547 F.3d 572,582 (C.A.6 (Mich.), 
2008), cert. granted. In this case this is exactly what the Defendant did. After Detective 
[5] Miranda itself does not require a written or express waiver. See North Carolina v. Butler. supra; State v. Mitchell, 
104 Idaho 493,497-498,660 P.2d 1336, 1340 - 1341 (1983). 
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Sutherland advised the Defendant of his Miranda rights, he indicated he understood with a "uh 
huh." 
Based on the totality of the questioning, the detectives made sure that Watkins 
understood his rights. The detectives fully explained that he was not under arrest and was being 
questioned in connection with the sexual touching of his daughter. They informed him of all the 
rights delineated in Miranda, and ascertained that he understood those rights. There is no 
indication through the interview that the Defendant failed to understand what the detectives had 
told him. The Defendant never indicated in any manner that he wished to remain silent, or that 
he wanted an attorney. 
If the individual indicates in any manner, at any time prior to or 
during questioning, that he wishes to remain silent, the 
interrogation must cease. At this point he has shown that he intends 
to exercise his Fifth Amendment privilege; any statement taken 
after the person invokes his privilege cannot be other than the 
product of compulsion, subtle or otherwise .... If the individual 
states that he wants an attorney, the interrogation must cease until 
an attorney is present. At that time, the individual must have an 
opportunity to confer with the attorney and to have him present 
during any subsequent questioning. If the individual cannot obtain 
an attorney and he indicates that he wants one before speaking to 
police, they must respect his decision to remain silent. Miranda, at 
473-474,86 S.Ct., at 1627, 1628; Fare, 442 U.S. at 717-718,99 
S.Ct. at 2568. 
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At no time did the defendant ever invoke his rights. He did not state or imply that he 
wished to remain silent, or have an attomeyJ6] This is clearly supported by the audio of the 
interview with Watkins. 
[6] As the Defendant has not raised the issue the State will not belabor the difference between invocation and 
waiver. Suffice it to note that the Supreme Court has cautioned that "[i]nvocation and waiver are entirely distinct 
inquiries, and the two must not be blurred by merging them together." Smith v. Illinois. 469 U.S. 91, 98, 105 S.Ct. 
490, (1984). In terms of a suspect's invocation of her right to remain silent, in Miranda the Supreme Court held that 
"[i]qhe individual indicates in any manner, at any time prior to or during questioning, that he wishes to remain 
silent, the interrogation must cease." Miranda. 384 U.S. at 473-74,86 S.Ct. 1602 (emphasis added). Although the 
Supreme Court has not addressed what conduct or statements suffice to "indicate in any manner" one's intent to 
invoke the right to remain silent, the Supreme Court has explained the standard governing the invocation of one's 
right to counsel. In Davis v. United States. 512 U.S. 452, 455, 114 S.Ct. 2350 (1994), the Supreme Court noted that 
the suspect "waived his rights to remain silent and to counsel, both and a half into the interview, the suspect stated 
that '''[m]aybe I should talk to a lawyer.' " Id., at 455, 114 S.Ct. 2350. After the investigating agents sought 
clarification as to whether the suspect wanted a lawyer, the suspect said" 'No, I don't want a lawyer.' " Id. Rejecting 
the defendant's argument that his statement that "[m]aybe I should talk to a lawyer" effectively invoked his right to 
counsel such that the interrogation should have ceased and his statements been suppressed, the Supreme Court held 
that to invoke one's right to counsel "the suspect must unambiguously request counsel" because the Court's 
"precedents do not require the cessation of questioning" "if a suspect makes a reference to an attorney that is 
ambiguous or equivocal." Id. at 459, 114 S.Ct. 2350. The Court specifically restated its holding as establishing "that, 
after a knowing and voluntary waiver of the Miranda rights, law enforcement officers may continue questioning 
until and unless the suspect clearly requests an attorney." Id. at 461,86 S.Ct. 1602 (emphases added); Thompkins v. 
BerghuiS, 547 F.3d 572, 582 -583 (C.A.6 (Mich.), 2008).orally and in writing." Approximately an hour 
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CONCLUSION 
The Defendant is time bared from raising this issue. Not only has years past but the law 
ofthe case prohibits him from raising issues which could have been previously raised. 
Furthermore, he was not in custody for purposes of Miranda and at the end of the interview was 
returned to his house by law enforcement. For those reasons, the State asks this Court to deny 
the Defendant's First Motion to Suppress. 
DATED Thislit- day of May, 2010. 
Prosecuting Attorney 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing Response to 
Defendant's First Motion To Suppress was served upon the attorney for the Defendant, the 
Canyon County Public Defender, by placing said instrument in their basket at the Clerk's Office 
on or about this ~ day of May, 2010 
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CANYON COUNTY PROSECUTING ATTORNEY 
Canyon County Courthouse 
1115 Albany& 
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Telephone: (208) 454-7391 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON 
THE STATE OF IDAHO 
Plaintiff, 
VANCE WATKINS, 
Defendant. 
) 
) CASE NO. CR2008-26831 
) 
) RESPONSE TO DEFENDANT'S 
) SECOND MOTION TO SUPPRESS 
) 
) 
) 
----------------------------) 
COMES NOW, Erica M. Kallin, Deputy Prosecuting Attorney for Canyon County, State 
ofIdaho, and hereby submits the following Response to Defendant's Second Motion Suppress. 
The Defendant cannot challenge the statements made during the 
Detention Order, as they are the law of the case. 
The Defendant filed a Motion to Suppress the condom, Anbesol and eye dropper, 
indicating they were not indicated on the search warrant and therefore illegally seized. The 
Search Warrant, as well as the evidence seized, were known to the Defendant and his attorney in 
2005. No motions were filed to suppress any of this evidence and the evidence itself was not 
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challenged on appeal, nor was Post Conviction Relief sought for failure to raise that issue. As 
such, the search warrant is valid under the law of the case theory. Under the law of the case 
principle, "on a second or subsequent appeal the courts generally will not consider errors which 
arose prior to the first appeal and which might have been raised as issues in the earlier appeal." 
Jarman v. Hale, 122 Idaho 952,956,842 P.2d 288, 292 (Ct. App. 1992); Capps v. Wood, 117 
Idaho 614, 618, 790 P.2d 395,399 (Ct. App. 1990). This doctrine discourages piecemeal 
litigation and is consistent with the analogous doctrine of res judicata. Jarman, 122 Idaho at 
956, 842 P.2d at 292; Capps, 117 Idaho at 618, 790 P.2d at 399. The law of the case principle 
operates to preclude a party from raising issues which could have been, but which were not, 
raised in the first appeal. See Capps, 117 Idaho 614, 790 P .2d 395 (Ct. App. 1990). As such, the 
Defendant is barred from raising this suppression motion. 
The Defendant is time barred from f"ding any motions pursuant to IeR 12. 
Idaho Criminal Rule 12( d) states: 
Motions pursuant to Rule 12(b) must be filed within twenty-eight 
(28) days after the entry of a plea of not guilty or seven (7) days 
before trial whichever is earlier ... The court in its discretion may 
shorten or enlarge the time provided herein, and for good cause 
shown, or for excusable neglect, may relieve a party of failure to 
comply with this rule. 
A motion to suppress is a 12(b) motion. Idaho Criminal Rule 12 requires that a motion to 
suppress be filed within twenty-eight days of the entry of a plea of not guilty, or seven days 
before trial, whichever is earlier. I.C.I). 12(b), I.C.R. 12(d). A party's failure to meet the 
deadline constitutes a waiver of the motion. I.C.R. 12(f). A court may relieve a party's failure to 
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comply with the rule only if the party shows good cause or excusable neglect for the failure. 
I.C.R. 12(d); See State v. Gleason, 130 Idaho 586 (Ct. App. 1997); see also State v. Dice, 126 
Idaho 595, 597 (Ct. App. 1994). A court may not "arbitrarily enlarge or shorten the filing 
requirements of the rule"; to "permit a court to do so without the required exempting factors 
would emasculate the intent ofthe rule." State v. Alanis, 109 Idaho 884, 888 (Idaho 1985). In 
fact, it is abuse of discretion for the court to consider an untimely filed motion to suppress if 
there has not been a finding of good cause or excusable neglect. Id. If a party has failed to meet 
the deadline, a court may not hear a motion simply because it appears meritorious. State v. Dice, 
126 Idaho 595, 597 (Idaho App. 1994). To do so would "eviscerate the purpose of the rule." Id. 
Consequently, if good cause or excusable neglect is not shown by the moving party, the court 
may not hear the motion. Id. 
In this case, the Defendant entered a plea of not guilty on December 22, 2004 in front of 
Judge Culet. His case proceeded to Jury Trial on August 20,2005. Thus, the deadline for the 
Defendant to file a motion to suppress was January 19,2005, twenty-eight days after the entry of 
his plea, because January 19,2005 is earlier than seven days prior to the trial. The Defendant 
filed his first motion to suppress on June 10, 2005 which was 170 days after his arraignment; 
however, the State did not raise a timeliness issue. The Defendant has filed a Motion to 
Suppress on May 21,2010. Even if the Defendant was allowed to file any and all motions again 
after remand (which is not consistent with the case law), the Defendant was arraigned on 
February 4,2010 and the time to file motions lapsed on March 4, 201O.Now the Defendant is 
trying to get another bite at the apple 2020 days after his first arraignment, and 106 days after his 
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arraignment after remand. This is well beyond the time proscribed by the statute. The Defense 
has made no showing of good cause as to why the time to file motions should be extended by 
1992 days. The Defendant never filed for Post Conviction Relief from his original trial. As 
such, the defendant is bared from arguing excusable neglect or ineffective assistance of counsel 
on the part of his prior attorney. There has been absolutely no showing of good cause or 
excusable neglect, so the Court must deny the motion to suppress. 
The condom constitutes mementos of sex abuse and therefore falls within 
the parameters of the search warrant. 
The Defendant has not challenged the actual issuance of the Search Warrant; as such the 
Search Warrant on its face is valid. The issue becomes whether the condom falls under the 
parameters of the search warrant. Search Warrant # 1847 was signed by Judge DeMeyer on 
December 1,2004. Judge DeMeyer wrote on the search warrant that law enforcement could 
seize any "mementos of sexual relations." Memento is defined as a keepsake or a souvenir. 
Webster's II New College Dictionary (1999.) A condom is a souvenir of the crime, much like 
the photograph in State v. Lewis, 123 Idaho 336,848 P.2d 394 (1993). In Lewis, the Court 
determined that although photographs were not specifically authorized to be seized under the 
search warrant, the Court determined it constituted memorabilia of the victimization and 
therefore fell under the search warrant. Here, the condom is a memento of the sexual abuse of 
R. W. There is no requirement for how'long someone keeps something for it to constitute a 
memento. Rather, the condom itself is something that is a souvenir of the sexual abuse ofR.W. 
As such, it falls within the parameters of the search warrant. 
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The condom, Anbesol and eye dropper was found in plain view 
during the execution of the search warrant. 
Even if the condom, Anbesol and eye dropper do not fall under the parameters of the 
search warrant, they were lawfully seized in plain view. The Plain View Doctrine provides that 
if an officer is lawfully on a premise, has a lawful right to access the object and the incriminating 
character of the object is immediately apparent (i.e. the officer has probable cause to believe the 
object is evidence of criminal activity), the officer may seize the evidence without a subsequent 
warrant. See State v. Butterbaugh, 138 Idaho 96, 99, 57 P.3d 807,810 (Idaho Ct. App. 1999), 
Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128 (1990), Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730 (1983), State v. Buti, 
131 Idaho, 793, 964 P.2d 660 (1998). 
In order for the plaint view doctrine to apply, the officers must be lawfully conducting a 
search within the parameters of the warrant (they cannot exceed the scope of the search 
authorized by the warrant.) In State v. Claiborne, 120 Idaho 581, 818 P.2d 285 (1991), the 
officers were executing a search warrant, during which time they discovered a book containing 
sexually exploitative material. The Court determined that the officers discovered the book while 
lawfully searching the home within the parameters of the search warrant and the book, based 
upon the officer's training and experience, contained evidence of a crime. Thus they had 
probable cause to believe the item is associated with criminal activity. Id. at 290-291 citing 
Texas v. Brown. 
Here, the officers had lawful authority to search the garbage, as evidence contained in the 
search warrant could have been thrown away. They also had authority to search the nightstand 
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looking for lubricants. During the search of the garbage, Officer Archuletta discovered the used 
condom in the garbage can. He immediately notified the primary detective, Detective Peck, of 
its existence. Given they were executing a search warrant for Lewd Conduct charges, the 
condom was immediately apparent as evidence of a crime. Additionally, while executing the 
search warrant upstairs, the officers opened the Defendant's nightstand and discovered two 
different lubricants, as well as the unopened condoms, the Anbesol and eye dropper. Search 
Warrant #1847 gave the officers the ability to seize any lubricants. Lubricants is defined as, "a 
usually oily substance, as grease, that reduces friction, heat and wear when applied as a surface 
coating to moving parts or between solid surfaces." Webster's II New College Dictionary 
(1999) Anbesol is a greasy substance that could reduce friction, so it could fall under the search 
warrant. Additionally, given the proximity to the lubricants and condoms, the officers had 
reason to seize the Anbesol as evidence of a crime, based upon their training and experience. 
Because the evidence was in plain view, the officers had legal authority to seize the condom, 
Anbesol and eye dropper. 
CONCLUSION 
The Defendant is time bared from raising this issue. Not only has years past but the law 
of the case prohibits him from raising issues which could have been previously raised. 
Furthermore, the evidence was seized lawfully either pursuant to the search warrant or was 
seized as evidence in plain view. For those reasons, the State asks this Court deny the 
Defendant's Second Motion to Suppress. 
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Canyon County Public Defender, by placing said instrument in their basket at the Clerk's Office 
on or about this ~day of May, 2010 
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c 
Supreme Court of Idaho, 
Boise, February 1991 Term. 
STATE of Idaho, Plaintiff-Respondent, 
v. 
Billy Gilbert CLAIBORNE, Defendant-Appel\ant. 
No. 18509. 
May 8, 1991. 
Dissent on Denial of Rehearing Oct. 29, 1991. 
Defendant was convicted in District Court, Fourth 
Judicial District, County of Ada, G. David Carey, J., 
and he appealed from partial denial of his motion to 
suppress. The Supreme Court, McDevitt, J., held that 
requirements of plain view doctrine for seizure of 
book containing sexually exploitative material were 
met where book was found during lawful search 
while officers were legitimately in defendant's home, 
where officers discovered the book inadvertently 
while searching for items named in search warrant, 
and it was immediately apparent to officers that the 
book contained sexually exploitative material. 
Affirmed. 
Johnson, J., dissented with opinion in which Bistline, 
1., concurred. 
Bistline, J., dissented from denial of motion for re-
hearing and filed opinion. 
West Headnotes 
ill Obscenity 281 ~7.6 
281 Obscenity 
281k7.5 Pretrial Seizure, Suppression, or Censor-
ship 
281k7.6 k. In General; Necessity for Adver-
sary Hearing. Most Cited Cases 
(Formerly 28Ik7.S) 
Searches and Seizures 349 ~5.1 
349 Searches and Seizures 
3491 In General 
Page 1 
349k25 Persons, Places and Things Protected 
349k25.1 k. In General. Most Cited Cases 
(Formerly 349k25) 
A book described on its front cover as dealing with 
"PedophilialPederasty/The Anal Com-
pleX/Completely Photo-Illustrated" was "expressive 
material" for purpose of the special requirements in 
the area of searches and seizures directed toward 
such materials. V.S.C.A. Const.Amends. 1,1. 
ill Constitutional Law 92 ~2191 
92 Constitutional Law 
92XVIII Freedom of Speech, Expression, and 
Press 
92XVIII(Y) Sexual Expression 
92k2189 Obscenity in General 
92k2191 k. Lack of Constitutional Pro-
tection. Most Cited Cases 
(Formerly 92k90.4(I» 
Obscenity is unprotected by the First Amendment. 
V.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 1 . 
.IIl Constitutional Law 92 ~2194 
92 Constitutional Law 
92XVIII Freedom of Speech, Expression, and 
Press 
Cases 
92XVIIUY) Sexual Expression 
92k2193 Print Publications 
92k2194 k. In General. Most Cited 
(Formerly 92k90.4(6» 
Searches and Seizures 349 ~30 
349 Searches and Seizures 
3491 In General 
349k30 k. Items Subject to Seizure in Gen-
eral; Nexus. Most Cited Cases 
Seizure during search of defendant's home of book 
containing sexual\y exploitative material did not in-
volve prior restraint inasmuch as defendant was not 
in business of producing or distributing expressive 
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materials. I.C. § . 18-1507(2)0); V.S.C.A. 
Const.Amends. I, 1. 
ill Searches and Seizures 349 ~149 
349 Searches and Seizures 
349IIl Execution and Return of Warrants 
349kl47 Scope of Search 
349k 149 k. Objects in Plain View; Inadver-
tent Discovery. Most Cited Cases 
Seizure of book containing sexually exploitative ma-
terial was proper under plain view doctrine where 
book was found during lawful search while officers 
were legitimately in defendant's home, officers dis-
covered the book inadvertently while searching for 
items named in valid warrant, and it was immediately 
apparent to officers that book contained sexually ex-
ploitative material. V.S.C.A. Const.Amends. I, 1; 
I.C. §§ 18-1507(2)(j), 19-1507A. 
ill Searches and Seizures 349 ~49 
349 Searches and Seizures 
3491 In General 
349k47 Plain View from Lawful Vantage 
Point 
349k49 k. Nature of Items Seized; Nexus. 
Most Cited Cases 
Requirement that it must be immediately apparent to 
police that item searched under plain view doctrine 
may be evidence of crime, contraband or otherwise 
subject to seizure is met when officer has probable 
cause to believe that item in question is associated 
with criminal activity, and this determination may be 
based on surrounding facts and circumstances, and 
officer may draw reasonable inferences based on his 
training and experience in determining whether con-
nection exists. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4. 
**285 *581 Seiniger, Nevin, Kofoed and Herzfeld, 
Boise, for defendant-appellant. David Z. Nevin, ar-
gued. 
Larry J. EchoHawk, Atty. Gen., Michael A. Hender-
gm, Deputy Atty. Gen., Boise, for plaintiff-
respondent. Michael A. Henderson, argued. 
McDEVITT, Justice. 
Billy Gilbert Claiborne was under investigation by 
the Ada County Sheriffs Department as a result of 
Page 2 
allegations brought by a twelve-year-old girl and her 
mother accusing**286 *582 Claiborne of attempting 
to entice the girl into performing sexual acts with 
him. On January II, 1989, after talking to the young 
girl and tape-recording a conversation between her 
and the defendant, Ada County Sheriffs Detective 
Ken Smith executed an eight page affidavit in sup-
port of a search warrant. Based upon this affidavit the 
magistrate issued two search warrants. The first war-
rant permitted a search of the defendant's home for 
the following seven items: 
I. sexually explicit letters; 
2. purple lace panties; 
3. photo album with nude photos of Claiborn [sic] 
and his wife; 
4. sexually explicit magazines; 
5. vibrator; 
6. box with letters; 
7. rose colored lipstick. 
The second warrant was for the safe at the 
defendant's office. A third warrant was issued on 
January 13, 1989, to search the defendant's home 
once more. Nothing was seized from the defendant's 
office, however, numerous items were taken from his 
home during the execution of the first warrant. One 
item seized was a book entitled The Ugly Duckling. 
which is the focus of our inquiry. 
On January 24, 1989, an Ada County grand jury re-
turned a five-count indictment against the defendant. 
The first two counts charged him with sexual abuse 
of the twelve-year-old girl in violation of I.C. § 18-
1506. The remaining three counts charged him with 
possession of sexually exploitative material in viola-
tion ofI.C. § 18-1507 A. 
The defendant filed a Motion to Suppress, which 
sought to suppress the fruits of the searches, specifi-
cally naming, among other materials, The Ugly Duck-
ling. The district court issued a Memorandum and 
Order granting in part and denying in part the Motion 
to Suppress. The district court ruled that some of the 
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items which were not named in the warrant were not 
properly seized. As for The Ugly Duckling, however, 
the court found that it was properly seized under the 
plain view exception. 
The parties entered an agreement pursuant to LC.R. 
1 1 (a)(2) with the defendant entering a conditional 
guilty plea to possession of sexually exploitative ma-
terial, and reserving the right to appeal the district 
court's partial denial of his Motion to Suppress. A1\ 
other charges were dropped and the defendant was 
sentenced to serve a prison term of one to five years 
with the court retaining jurisdiction for 120 days 
pending this appeal. 
The issue presented is whether the district court was 
correct in ruling that The Ugly Duckling was properly 
seized under the plain view exception to the warrant 
requirement. Our task is to determine where statuto-
rily prohibited materials, as defined by I.C. § 18-
1507(2)(j),.El::il such as The Ugly Duckling, (hereinaf-
ter called "sexua1\y exploitative materials") fa1\ on 
the spectrum of permissible or impermissible sei-
zures. We then must decide when the requirements 
for the seizure of such materials are met. 
FNI. "Sexua1\y exploitative material" means 
any photograph, motion picture, videotape, 
print, negative, slide, or other mechanically, 
electronically, or chemically reproduced vis-
ual material which depicts a child engaged 
in, participating in, observing, or being used 
for explicit sexual conduct. 
The defendant urges that "expressive materials" are 
entitled to heightened scrutiny and are presumptively 
protected at the time of the seizure, and that The Ugly 
Duckling qualifies as expressive material. 
In order for us to properly address this question, we 
must begin with a working definition of "expressive 
materials." As common as this term is, it seems no 
court has ever set forth its exact meaning. After a 
careful examination of the cases involving the First 
Amendment and more specifica1\y, freedom of 
speech concerns, we have found but fragments of 
definitions that have proven helpful in our analysis. 
One case consistently referred to in this area is Lovell 
v. City ofGrifjin. Ga .. 303 U.S. 444, 58 S.Ct. 666.82 
L.Ed. 949 (1938), where the United States Supreme 
Court spoke of "the liberty of the press" and said, 
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"[t]he press in its historic connotation **287 *583 
comprehends every sort of publication which affords 
a vehicle of information and opinion." Id .. 303 U.S. 
at 452. 58 S.Ct. at 669 (emphasis added). In Grove 
Press, Inc. v. Christenberry. 175 F.Supp. 488 
(S.D.N. Y.1959), affd. 276 F.2d 433 (2d Cir.l960), 
the court spoke about the importance of the freedom 
of expression and stated, "[ilt matters not whether 
ideas be expressed in political pamphlets or works or 
political, economic or social theory or criticism, or 
through artistic media. A1\ such expressions must be 
freely available." Id. at 502-03. 
From these guidelines, we have distilled the defini-
tion of "expressive materials" to mean any medium 
through which ideas, information, and opinions are 
expressed, articulated, or made known. 
Next we must consider whether The Ugly Duckling 
fits within this definition of "expressive materials." 
The Ugly Duckling is a sma1\ paperback book with 
the title in large print on the cover. On the bottom, in 
smaller print, are the words: 
PedophilialPederasty/The Anal Com-
plex/Completely Photo-Illustrated. 
In the center of the cover is a drawing of an adult 
man sitting on a chair surrounded by four young chil-
dren. On the back cover are the words: 
Pedophilia, Pederasty and the Anal Complex are 
considered the "ugly ducklings" of Man's sexual 
nature. Now, for the frrst time anywhere, F.A. Grif-
fin takes an honest, in-depth look at these three ta-
boos. 
Inside is a history of these types of sexual practices in 
different cultures throughout history. Interspersed 
throughout the text are illustrations, many of which 
are explicit photographs of young children engaged 
in a variety of sexual acts. 
ill Arguably, The Ugly Duckling can be considered 
"expressive material" under our definition; it is an 
expression of ideas and information, however repug-
nant they may be to the general population. Our next 
level of inquiry is whether and to what extent it is 
protected under the United States Constitution. 
Within the area of "expressive materials" are sub-
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groups which are treated differently by virtue of their 
content. One subgroup consists of materials deemed 
obscene. Miller v. California. 413 U.S. 15, 93 S.Ct. 
2607,37 L.Ed.2d 419 (973), held that obscenity is 
not protected by the First Amendment and set forth 
these guidelines for the trier of fact: 
(a) whether "the average person, applying contem-
porary community standards" would find that the 
work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient in-
terest; (b) whether the work depicts or describes, in 
a patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifi-
cally defined by the applicable state law; and (c) 
whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious 
literary, artistic, political, or scientific value. 
Miller. 413 U.S. at 24, 93 S.Ct. at 2615 (citations 
omitted). 
ill Although obscenity is unprotected by the First 
Amendment, it is still subject to special requirements 
in the area of searches and seizures because the pre-
sumptive protection of "expressive materials" is ex-
tended to materials that, at the time of the seizure, 
have not been conclusively proven to be obscene. 
The United States Supreme Court stated in Maryland 
v. Macon. 472 U.S. 463, 105 S.Ct. 2778, 86 L.Ed.2d 
370 (1985): 
The First Amendment imposes special constraints 
on searches for and seizures of presumptively pro-
tected material, and requires that the Fourth 
Amendment be applied with "scrupulous exacti-
tude" in such circumstances. Consequently the 
Court has imposed particularized rules applicable 
to searches for and seizures of allegedly obscene 
films, books and papers. 
Id. 472 U.S. at 468, 105 S.Ct. at 2781 (citations 
omitted). 
It is important to keep in mind the reasons for height-
ened procedural safeguards in the context of seizing 
"expressive materials." The foundation for this pro-
tection lies in the First Amendment. "Expressive ma-
terials" have traditionally been afforded more protec-
tion in the search and seizure **288 *584 area be-
cause of the danger of prior restraint. In Fort Wqyne 
Books v. Indiana. 489 U.S. 46, 109 S.Ct. 916, 103 
L.Ed.2d 34 (I989), the United States Supreme Court 
cited Maryland v. Macon. 472 U.S. at 470, 105 S.Ct. 
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at 2782, saying, "[i]t is '[t]he risk of prior restraint, 
which is the underlying basis for the special Fourth 
Amendment protections according searches for and 
seizure of First Amendment materials' that motivates 
this rule." Id. 489 U.S. at 63-64. 109 S.Ct. at 928. 
ill The danger of prior restraint is not present here. 
The defendant was not in the business of producing 
or distributing "expressive materials." The police 
seized one copy of one book that was in the private 
possession of the defendant. Therefore the danger 
sought to be avoided by the implementation of 
heightened procedural safeguards in the area of seiz-
ing "expressive materials" is not a concern in this 
situation. 
Another constitutional concern present in the seizure 
of obscenity is the recognition that it is difficult, if 
not impossible, for police officers in the field to make 
a determination that material is obscene at the time of 
the seizure. The defmition of obscenity involves de-
tailed analysis and fact finding by an appropriate trier 
of fact not capable of being made by the individuals 
participating in a search and seizure. The defmition 
of sexually exploitative material, by contrast, is much 
more detailed, and narrowly defmed by statute. This 
difference has been recognized: 
We also note that the difference in constitutional 
requirements between child protection and obscen-
ity statutes also results in different requirements for 
an affidavit supporting a warrant ... To pass consti-
tutional muster as unprotected obscenity, a work 
must appeal to the prurient interest in sex when 
taken as a whole, must portray sexual conduct in a 
patently offensive way, and must not, taken as a 
whole, have serious literary, artistic, political, or 
scientific value. Although the existence of these 
characteristics is ultimately a question of fact, 
submitted to a jury, a determination of this "fact" 
involves complicated knowledge and information 
far beyond that which is evident from the face of a 
photograph alone ... In contrast, the constitutional 
requirements for a child pornography statute are 
much simpler and more susceptible to credible as-
sertion in an affidavit ... An assertion that certain 
pictures depict "sexually explicit conduct" prohib-
ited by [the statute] does not require of the affiant 
extensive knowledge of the prurient interest of the 
average person, of what portrayals of sexual con-
duct are patently offensive, or of literary, artistic, 
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political, or scientific criteria for "serious merit." 
The affiant need only be able to identify the spe-
cific, clearly dermed acts tisted in [the statute] .... 
United States v. Smith. 795 F .2d 841, 848 n. 7 (9th 
Cir.1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1032, 107 S.Ct. 
1964,95 L.Ed.2d 535 (987), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 
974, 109 S.Ct. 512, 102 L.Ed.2d 547 (988) (cita-
tions omitted). 
Thus, the problem of police making subjective judg-
ments at the time of the seizure is not present in the 
case of seizing sexually exploitative materials. 
The United States Supreme Court carved out another 
area of "expressive materials" for special treatment 
with two significant decisions dealing with sexually 
exploitative material. New York v. Ferber. 458 U.S. 
747, 102 S.Ct. 3348, 73 L.Ed.2d 1113 (982), re-
jected the traditional obscenity standards set forth in 
Miller v. California, as being inapplicable to child 
pornography, saying that a "trier of fact need not find 
that the material appeals to the prurient interest of the 
average person; it is not required that sexual conduct 
portrayed be done so in a patently offensive marmer; 
and the material at issue need not be considered as a 
whole." 458 U.S. at 764, 102 S.Ct. at 3359. In 
Osborne v. Ohio. 495 U.S. 103, 110 S.Ct. 1691. 109 
L.Ed.2d 98 (1990), the Court went further and held 
that, unlike obscenity, states may prohibit the private 
possession of child pornography. The states have 
strong interests in enacting such legislation. In 
**289*S8SNew York v. Ferber. 458 U.S. 747, 102 
S.Ct. 3348, 73 L.Ed.2d 1113 (982), the Court wrote: 
It is evident beyond the need for elaboration that a 
State's interest in "safeguarding the physical and 
psychological well-being of a minor" is "compel-
ling" .... The legislative judgment, as well as the 
judgment found in relevant literature, is that the use 
of children as subjects of pornographic materials is 
harmful to the physiological, emotional, and men-
tal health of the child. That judgment, we think, 
easily passes muster under the First Amendment. 
'd. 458 U.S. at 756-58, 102 S.Ct. at 3354-55 (cita-
tions omitted). 
Other interests were outlined in Osborne v. Ohio. 495 
U.S. 103, 110 S.Ct. 1691. 109 L.Ed.2d 98 (990): 
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First, as Ferber recognized, the materials produced 
by child pornographers permanently record the vic-
tim's abuse. The pornography's continued existence 
causes the child victims continuing harm by haunt-
ing the children in years to come. The State's ban 
on possession and viewing encourages the posses-
sors of these materials to destroy them. Second, 
encouraging the destruction of these materials is 
also desirable because evidence suggests that pe-
dophiles use child pornography to seduce other 
children into sexual activity. 
'd. 495 U.S. at Ill. 110 S.Ct. at 1697 (citations 
omitted). 
Idaho has seen fit to enact legislation prohibiting the 
possession of sexually exploitative material which is 
dermed as: 
"Sexually exploitative material" means any photo-
graph, motion picture, videotape, print, negative, 
slide, or other mechanically, electronically, or 
chemically reproduced visual material which de-
picts a child engaged in, participating in, observ-
ing, or being used for explicit sexual conduct. 
Idaho Code § 18-1507(2)<D. 
Idaho Code § 18-1507A, the provision prohibiting 
the possession of such material, states, in its entirety: 
Possession of sexually exploitative material for 
other than a commercial purpose-Penalty.- (1) It 
is the policy of the legislature in enacting this sec-
tion to protect children from the physical and psy-
chological damage caused by their being used in 
photographic representations of sexual conduct 
which involves children. It is, therefore, the intent 
of the legislature to penalize possession of photo-
graphic representations of sexual conduct which 
involves children in order to protect the identity of 
children who are victimized by involvement in the 
photographic representations, and to protect chil-
dren from future involvement in the photographic 
representations of sexual conduct. 
(2) Every person who knowingly and willfully 
has in his possession any sexually exploitative ma-
terial as defined in section 18-1507, Idaho Code, 
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for other than a commercial purpose, is gUilty of a 
felony, and shall be punished by imprisonment in 
the state prison for a period not to exceed five (5) 
years and by a fine not to exceed five thousand dol-
lars ($5,000). 
Because Idaho has chosen to criminalize the posses-
sion of sexually exploitative material, The Ugly 
Duckling achieves the status of prohibited material. 
Although it may fall under the broad definition of 
"expressive materials," it is at the same time evidence 
of the crime of possession of sexually exploitative 
material. This changes the traditional obscenity sei-
zure analysis considerably. When a book is judged to 
be evidence of a crime, it is seizable with a valid war-
rant or under one of the exceptions to the warrant 
requirement just as any other piece of evidence of a 
crime would be. The United States Supreme Court, in 
Fort Wayne Books v. Indiana stated: 
Most importantly, in Heller v. New York. 413 U.S. 
483, 492 [93 S.Ct. 2789, 2794, 37 L.Ed.2d 7451 
(1973), the Court noted that "seizing films to de-
stroy them or to block their distribution or exhibi-
tion is a very different matter from seizing a single 
copy of a film for the bona fide purpose of preserv-
ing it as evidence in a criminal proceeding" ... The 
same is obviously true for books or any other ex-
pressive **290 *586 materials. While a single copy 
of a book or film may be seized and retained for 
evidentiary purposes based on a finding of prob-
able cause, the publication may not be taken out of 
circulation completely until there has been a de-
termination of obscenity after an adversary hearing. 
ld .. 489 U.S. at 83, 109 S.Ct. at 927. 
We now must return to our original inquiry of 
whether or not the plain view exception to the war-
rant requirement may be applied to the seizure of The 
Ugly Duckling in this case. 
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Consti-
tution protects society against unreasonable searches 
and seizures by requiring a warrant supported by 
probable cause describing with particularity the place 
to be searched and the items to be seized. U.S. Const. 
amend. IV. There are recognized exceptions to the 
warrant requirement, one of which is the plain view 
exception. This exception permits the seizure of 
items not named in the warrant if they meet certain 
Page 6 
requirements. These requirements were outlined in 
Texas v. Brown. 460 U.S. 730, 103 S.Ct. 1535, 75 
L.Ed.2d 502 (983): 
First, the officer must lawfully make an "initial in-
trusion" or otherwise properly be in a position from 
which he can view a particular area. Second, the 
officer must discover incriminating evidence "in-
advertently," which is to say, he may not "know in 
advance the location of [certain] evidence and in-
tend to seize it," relying on the plain-view doctrine 
only as a pretext. Finally, it must be "immediately 
apparent" to the police that the items they observe 
may be evidence of a crime, contraband, or other-
wise subject to seizure. 
Id.. 460 U.S. at 737, 103 S.Ct. at 1540-41 (citations 
omitted).fW. 
FN2. The second requirement, that the evi-
dence must be discovered "inadvertently" 
appears to have been eliminated by Horton 
v. California. 496 U.S. 128 , 110 S.Ct. 230 l, 
110 L.Ed.2d 112 (1990), 
HI Applying this test to the case at bar, the first 
prong was satisfied because The Ugly Duckling was 
found during a lawful search while the officers were 
legitimately in the defendant's home. The second 
prong of the test was satisfied by the fact that the 
officers discovered the book inadvertently while 
searching for items named in a valid warrant. In order 
to satisfy the third prong of the test, we must deter-
mine if it was immediately apparent to the officers 
that The Ugly Duckling contained sexually exploita-
tive material in violation ofl.C. § 18-1507 A. 
ill This requirement is met when an officer has prob-
able cause to believe that the item in question is asso-
ciated with criminal activity. Texas v. Brown. 460 
U.S. 730, 741-42, 103 S.Ct. 1535, 1543, 75 L.Ed.2d 
502 (983), This determination may be based on the 
surrounding facts and circumstances. State v. Lair. 95 
Wash.2d 706, 712, 630 P.2d 427, 433 (1981). An 
officer "may draw reasonable inferences based on his 
training and experience in determining whether a 
connection exists." State v. Tamez, 116 Idaho 945, 
946,782 P.2d 353, 354 (Ct.App.l989). In addition, it 
is acceptable to look at "the collective knowledge of 
the officers executing the searches." United States v. 
Newton. 788 F.2d 1392 (8th Cir.1986). 
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We believe that it was immediately apparent to the 
officers searching Claiborne's home that Th{! Ugly 
Duckling contained sexua\1y exploitative material. 
The words on the front cover: 
Pedophilia/Pederasty/The Anal Com~ 
plexlCompletely Photo~I1lustrated 
and the words on the back cover: 
Pedophilia, Pederasty and the Anal Complex are 
considered the "ugly ducklings" of Man's sexual 
nature. Now, for the first time anywhere, F.A. Grif~ 
fin takes an honest, in~depth look at these three ta~ 
boos. 
alerted officers as to the contents and clearly make it 
immediately apparent that sexua\1y exploitative mate-
rial in the form of "Pedophilia .. , Photo Illustrated" 
will be found inside. A cursory glance at the inner 
contents only serves to confirm that conviction. 
There are numerous photographs**291 *587 of pre-
pubescent boys and girls engaged in or observing 
explicit sexual activities with both other children and 
adults that meet the definition of sexually exploitative 
material as set forth in I.C. § l8-1507(2)(j). 
Thus, because the statute narrowly and specifically 
defmes sexually exploitative material, and because of 
the lesser constitutional protections afforded this ma-
terial, officers involved in the search were not re~ 
quired to make a subjective determination regarding 
the status of sexually exploitative materials. Here, it 
was immediately apparent to the officers upon view-
ing the cover of The Ugly Duckling that it contained 
sexua\1y exploitative material. 
We hold that all three requirements for a valid plain 
view seizure were met. 
We affirm the district court's ruling that The Ugly 
Duckling was properly seized under the plain view 
exception to the warrant requirement. 
BAKES, C.J., and BOYLE, J. concur. 
JOHNSON, Justice, dissenting. 
"You can't tell a book by its cover," so an old English 
proverb tells us. Today, the Court rewrites this prov-
erb to a\1ow a statement on a book's cover to permit a 
law enforcement officer to seize the book without a 
Page 7 
warrant. I am unable to join in this opinion. In my 
view, the plain view doctrine is not applicable to the 
seizure of a book because of statements on its cover 
about its contents. 
Although the United States Supreme Court has not 
ruled on this question, in a footnote in Lo-)i Sales 
Inc. v. New York. 442 U.S. 319, 326 n. 5, 99 S.Ct. 
2319, 2324 n. 5, 60 L.Ed.2d 920 (1979) the Court 
noted that "materials normally may not be seized on 
the basis of alleged obscenity without a warrant." 
In United States v. Hale, 784 F.2d 1465 (9th Cir.), 
cert. denied 479 U.S. 829, 107 S.Ct. 110,93 L.Ed.2d 
59 (986), the Ninth Circuit considered the issue of 
the seizure of alleged child pornography under the 
plain view doctrine: 
Under Supreme Court and Ninth Circuit precedent, 
the "First Amendment imposes special constraints 
on searches for and seizures of presumptively pro-
tected material ... and requires that the Fourth 
Amendment be applied with 'scrupulous exacti-
tude' in such circumstances." As we have held, 
"Because of the First Amendment, the seizure of 
all publications must meet higher procedural stan-
dards than normal." 
These "higher procedural standards" take two 
forms. First, the warrant must specifica\1y describe 
the material to be seized. Blanket clauses that do 
not refer to specific items and to material directly 
related to specific items are not proper bases for 
constitutional searches and seizures. Second, the 
exceptions to the warrant requirement are narrowly 
construed. The plain view exception argued by the 
government, for example, cannot be used to search 
for or seize alleged obscenity or alleged child por-
nography that is unspecified in the warrant. Oth-
erwise, police officers could seize any publication 
or film they deem to be unprotected by the First 
Amendment, thereby subverting the higher proce-
dural standards that require a neutral magistrate to 
make the initial determination of probable cause as 
to specific items. The fact that child pornography is 
unprotected by the First Amendment is irrelevant. 
All expression is presumptively protected at the 
time of the warrantless seizure; child pornography 
is no different in this regardfrom obscenity. 
[d. at 1469 (citations omitted) (emphasis added). 
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The Ninth Circuit has recently noted that to the extent 
Hale stands for the proposition that a stricter prob-
able cause standard should apply when First 
Amendment values are implicated it has been over-
ruled by New York v. P.J. Video, Inc .. 475 U.S. 868. 
875. 106 S.Ct. 1610. 1615. 89 L.Ed.2d 871 (1986). 
u.s. v. Weber, 923 F.2d 1338. 1343 n. 6 (9th 
Cir.1990). P.J. Video does not, however, hold that the 
plain view doctrine applies to the seizure of a publi-
cation thought to contain child pornography. In 
**292 *588 P.J. Video, the Court buttressed its con-
clusion that a different standard for determining 
probable cause is not necessary where First Amend-
ment protection is at issue with a reference to "the 
requirement that the magistrate determine probable 
cause as a means of safeguarding First Amendment 
interests." Allowing an officer to make a probable 
cause determination under the plain view doctrine 
based on the reading of a book's cover is inconsistent 
with this view. 
The recent decision of the Supreme Court in Osborne 
v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103. 110 S.Ct. 1691. 109 L.Ed.2d 
98 (1990) does not undermine the force of the Ninth 
Circuit's decision in Hale rejecting the application of 
the plain view doctrine to the seizure of alleged child 
pornography. In Osborne, the Court held that a state 
may constitutionally proscribe the possession and 
viewing of child pornography. Osborne did not pur-
port to deal with the Fourth Amendment question 
presented in this case. The opinion of the Ohio Su-
preme Court in Osborne reveals that the search and 
seizure of child pornography there was conducted 
pursuant to a warrant, not pursuant to the plain view 
doctrine. State v. Osborne, 37 Ohio St.3d 249. 525 
N.E.2d 1363. 1372 (988). 
The fact that the cover of The Ugly Duckling referred 
to its being "Completely Photo-Illustrated" should 
not be considered as a substitute for a warrant issued 
by a neutral magistrate based on a determination of 
probable cause. To do so would weaken the presump-
tion that all publications are protected under the First 
Amendment. 
I do not gainsay the right of the state to seek a war-
rant for the search and seizure of The Ugly Duckling 
based on information provided by the officers who 
executed the warrant for the search of ClaiBorne's 
residence. Nor do I contend that the state could not 
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prosecute Claiborne if the book were seized pursuant 
to a warrant issued by a magistrate. What I do find 
erroneous is permitting the seizure of the book with-
out a warrant issued after a determination of probable 
cause by a magistrate. The application of the plain 
view doctrine in this case puts law enforcement offi-
cers in the position of determining what is entitled to 
First Amendment protection. 
BISTLINE, J., concurs.BISTLINE, J. dissenting from 
the denial of the motion for rehearing. 
In the Court's initial opinion it was held, erroneously 
as Justice Johnson's dissenting opinion forcefully 
demonstrated, that material presumptively protected 
by the first amendment may be seized without a war-
rant under the "plain view doctrine." In the petition 
for rehearing, the Court is asked by respected defense 
counsel to reconsider whether the facts of this case 
permit a conclusion that the requirements for a plain 
view seizure were present. The Court should not be 
overly quick to eschew this opportunity to reconsider 
the question. On a proper review, in hindsight, the 
Court should reach the conclusion that the State 
failed to carry its burden of proving that the seizure 
of appellant's copy of The Ugly Duckling was consti-
tutionally permissible under the plain view doctrine. 
A warrantless search and seizure is presumptively 
unreasonable. And, although it has been said many 
times, it is important to remember that it is the prose-
cutor who bears the burden of proving that a war-
rantless seizure falls within one of our carefully 
drawn and jealously guarded exceptions to the war-
rant requirement. State v. Bottelson. 102 Idaho 90. 
92. 625 P.2d 1093. 1095 (981). Here, where the 
book was seized without the authority of a warrant, it 
became the State's burden to show the seizure was 
constitutionally permissible. 
The Court cites to Texas v. Brown. 460 U.S. 730, 
737. 103 S.Ct. 1535. 1540-41. 75 L.Ed.2d 502 
Ll..2.§J1 for its statement of the three requirements 
which are required to establish a valid plain view 
seizure: 1) a valid initial intrusion into the constitu-
tionally protected area, 2) the officer must inadver-
tently discover the evidencefW., and 3) that **293 
*589 it must be immediately apparent to the police 
that the object is subject to seizure. A review of the 
suppression hearing transcript shows the State fell 
well short of its burden under Brown. 
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FN I. The United States Supreme Court has 
eliminated the inadvertence requirement 
from the fourth amendment plain view doc-
trine. Horton v. California. 496 U.S. 128, 
110 S. Ct. 2301. 2304, 110 L.Ed.2d 112 
(1990). The search warrant here was exe-
cuted prior to the issuance of Horton. But, 
where the majority relies on Brown v. Texas 
and does not apply Horton to this case, the 
questions of whether Horton will be adopted 
under Article I, § 17, and if it is adopted 
whether it applies retroactively are left for 
another day. 
On a reading of the appeal record it is immediately 
observed that the State did not present one single 
witness at the suppression hearing. It should go with-
out saying that it is certainly difficult, if not impossi-
ble, to prove anything without the benefit of evi-
dence. That seemingly indisputable observation is 
mentioned because the recognition of it has appar-
ently eluded those other members of the Court who 
comprise the majority. Detective Kenneth Smith was 
a likely witness for the State, and yet he was called to 
the witness stand by the defense. Smith testified that 
he was not present when the police seized The Ugly 
Duckling. but had heard some things about it. To wit: 
Q [BY DEFENSE COUNSEL] "Ugly Duckling" 
and "Sexual Encounter No.6," Exhibits 3 and 4, 
were located in the same place, is that correct? 
i.' 
A Yes. 
Q Will you describe where that was? 
A I personally did not seize those items. They were 
seized by Detective Bart Hamilton. I have no per-
sonal knowledge of where they were seized other 
than what I was told by Detective Bart Hamilton. 
Q Explain what your understanding from Detective 
Hamilton is. 
A In the master closet bedroom, on the floor, in a 
box. And the box contained all 40 magazines Gkus 
items b I and b2 listed on the property invoice. 
FN2. Actually, the inventory list shows that 
there were twenty-eight magazines seized 
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along with twelve books. Additionally, there 
were four films and two empty film contain-
ers in the box. Out of these forty-six items 
seized, only two resulted in an indictment. 
Other items seized in the search included 
copies of "Playboy" and "Penthouse" and a 
copy of The Art of Sensual Massage. At a 
second search of the house, the police seized 
forty-six videotapes many of which were not 
sexually explicit or exploitative, including 
one on taxes, one on how to fly a mini-
helicopter, the Wizard of Oz, the Blues 
Brothers, several made for T.V. movies and 
a tape of a family reunion. None of these 
tapes resulted in an indictment or informa-
tion being filed against the appellant. 
****** 
Q Okay. Now was the box closed or open? 
A Again, I have no personal knowledge of that. 
Q Okay. Has anyone told you? 
A No. I don't know. 
Q All right. Have you seen the box? 
A Not to my recollection. 
Q Was there marking on it? 
A I have no recollection. 
Q You have seen it since it was seized, have you 
not? 
A My recollection is that the box was seized and 
then we placed it in one of our evidence boxes, and 
I don't know what the status of the box is, whether 
it was seized or what. I have no idea. 
The State's cross-examination of Detective Smith 
merely re-established that the book in question was in 
a box along with 44 other items of legal, albeit erotic, 
material. 
At best, all that one can discern from the record eve-
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rything in the box was seized without a close exami-
nation by the police. The testimony from Detective 
Smith suggests that the officers did not realize they 
had seized sexually exploitative material until after 
the materials already had been taken to the police 
station. While searching the home the first time, the 
officers saw numerous videotapes which they felt had 
suspicious titles. Detective Smith was asked whether 
the decision to seek another search warrant was mo-
tivated only by those titles. He was careful to say that 
**294 *590 the officers relied on the other items they 
had seized in the fIrst search. 
Upon seeing them [the videotapes at the house], 
also upon reviewing the items that we did seize, in 
reviewing those items, we did locate items that ap-
peared to be child pornographic, child pornogra-
phy. (emphasis added) 
The implication of Detective Smith's testimony is that 
it was not readily apparent to the police they had 
seized sexually exploitative material until it was ex-
amined at the police station. 
Common sense would suggest to anyone that the po-
lice properly would not have taken all forty-six items, 
but not take the box. The box would have been taken, 
if only for the convenience of handling the other ma-
terials. If the detective decided to simply take the box 
and everything in it back to the police station, it is 
entirely possible, if not probable, that the contents 
were not completely examined until after they had 
been seized. That is, Detective Hamilton could have 
looked at a few items, which mayor may not have 
included the one in question, and then decided to take 
everything. 
This "seize in haste, examine at leisure" method of 
police work was certainly in effect at the time of the 
second search of the house where the seventy-four 
videotapes were seized without regard for content. 
There is no reason to believe that the police were any 
more solicitous of the appellant's fIrst and fourth 
amendment rights during the fIrst search when the 
Ugly Duckling was seized. 
Because it is not at all clear whether the examination, 
not the seizure, of The Ugly Duckling occurred at the 
home, or later at the station, it is inappropriate for 
this Court to fInd that the State carried its burden of 
proving the search was justifIed by the plain view 
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doctrine. If the Ugly Duckling was not discovered 
until the contents of the box were examined at the 
police station, then the seizure could not fall within 
the plain view exception as the seizure would have 
already been accomplished prior to the time it be-
came readily apparent to the police that The Ugly 
Duckling was sexually exploitative material. 
In sum, the Court could conclude that the search was 
justifIed by the plain view doctrine, provided how-
ever that Detective Hamilton examined the contents 
of the box while searching for those items listed in 
the search warrant, and also provided that during the 
examination he inadvertently saw the book, and it 
was immediately apparent to him that it was sexually 
exploitative material as that term is defIned in 1hl 
18-1507(2)(j). But the Court could only so urge if 
Detective Hamilton had testifIed, which he did not. 
Appellate courts do not sit to engage in imagination 
of what might have been proveable; rather, our func-
tion is to discern what has or has not been factually 
proven, and then apply pertinent statutory or case 
precedent and principles of law. Here the State failed 
to prove that it knew The Ugly Duckling was sexually 
exploitative material before it was seized and taken to 
the police station. The State has utterly failed to 
prove its search came within the plain view exception 
to the warrant requirement. Accordingly, the evi-
dence should have been suppressed, which is so as a 
matter of law. There are no issues of fact discernable 
in the State's presentation. 
The lesson which should be learned today, both by 
those who comprise the majority and by the official-
dom of Garden City, is that police officers are enti-
tled to more education and instruction in the laws 
attendant to search and seizure. This dissent does not 
intend to convey the message that the police officers 
were at fault. Rather it appears that they were un-
trained and unadvised relative to an undertaking 
which requires specialized knowledge in a particular-
ized area of criminal law. 
Idaho,1991. 
State v. Claiborne 
120 Idaho 581,818 P.2d 285 
END OF DOCUMENT 
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Supreme Court of Idaho, 
Boise, December 1992 Term. 
STATE ofidaho, Plaintiff-Respondent, 
v. 
George Frank LEWIS, Defendant-Appellant. 
No. 18580. 
Feb.2S, 1993. 
Rehearing Denied March 30, 1993. 
Defendant was convicted in the District Court Fourth 
Judicial District, Ada County, Deborah A. Ball, J., of 
lewd and lascivious conduct with minor under age of 
16, and he appealed. The Supreme Court, McDevitt, 
C.J., held that: (1) double jeopardy did not bar prose-
cution, despite prior prosecution for knowingly trans-
ferring bodily fluid containing human immunodefi-
ciency virus (HIV); (2) continuance of trial was not 
abuse of discretion; (3) selecting jury from another 
county was not improper; (4) certain photographs 
and "memorabilia" were properly admitted; (S) evi-
dence of prior uncharged sexual contact with same 
victim was properly admitted; and (6) allowing ex-
pert to testifY regarding whether defendant fit profile 
of sexual abuse victim was proper. 
Affmned. 
Bistline, J., filed opinion concurring in part and dis-
senting in part. 
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derson (argued), Deputy Atty. Gen., Boise, for plain-
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McDEVITT, Chief Justice. 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
Appellant, George Frank Lewis ("Lewis"), was con-
victed of the crime of lewd conduct with a minor 
under the age of sixteen, in violation of I.C. § 18-
1508. He was sentenced to a fixed term of life in 
prison. On appeal, Lewis contends that he was tried 
for the crime of lewd conduct in violation of the 
Double Jeopardy Clause of the United States Consti-
tution based upon the claim that a previous charge 
(knowingly transferring a bodily fluid containing the 
HIV virus, I.C. § 39-608) resulted in a mistrial and, 
according to Lewis, involved proof of the same con-
duct. In addition, Lewis contends that the district 
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court erred in delaying his trial, selecting a jury from 
another county, allowing certain evidence and testi-
mony to be presented to the jury, denying his motion 
for a new trial, and sentencing him to a fixed term of 
life in prison. For the reasons set forth below, we 
affirm the decision of the district court. 
BACKGROUND AND PRIOR PROCEEDINGS 
On June 11, 1989, a criminal complaint was filed 
against Lewis. In the complaint, the State alleged that 
Lewis had committed the crime of lewd conduct with 
a minor under the age of sixteen, in violation of L.h..§. 
18-1508. More specifically, the complaint stated that 
the conduct occurred in February of 1989, with a 
fifteen-year-old boy and involved the acts of Lewis 
performing oral sex and attempting to perform anal 
sex upon the boy, both with the intent to gratify 
Lewis' sexual desire. After a preliminary hearing held 
on June 13, 1989, an information was filed against 
Lewis on June 15, 1989. Lewis was arraigned on the 
charges and pled not guilty. 
On September 19, 1989, the parties appeared at the 
time set for jury trial by the court. At this hearing, the 
court advised the parties that trial needed to be reset. 
Lewis requested a "trial as soon as possible." The 
court inquired as to certain dates, heard responses, 
and the parties fmally**397 *339 agreed to set trial 
for November 20, 1989, at 9:00 a.m. 
On November 6, 1989, Lewis filed a motion to dis-
miss the information. Grounds for the motion were: 
(I) Lewis had been tried for attempting to transfer the 
HIV virus, "which contained the identical issue as in 
this matter;" and (2) the HIV charge ended in a mis-
trial, over Lewis' objections, and the State is now 
collaterally estopped from further proceedings. In 
support of the motion, Lewis cited "principles of res 
judicata and the 'double jeopardy' clause of the 
United States Constitution." During oral argument on 
this motion, counsel for Lewis discussed I.C. § 18-
ill, a statutory double jeopardy constraint. 
On November 7, 1989, the parties again appeared 
before the court. At the hearing, Lewis withdrew his 
November 6, 1989 motion to represent himself. In 
addition, the court discussed its concern about select-
ing a jury due to publicity, and whether jury selection 
in a county other than Ada County should be consid-
ered. Lewis requested that jury selection be from Ada 
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County. The State requested that the jury be selected 
from another county. Finally, the court ruled that 
there be no mention of Lewis being HIV -positive. FN I 
FN 1. Despite the court's ruling regarding 
Lewis' HIV status, Lewis decided to tell the 
jury in this case of his HIV status. During 
the in camera pre-trial motions, Lewis' at-
torney informed the judge that Lewis had 
decided to tell the jury of his HIV status. 
The trial judge warned Lewis of doing so, 
explaining the possible consequences, and 
Lewis' attorney responded that it was a mat-
ter of trial tactics. During the voir dire of 
prospective jurors, Lewis' attorney said, 
"Mr. Lewis has tested positive for the HIV 
virus, the AIDS virus." Finally, during the 
closing argument, Mr. Lewis, acting as his 
own attorney, stated, "I am infected with the 
HIV virus." 
On November 17, 1989, Lewis filed a motion in 
limine and a motion to suppress. Among other things, 
Lewis asked that the court not allow into evidence a 
statement made by Lewis to a police officer regard-
ing his sexual preference, a videotape, testimony 
from an expert witness, and certain property that was 
seized from his apartment. 
On November 20, 1989, the parties met in court for a 
status conference. At this conference, the court an-
nounced its decision to select a jury from another 
county, to which Lewis objected, stating his desire to 
go to trial immediately. The court responded that 
another trial was going on at the time, and it set jury 
trial for November 28, 1989. Finally, the court heard 
argument on Lewis' claim of double jeopardy. 
Also on November 20, 1989, Marji Shepherd, Ada 
County Jury Commissioner, filed an affidavit stating 
that she interviewed seventy-six prospective jurors, 
asking them questions concerning their ability to be 
fair and impartial in the Lewis case, as well as their 
familiarity with Lewis, including the AIDS issue, 
through the media. In this regard, she stated that forty 
people said they could not be impartial, thirty-five 
said they could, and one was undecided. Jury Com-
missioner Shepherd also stated that, based upon her 
experience, it would be necessary to call at least 300 
prospective jurors in Ada County in order to have a 
fair and impartial jury for Lewis, and that it would 
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not be possible to sequester 300 prospective jurors. 
On November 27, 1989, the court issued its decision 
on jury selection and Lewis' motion to dismiss. As to 
jury selection, the court decided to impanel a jury 
from another county pursuant to I. C. § 19-1816, due 
to the publicity of Lewis' HIV case, his HlV status 
not being relevant to this case, and the matters set 
forth in Jury Commissioner Shepard's affidavit. The 
court denied Lewis' motion to dismiss. In so doing, 
the court stated that if Lewis had been acquitted in 
the HIV case, the State would be collaterally es-
topped from proceeding in this case. However, since 
a mistrial was declared and there was no final judg-
ment on whether Lewis and the victim had sexual 
contact, the court concluded that this prosecution was 
not barred. In addition, the court noted that I.C. § 39-
608, the statute relating to transferring the HIV virus, 
does not require sexual contact or that the victim be 
under the age of sixteen. 
On November 29, 1989, the parties again met in court 
to take up motions. At the hearing, Lewis filed an 
amended motion to **398 *340 suppress. The 
amended motion to suppress, regarding all video-
tapes, writings, notes, and letters seized, cited the 
Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution 
and article I, section 17 of the Idaho Constitution, and 
claimed that probable cause did not exist to support 
the warrant. Additionally, Lewis filed an affidavit 
stating that he did not consent to the May 5, 1989, 
search of his premises. The case proceeded to trial. 
On December 5, 1989, the sixth day of jury trial, the 
jury reached a verdict of guilty. 
On January 19, 1990, Lewis filed a motion to reap-
point August H. Cahill as defense counsel.fl::!l He also 
filed a motion for a new trial pursuant to I.C.R. 34 
and I.C. § 19-2406, stating that "[n]ew evidence ex-
ists which substantially impeaches the credibility of 
the state's primary witness .... " In support of this mo-
tion, Lewis filed an affidavit of Joie Hein. Mr. Hein 
stated that the victim could not have seen a certain 
videotape with Lewis on a certain day because Hein 
had borrowed that tape from Lewis' roommate' on the 
day in question. 
FN2. On the second day of jury trial, No-
vember 30, 1989, Lewis filed a motion to 
represent himself. Mr. Cahill had been rep-
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resenting Lewis. The court granted the mo-
tion. 
On January 29, 1990, a sentencing hearing was held. 
At the hearing, the court denied Lewis' motion to 
strike certain evidence in the presentence investiga-
tion report, and it sentenced Lewis to a fixed life term 
in prison. 
On February 8, 1990, Lewis' roommate, Michael 
Carver, filed an affidavit. In his affidavit, Mr. Carver 
stated that he had lent the above-mentioned videotape 
to Joie Hein on the day the victim testified that he 
had watched it with Lewis. 
On March I, 1990, Lewis filed a notice of appeal. He 
appealed from the January 29, 1990 judgment pursu-
ant to I.A.R. Il(c)(l). 
On May 3, 1990, the parties met in court to argue the 
motion for a new trial. At the hearing, Lewis filed a 
motion to disqualify the presiding judge, and the par-
ties agreed to continue the matter. 
On May 23, 1990, Lewis filed a motion for reconsid-
eration of sentence. The motion was made pursuant 
to I.C.R. 35. 
On June 13, 1990, the court issued its decision and 
order denying the motion for a new trial. In denying 
the motion, the court cited State v. Drapeau. 97 Idaho 
685,551 P.2d 972 (1976), for the standard for grant-
ing a new trial based upon newly discovered evi-
dence. Applying this standard, the court found, inter 
alia, that Lewis had not acted with due diligence to 
discover the new evidence because he had unre-
stricted access to Mr. Carver and Mr. Hein. In addi-
tion, the court found that the jury was properly se-
lected from another county, commenting that there 
was no way to evaluate whether Boise-area people 
are more sensitized to gay issues. 
ANALYSIS 
We address the following issues: 
I. Did the district court err in ruling that this case was 
not barred by the double jeopardy clause of the 
United States Constitution, U.S. Const. amend. V. 
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11. Did the district court abuse its discretion by con-
tinuing Lewis' trial? 
III. Did the district court violate a constitutional right 
or abuse its discretion by selecting a jury from an-
other county? 
IV. Did the district court err in denying Lewis' mo-
tion to suppress evidence? 
V. Did the district court correctly apply rules of evi-
dence in admitting certain evidence at trial? 
VI. Did the district court abuse its discretion by al-
lowing the testimony of an expert witness? 
VII. Did the district court abuse its discretion by de-
nying Lewis' motion for a new trial? 
VIII. Did the district court abuse its discretion by 
sentencing Lewis to a fixed term of life in prison? 
**399 *3411. 
DID THE DISTRICT COURT ERR IN RULING 
THAT THIS CASE WAS NOT BARRED BY THE 
DOUBLE JEOPARDY CLAUSE OF THE UNITED 
STATES CONSTITUTION, U.S. CONST.AMEND. 
V? 
We hold that the district court did not err in ruling 
that Lewis' prosecution for the crime of lewd con-
duct, I.C. § 18-1508 (1984) FN3, was not barred by 
double jeopardy because of his previous prosecution 
for the crime of transferring the HlV virus, I.C. § 39-
608 llM, which ended in a sua sponte mistrial. 
FN3. We apply the 1984 version of this stat-
ute instead of the 1992 version because the 
conduct giving rise to this prosecution took 
place prior to the 1992 amendment. This 
statute provides: 
18-1508. Lewd conduct with minor or 
child under sixteen.-Any person who 
shall wilfully and lewdly commit any 
lewd or lascivious act or acts upon or with 
the body or any part or member thereof of 
a minor or child under the age of sixteen 
(16) years, including but not limited to, 
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genital-genital contact, oral-genital con-
tact, anal-genital contact, oral-anal con-
tact, manual-anal contact, or manual-
genital contact, whether between persons 
of the same or opposite sex, or who shall 
involve a minor or child in any act of bes-
tiality or sado-masochistic abuse or lewd 
exhibition as any of such acts are defined 
in section 18-1507, Idaho Code, when any 
of such acts are done with the intent of 
arousing, appealing to, or gratifying the 
lust or passions or sexual desires of such 
person or of such minor or child, shall be 
guilty of a felony and shall be imprisoned 
in the state prison for a term of not more 
than life. 
FN4. This statute provides: 
39-608. Transfer of body fluid which 
may contain the HIV virus-
Punishment-Definitions-Defenses.-( 1) 
Any person who exposes another in any 
manner with the intent to infect or, know-
ing that he or she is or has been afflicted 
with acquired immunodeficiency syn-
drome (AIDS), AIDS related complexes 
(ARC), or other manifestations of human 
immunodeficiency virus (HlV) infection, 
transfers or attempts to transfer any of his . 
or her body fluid, body tissue or organs to 
another person is guilty of a felony and 
shall be punished by imprisonment in the 
state prison for a period not to exceed fif-
teen (15) years, by fine not in excess of 
five thousand dollars ($5,000), or by both 
such imprisonment and fine. 
(2) Defmitions. As used in this section: 
(a) "Body fluid" means semen (irrespec-
tive of the presence of spermatozoa), 
blood, saliva, vaginal secretion, breast 
milk, and urine. 
(b) "Transfer" means engaging in sexual 
activity by genital-genital contact, oral-
genital contact, anal-genital contact; or 
permitting the use of a hypodermic sy-
ringe, needle, or similar device without 
sterilization; or giving, whether or not for 
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value, blood, semen, body tissue, or or-
gans to a person, blood bank, hospital, or 
other medical care facility for purposes of 
transfer to another person. 
(3) Defenses: 
(a) Consent. It is an affIrmative defense 
that the sexual activity took place between 
consenting adults after full disclosure by 
the accused of the risk of such activity. 
(b) Medical advice. It is an affrrmative de-
fense that the transfer of body fluid, body 
tissue, or organs occurred after advice 
from a licensed physician that the accused 
was noninfectious. 
We begin our analysis of this issue with a review of 
t~ee United ~tates Su~me Court opinions dealing 
With double Jeopardy. The three United States 
Supreme Court cases are: Blockburger v. United 
States. 284 U.S. 299, 52 S.Ct. 180, 76 L.Ed. 306 
(1932); Gracly v. Corbin. 495 U.S. 508, 110 S.Ct. 
2084, 109 L.Ed.2d 548 (1990); and United States v. 
Felix. 503 U.S. 378, 112 S.Ct. 1377, 118 L.Ed.2d 25 
(1992). 
FN5. U.S. Const. amend. V provides, in 
relevant part, that "nor shall any person be 
subject for the same offense to be twice put 
in jeopardy of life or limb .... " 
A. Blockburger v. United States. 284 U.S. 299, 52 
S.Ct. 180, 76 L.Ed. 306 (1932): In Blockburger, the 
defendant was charged with five counts of violating 
provisions of the Harrison Narcotic Act, and he was 
found gUilty of the second, third, and fifth counts. 
The Court explained: 
The second count charged a sale on a specified day 
of ten grains of the drug not in or from the original 
stamped package; the third count charged a 'sale on 
the following day of eight grains of the drug not in 
or from the original stamped package; the fifth 
count charged the latter sale also as having been 
made not in pursuance of a written order of the 
purchaser as required by the statute. 
Btockburger. 284 U.S. at 301, 52 S.Ct. at 181. The 
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relevant federal statutes provided: 
It shall be unlawful for any person to purchase, 
sell, dispense, or distribute any **400 *342 of the 
aforesaid drugs [opium and other narcotics] except 
in the original stamped package or from the origi-
nal stamped package; and the absence of appropri-
ate tax-paid stamps from any of the aforesaid drugs 
shall be prima facie evidence of a violation of this 
section by the person in whose possession same 
may be found .... 
Btockburger. 284 U.S. at 300 n. I, 52 S.Ct. at 180-81 
!1.J.. 
It shall be unlawful for any person to sell, barter, 
exchange, or give away any of the drugs specified 
in section 691 of this title, except in pursuance ofa 
written order of the person to whom such article is 
sold, bartered, exchanged, or given on a form to be 
issued in blank for that purpose by the Commis-
sioner of Internal Revenue. 
Blockburger. 284 U.S. at 300 n. 2, 52 S.Ct. at 181 n. 
2· 
On appeal, the defendant argued that the two sales 
charged in the second and third counts, having been 
made to the same person, constituted a single offense. 
Further, he argued that the fifth count, having been 
made not from the original stamped package and 
having been made not in pursuance of a written or-
der, constituted one offense. 
As to the defendant's first argument, the Court held 
that the sales charged in the second and third counts, 
were "distinct and separate sales made at different 
times." Blockburger, 284 U.S. at 30 I, 52 S.Ct. at 181. 
The Court explained that, although the purchaser paid 
for the additional quantity shortly after the first quan-
tity was delivered, the first sale had been consum-
mated by its delivery, making "[e]ach of several suc-
cessive sales constitute[ ] a distinct offense, however 
closely they may follow each other." Blockburger. 
284 U.S. at 302, 52 S.Ct. at 181. 
As to the defendant's second argument, the Court 
recognized that the above-quoted provisions of the 
Narcotic Act create "two distinct offenses," one cre-
ating a crime of selling any of the drugs unless they 
are in or from the original stamped package, and the 
other creating a crime of selling any of the drugs 
without a written order from the purchaser. 
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Btockburger. 284 U.S. at 303-04, 52 S.Ct. at 182. 
The Court stated the issue as whether, when there has 
been one sale, "both sections being violated by the 
same act, the accused committed two offenses or only 
one." Blockburger, 284 U,S, at 304, 52 S,Ct. at 182, 
In concluding that two offenses were committed, the 
Court held: 
Each of the offenses created requires proof of a 
different element. The applicable rule is that, where 
the same act or transaction constitutes a violation 
of two distinct statutory provisions, the test to be 
applied to determine whether there are two of-
fenses or only one is whether each provision re-
quires proof of an additional fact which the other 
does not..., "A single act may be an offense against 
two statutes; and if each statute requires proof of an 
additional fact which the other does not, an acquit-
tal or conviction under either statute does not ex-
empt the defendant from prosecution and punish-
ment under the other," 
Blockburger, 284 U.S. at 304, 52 S.et. at 182 (cita-
tions omitted). 
B. Grady v. Corbin, 495 U.S. 508, 110 S.Ct. 2084, 
109 L.Ed.2d 548 (I 990): In Grady, the defendant 
drove his vehicle across the double yellow line of the 
road, striking two oncoming vehicles. The driver of 
the second vehicle struck by the defendant died later 
that evening. The defendant was served with two 
tickets directing him to appear in the local court on a 
certain date for: (1) driving while intoxicated, a mis-
demeanor; and (2) failing to keep right of the median. 
Prior to the defendant's scheduled appearance, an 
assistant district attorney began to prepare for a 
homicide prosecution in connection with the acci-
dent. The defendant entered guilty pleas to the two 
traffic tickets, and was given the minimum sentence 
for these two crimes. There was never any mention of 
the fatality at either the acceptance of the defendant's 
guilty pleas or his sentencing hearing. 
About two months after the sentencing hearing, a 
grand jury investigating the accident indicted the de-
fendant, charging him **401 *343 with: (1) reckless 
manslaughter, (2) second degree vehicular man-
slaughter, and (3) criminally negligent homicide, all 
for causing the death of the driver of the second vehi-
cle; (4) third degree reckless assault for causing in-
jury to the passenger of the second vehicle; and (5) 
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driving while intoxicated. Furthermore: 
The prosecution filed a bill of particulars that iden-
tified the three reckless or negligent acts on which 
it would rely to prove the homicide and assault 
charges: (1) operating a motor vehicle on a public 
highway in an intoxicated condition, (2) failing to 
keep right of the median, and (3) driving approxi-
mately 45 to 50 miles per hour in heavy rain, 
"which was a speed too fast for the weather and 
road conditions then pending." 
Grady. 495 U.S. at 513-14, 110 S.Ct. at 2089. The 
defendant moved to dismiss the indictment, arguing 
that the prosecution would violate statutory and con-
stitutional double jeopardy constraints. 
The United States Supreme Court in Grady affirmed 
the New York Court of Appeals' opinion, which 
agreed with the defendant's argument. Grady. 495 
U.S. at 515, 110 S.Ct. at 2089-90. The Court held 
that, in addition to the traditional Blockburger test, 
[T]he Double Jeopardy Clause bars a subsequent 
prosecution if, to establish an essential element of 
an offense charged in that prosecution, the gov-
ernment will prove conduct that constitutes an of-
fense for which the defendant has already been 
prosecuted. 
Grady. 495 U.S. at 510, 110 S.C!. at 2087 (footnote 
omitted).lli2 
FN6. The Grady Court further stated: 
[I]f in the course of securing a conviction 
for one offense the State necessarily has 
proved the conduct comprising all of the 
elements of another offense not yet prose-
cuted (a "component offense"), the Dou-
ble Jeopardy Clause would bar subsequent 
prosecution of the component offense. 
Grady. 495 U.S. at 521 n. 11, 110 S.C!. at 
2093 n. 11. 
The Grady Court reached its holding by adopting 
reasoning set forth ten years earlier in Illinois v. 
Vitale, 447 U.S. 410, 100 S.Ct. 2260, 65 L.Ed.2d 228 
(1980). It deemed the following analysis to "govern[ 
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] this case:" 
Like Thomas Corbin, John Vitale allegedly caused 
a fatal car accident. A police officer at the scene is-
sued Vitale a traffic citation charging him with 
failure to reduce speed to avoid an accident in vio-
lation of § 11-601(a) of the Illinois Vehicle Code. 
Vitale was convicted of that offense and sentenced 
to pay a $15 fine. The day after his conviction, the 
State charged Vitale with two counts of involuntary 
manslaughter based on his reckless driving. Vitale 
argued that this subsequent prosecution was barred 
by the Double Jeopardy Clause. 
This Court held that the second prosecution was 
not barred under the traditional Blockburger test 
because each offense "require[ d] proof of a fact 
which the other [did] not." See Blockburger. 284 
U.S. at 304, 52 S.Ct. at 182. Although involuntary 
manslaughter required proof of a death, failure to 
reduce speed did not. Likewise, failure to slow was 
not a statutory element of involuntary manslaugh-
ter. Vitale. 447 U.S. at 418-19, 100 S.Ct. at 2266. 
Thus, the subsequent prosecution survived the 
Blockburger test. 
But the Court did not stop at that point. Justice 
White, writing for the Court, added that, even 
though the two prosecutions did not violate the 
Blockburger test: 
[I]t may be that to sustain its manslaughter case the 
State may find it necessary to prove a failure to 
slow or to rely on conduct necessarily involving 
such failure; it may concede as much prior to trial. 
In that case, because Vitale has already been con-
victed for conduct that is a necessary element of 
the more serious crime for which he has been 
charged, his claim of double jeopardy would be 
substantiaL ... 
Grady. 495 U.S. at 515-16, 110 S.Ct. at 2090 (cita-
tions omitted), quoting Vitale. 447 U.S. at 420, 100 
S.Ct. at 2267.00 
FN7. In Felix, the United States Supreme 
Court acknowledged that the Grady test was 
adopted from dicta in Vita/e. Fe/ix. 503 U.S. 
at ----, 112 S.Ct. at 1384. 
Page 9 
**402 *344 The United States Supreme Court fash-
ioned a two-step double jeopardy analysis: (1) apply 
the Blockburger test; if the prosecution is not barred 
under Blockburger, then; (2) apply the Grady test. 
For the Blockburger test, the inquiry is whether the 
two or more offenses have "identical statutory ele-
ments or that one is a lesser included offense of the 
other .... " Grady. 495 U.S. at 516, 110 S.Ct. at 2090 
(emphasis added), citing Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 
161. 166, 97 S.Ct. 2221. 2225, 53 L.Ed.2d 187 
(] 977). For the Grady test, "[t]he critical inquiry is 
what conduct the State will prove .... " Grady. 495 
U.S. at 521. 110 S.Ct. at 2093 (emphasis added). 
The Grady Court applied the two-step double jeop-
ardy analysis to the facts of that case. First, it recog-
nized that the defendant conceded that the B/ock-
burger test did not bar the prosecution of the reckless 
manslaughter, criminally negligent homicide, and 
third degree reckless assault offenses. FN8 Grady. 495 
U.S. at 522, 110 S.Ct. at 2094. In applying the second 
step of the analysis, the Court turned to the prosecu-
tion's bill of particulars, which was binding on the 
State as its theory of proof. Grady, 495 U.S. at 522-
23, 110 S.Ct. at 2094, citing Corbin v. Hillery. 74 
N.Y.2d 279, 290, 545 N.Y.S.2d 71. 75, 543 N.E.2d 
714, 720 (1989), affirmed The Grady Court quoted 
from the document, and held that the State admitted 
that it would prove the entirety of the conduct for 
which the defendant was convicted. Grady, 495 U.S. 
at 523, 110 S.Ct. at 2094. 
FN8. The State did not contest the New 
York Court of Appeal's ruling that driving 
while intoxicated and vehicular manslaugh-
ter were barred under state law and Block-
burger. Grady, 495 U.S. at 522 n. 13, 110 
S.Ct. at 2094 n. 13. 
C. United States v. Felix, 503 U.S. 378, 112 S.Ct. 
1377, 118 L.Ed.2d 25 (l992): The defendant oper-
ated a methamphetamine facility in Beggs, Okla-
homa. In July of 1987, DEA agents raided the Beggs 
facility and shut it down. Subsequently, the defendant 
ordered materials for manufacturing methampheta-
mine to be delivered to him in Joplin, Missouri. DEA 
agents witnessed the Joplin transfer and arrested the 
defendant shortly thereafter. 
The defendant was charged and convicted in Mis-
souri for the crime of attempting to manufacture 
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methamphetamine based upon the Joplin transfer. In 
the Missouri case, the Felix Court summarized what 
the government showed: 
1. On August 26, 1987, the defendant asked to pur-
chase the materials from a DEA informant; 
2. The defendant made a down payment of $7,500 
on the materials; 
3. The defendant instructed the informant to deliver 
the materials to a Joplin hotel on August 31, 1987; 
4. The informant met the defendant at that hotel on 
that date with the materials; and, 
5. The defendant inspected the materials, hitched 
his car to the trailer in which the materials had 
been transported, and then he was arrested. 
Felix. 503 U.S. at ----, 112 S.Ct. at 1380. 
At the trial in the Missouri case, the defendant dis-
puted that he had the requisite criminal intent. In or-
der to prove his intent, the government introduced 
evidence that the defendant had manufactured 
methamphetamine in Oklahoma. The Felix Court 
summarized this evidence as follows: 
I. During the spring of 1987, the defendant had 
purchased material from the DEA agent for manu-
facturing methamphetamine; 
2. The defendant gave those materials to Paul 
Roach in exchange for lessons on how to manufac-
ture methamphetamine; 
3. Roach testified that he and the defendant had 
made methamphetamine in a trailer near Beggs, 
Oklahoma; and, 
4. Government agents seized the trailer but did not 
arrest the defendant, as the defendant avoided ar-
rest by hiding in the nearby woods. 
Felix. 503 U.S. at ----, 112 S.Ct. at 1380. The Court 
admitted this evidence pursuant **403 *345 to F.R.E. 
1!M(hl, regarding the defendant's state of mind with 
respect to the materials. 
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Subsequently, the defendant was charged and con-
victed in Oklahoma of one count of conspiracy to 
manufacture, possess, and distribute methampheta-
mine and seven substantive counts, four counts relat-
ing to manufacturing and possession with intent to 
distribute, one count relating to maintaining a 
methamphetamine manufacturing lab, and the last 
two counts relating to interstate travel with the intent 
to promote his illegal enterprise. "At trial, the Gov-
ernment introduced much of the same evidence of the 
Missouri and Oklahoma transactions that had been 
introduced in the Missouri trial." Felix. 503 U.S. at --
--, 112 S.Ct. at 1381. 
On appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Tenth Circuit, the convictions for conspiracy and 
the first five substantive counts were reversed based 
upon the Grady test. The United States Supreme 
Court reversed the Court of Appeals. 
As to the substantive counts, the Felix Court stated 
that "[t]he actual crimes charged in each case were 
different in both time and place; there was absolutely 
no common conduct linking the alleged offenses." 
Felix. 503 U.S. at _no, 112 S.Ct. at 1382. In this re-
gard: 
The Court of Appeals appear[ed] to have acknowl-
edged as much, as it concentrated not on the actual 
crimes prosecuted in the separate trials, but instead 
on the type of evidence presented by the Govern-
ment during the two trials.... Thus, the Court of 
Appeals holding must rest on an assumption that if 
the Government offers in evidence in one prosecu-
tion acts of misconduct that might ultimately be 
charged as criminal offenses in a second prosecu-
tion, the latter prosecution is barred under the Dou-
ble Jeopardy Clause. 
Felix. 503 U.S. at ----, 112 S.Ct. at 1382. The Felix 
Court disagreed with this rationale, reiterating that "a 
mere overlap in proof between two prosecutions does 
not establish a double jeopardy violation." Felix, 503 
U.S. at ----, 112 S.Ct. at 1382. It also pointed to the 
Grady opinion's disclaimer of adopting a "same evi-
dence" test.1W. Felix, 112 S.Ct. at m_, 112 S.Ct. at 
1382, citing Gradv. 495 U.S. at 521 n. 12, 110 s.et. 
at 2093 n. 12. 
FN9. At the end of the Felix Court's opinion, 
© 2010 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works. 
000177 
848 P.2d 394 
123 Idaho 336,848 P.2d 394 
(Cite as: 123 Idaho 336, 848 P.2d 394) 
the Court states: 
It appears that while Grady eschewed a 
"same evidence" test and 'Garrett rejected 
a "single transaction" test, Garrett v. 
United States, 471 U.S. 773, 790, 105 
S.Ct. 2407,2417,85 L.Ed.2d 764 (1985), 
the line between those tests and the "same 
conduct" language of Grady is not easy to 
discern. 
Felix. 503 U.S. at ----, 112 S.Ct. at 1385. 
The Grady decision, which was a 5-4 de-
cision, was written by Justice Brennan. 
Writing for the Court, he recognized that 
"[t]he Court ... has 'steadfastly refused to 
adopt the "single transaction" view of the 
Double Jeopardy Clause.' " Grady. 495 
U.S. at 523 n. 15, 110 S.Ct. at 2094 n. 15. 
quoting Garrett v. United States. 471 U.S. 
773, 790, 105 S.Ct. 2407, 2417, 85 
L.Ed.2d 764 (1985). In Ashe v. Swenson, 
397 U.S. 436, 90 S.Ct. 1189, 25 L.Ed.2d 
469 (970), the Court was faced with a 
situation where a defendant was charged 
with robbing one of six men at a poker 
party, found not guilty, and subsequently 
charged with robbing another one of the 
six men. The Supreme Court reversed be-
cause in the fIrst trial, where the defendant 
was found not guilty, the only "rationally 
conceivable issue" before the jury was the 
identity of the defendant as the robber. 
Ashe, 397 U.S. at 445,90 S.Ct. at 1195. It 
is interesting that in Justice Brennan's 
concurring opinion in Ashe he announced: 
In my view, the Double Jeopardy Clause 
requires the prosecution, except in most 
limited circumstances, to join at one trial 
all the charges against a defendant that 
grow out of a single criminal act, occur-
rence, episode, or transaction. This "same 
transaction" test of "same offense" not 
only enforces the ancient prohibition 
against vexatious multiple prosecutions 
embodied in the Double Jeopardy Clause, 
but responds as well to the increasingly 
widespread recognition that the consolida-
tion in one lawsuit of all issues arising out 
of a single transaction or occurrence best 
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promotes justice, economy, and conven-
ience. 
Ashe, 397 U.S. at 453, 90 S.Ct. at 1199 
(Brennan, J., concurring, joined by Doug-
las and Marshall, JJ.), (footnotes omitted). 
D. Application of the Double Jeopardy Analysis to 
the Present Case. 
ill 1, Jeopardy Attached in Lewis' First Trial: In the 
HIV case, the jury was impanelled and sworn. "Jeop-
ardy attaches when a jury is sworn." **404*346State 
v. Sharp, 104 Idaho 691. 693,662 P.2d 1135, 1137 
(1983), citing Crist v. Bretz, 437 U.S. 28, 98 S.Ct. 
2156, 57 L.Ed.2d 24 (1978). Jeop;1l'dy did attach in 
Lewis' first trial. We must therefore analyze the issue 
of whether Lewis was twice placed in jeopardy. 
2. The Traditional Blockburger Test: The traditional 
Blockburger test requires us to examine the elements 
of each crime and determine whether each crime re-
quires proof of a fact that the other does not. Grady. 
495 U.S. at 516, 110 S.Ct. at 2090. 
The crime of lewd conduct with a minor or child un-
der sixteen, I.C. § 18-1508 (1984), contains the fol-
lowing elements: 
(la) A lewd or lascivious act committed upon or 
with the body or a body part of a minor or child 
under the age of sixteen; or 
(1 b) Involving a minor or child in any act of besti-
ality or sadomasochistic abuse or lewd exhibition, 
as defmed in I.C. § 18-1507; and 
(2) Intent to arouse, appeal to, or gratify the lust, 
passions, or sexual desires of the defendant or vic-
tim. 
The crime of transferring a body fluid which may 
contain the HIV virus, I.C. § 39-608, contains the 
following elements: 
(la) Expose another person in any manner with the 
intent to infect; or 
(1 b) With defendant's knowledge that he or she has 
been afflicted with acquired immunodeficiency 
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syndrome (AIDS), AIDS related complexes 
(ARC), or other manifestations of human 
immunodeficiency virus (HIV); and 
(2) A transfer or attempted transfer of body fluid, 
tissue, or organs to another person. 
I.C. § 39-608(1 ). The statute goes on to defme "body 
fluid" as, among other things, semen, I.C. § 39-
608(2)(a). and "transfer" as including, among other 
modes sexual and otherwise, anal-genital contact, 
I.C. § 39-608(2)(b). Finally, consent and medical 
advice are defenses to I.C. § 39-608(1). I.C. § 39-
608(3)(a). 
It is clear from our examination of the statutory ele-
ments of each crime that the Blockburger test is satis-
fied. In order to prove a violation of the HIV offense, 
it is not necessary to prove that the victim is under 
the age of sixteen, that the defendant had an intent to 
arouse, appeal to, or gratify his or her, or the victim's, 
lust, passions, or sexual desires-all of which are ele-
ments of the lewd conduct crime. In order to prove a 
violation of the lewd conduct statute, it is not neces-
sary to prove that the defendant had an intent to in-
fect the victim or expose the victim with knowledge 
of his or her HIV status, or that any body fluid, tis-
sue, or organ was transferred to the victim-all of 
which are elements of the HIV crime. Therefore, we 
hold that the traditional Blockburger test, which fo-
cuses upon the elements of each crime, is satisfied in 
this case. 
3. The Grady Test: The second part of the double 
jeopardy analysis requires us to focus upon the con-
duct which the State intended to prove in the HIV 
case and the conduct it proved at the lewd conduct 
trial.flil.Q Grady. 495 U.S. at 521. 110 S.Ct. at 2093. 
FNI0. We do have the indictment and cer-
tain transcripts from the HIV case before us 
on appeal. 
In the lewd conduct case, the State alleged the fol-
lowing: (I) during February of 1989, the defendant 
committed a lewd and lascivious act upon the body of 
the victim; (2) the victim was under the age of six-
teen years old; and (3) the defendant had the intent to 
gratify his sexual desire. 
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In the HIV case, the indictment read: 
GEORGE FRANK LEWIS is accused by the 
Grand Jury of Ada County by this Indictment, of 
the crime of KNOWINGLY ATTEMPTING TO 
TRANSFER BODY FLUIDS WHICH MA Y 
CONTAIN THE HIV VIRUS, I.C. § 39-608 com-
mitted as follows: 
That the defendant, GEORGE FRANK LEWIS, 
on or about February, 1989, in the County of Ada, 
State of Idaho, did attempt to transfer his body flu-
ids to another person, knowing that he has been af-
flicted with the Acquired Immunodeficiency Syn-
drome (AIDS), AIDS related complexes (ARC), or 
other manifestations of the Human 
Immunodeficiency Virus, to wit: attempting to anal 
penetrate**40S *347 [the victim] with his penis, 
with the intent to gratify the sexual desires of the 
defendant, by passing semen onto or into [the vic-
tim's] body. 
While the State may have introduced evidence in the 
lewd conduct case that it would have introduced in 
the HIV case, it is clear that "a mere overlap in proof 
between two prosecutions does not establish a double 
jeopardy violation." Felix, 503 U.S. at ----. 112 S.Ct. 
at 1382. Instead, the Grady test looks only to "what 
conduct the State will prove, not the evidence the 
State will use to prove that conduct." Grady, 495 
U.S. at 521. 110 S.Ct. at 2093 (emphasis added). Al-
though the HIV charge and the lewd conduct charge 
may have arisen at or near the same time and place, 
the Grady test is not a "same transaction" test. Felix, 
503 U.S. at ----. 112 S.Ct. at 1385; Grady, 495 U.S. 
at 523 n. 15. 110 S.Ct. at 2094 n. 15. Further, "it is 
clear that when two crimes arise from the same se-
quence of events, such is not sufficient to invoke the 
protection of I.e. § 18-301." il:!l! State v. Chapman. 
112 Idaho 1011, 10 13. 739 P.2d 310. 312 (1987). 
FN II. This statute provides: 
18-301. Acts punisbable in different 
ways-Double jeopardy.-An act or omis-
sion which is made punishable in different 
ways by different provisions of this code 
may be punished under either of such pro-
visions, but in no case can it be punished 
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under more than one; an acquittal or con-
viction and sentence under either one bars 
a prosecution for the same act or omission 
under any other. 
In establishing the essential elements of the lewd 
conduct charge, the State introduced evidence that 
Lewis' conduct consisted of anal-genital or oral-
genital contact with an under sixteen-year-old victim 
and that Lewis or the victim had the intent to arouse, 
appeal to, or gratifY their lust, passions, or sexual 
desires. This conduct does not constitute a violation 
of the HIV offense because the State did not produce 
evidence of Lewis' conduct as a knowing carrier of 
HIV. Therefore, the lewd conduct prosecution was 
not barred by double jeopardy.fl:ill 
FN 12. We recognize that Lewis has argued 
that because of the sua sponte mistrial in the 
HIV case, the State must show a "manifest 
necessity" in order to prosecute the lewd 
conduct case. Sharp. 104 Idaho at 693, 662 
P.2d at 1137, citing Arizona v. Washin'don. 
434 U.S. 497, 98 S.Ct. 824, 54 L.Ed.2d 717 
(1978); Downum v. United States. 372 U.S. 
734, 83 S.C!. 1033, 10 L.Ed.2d 100 (] 963). 
In order for the district court to allow for a 
"retrial of [Lewis]," i.e., a refiling of the 
HIV charge, the State would have had to 
prove a "manifest necessity" for the sua 
sponte mistrial. Sharp. 104 Idaho at 693, 
662 P.2d at 1137. Based upon our decision 
on the double jeopardy claim, we need not 
address the "manifest necessity" issue, 
II. 
DID THE DISTRICT COURT ABUSE ITS DIS-
CRETION BY CONTINUING LEWIS' TRIAL? 
illill We hold that the district court did not abuse its 
discretion by continuing Lewis' trial until December 
29, 1989. 
At the hearing on September 19, 1989, the district 
court suggested a trial date of December 5, to which 
Lewis' counsel responded that, "I would certainly 
object to that late of a setting." The parties and the 
court discussed alternate dates to set the trial, and 
ultimately agreed upon November 20, 1989, Lewis' 
counsel stating, "That would be fine with me, Judge." 
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Lewis had filed several motions, including a motion 
to dismiss that was set for hearing on November 20, 
1989, at 1:30. At the hearing on November 20, 1989, 
the court noted that Lewis' motions, which had not 
yet been heard and decided, were filed late. Yet, 
Lewis' counsel did "object[ ] to another change of 
date." However, at the November 7, 1989 hearing, 
the parties and court agreed to begin jury selection on 
November 21, 1989. The trial ultimately began on 
November 29, 1989. 
Idaho Code § 19-3501 provides, in relevant part: 
19-3501. When action may be dismissed.-The 
court, unless good cause to the contrary is shown, 
must order the prosecution or indictment to be 
dismissed, in the following cases: 
2. If a defendant, whose trial has not been post-
poned upon his application, is not brought to trial 
within six (6) months **406 *348 from the date 
that the indictment or information is filed with the 
court. 
Thus, the district court has discretion in determining 
whether "good cause" exists to justifY a continuance 
in the trial. In re Rash. 64 Idaho 521, 526, 134 P.2d 
420, 421-22 (1943). Whenever this Court is faced 
with an appeal from a discretionary determination, 
we ask three questions: 
(1) whether the trial court correctly perceived the 
issue as one of discretion; (2) whether the trial 
court acted within the outer boundaries of its dis-
cretion and consistently with the legal standards 
applicable to the specific choices available to it; 
and (3) whether the trial court reached its decision 
by an exercise of reason. 
Sun Valley Shopping Ctr., Inc. v. Idaho Power Co .. 
119 Idaho 87, 94, 803 P.2d 993, 1000 (1991), citing 
State v. Hedger. 115 Idaho 598, 600, 768 P.2d 1331, 
1333 (1989). 
In this case, the record clearly shows that the district 
court correctly understood this issue to be one of dis-
cretion. Further, the record shows that the decision 
was made within the confines of its discretion and 
consistent with the applicable legal standards. First, 
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the length of the continuance was about two and one-
half months (from the original date of September 19, 
1989, to the ultimate date of November 29, 1989) and 
the trial began within six months of the filing of the 
criminal information (June 15, 1989); second, the 
basis for the continuance (that "another trial was go-
ing on ... ") was an adequate reason. State v. Talmage. 
104 Idaho 249,251, 658 P.2d 920, 922 (1983), citing 
Barker v. Wingo. 407 U.S. 514, 92 S.Ct. 2182, 33 
L.Ed.2d 10 I (1972). Finally, the record shows that 
the district court reached its decision to continue the 
trial until November 29th by an exercise of reason. 
III. 
DID THE DISTRICT COURT VIOLATE A CON-
STITUTIONAL RIGHT OR ABUSE ITS DISCRE-
TION BY SELECTING A WRY FROM ANOTHER 
COUNTY? 
ill We hold that the district court did not violate a 
constitutional right or abuse its discretion by select-
ing a jury from another county to sit in the lewd con-
duct case. 
Idaho Code § 19-1816, which was flrst enacted in 
1983, provides, in relevant part: 
19-1816. Impaneling jury from another 
county.-(a) As an alternative to entering the order 
of removal provided in the preceding sections of 
this chapter, the court may instead enter an order 
directing that jurors be impaneled from the county 
to which venue would otherwise have been trans-
ferred, if it finds: 
1. That a fair and impartial jury cannot be im-
paneled in the county where the criminal com-
plaint, information or indictment is filed; 
2. That it would be more economical to transport 
the jury than to transport the pending action; and 
3. That justice will be served thereby. 
Lewis contends that I.C. § 19-1816 does not em-
power a district court, on its own motion, to order 
selection of a jury from another county, and that the 
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district court, in this case, did order the change in 
jury selection upon its own motion. For authority, 
Lewis points to I.C. §§ 19-1801 and 19-1808, which 
require motion by the defendant or the State, respec-
tively, in order to effect a change of venue, and to 
I.C.R. 21, which provides for change of venue upon 
motion by the defendant or the State, and cites State 
v. Ash. 94 Idaho 542, 493 P.2d 701 (1972), wherein 
this Court ruled it improper for a district court to 
change venue pursuant to I.C. § 19-180 I on its own 
motion. We conclude that the State did move for the 
change of jury selection. 
At the November 7, 1989 hearing, the district court 
identified the following issues to be discussed: (1) 
Lewis representing himself; (2) the publicity of the 
case and consideration of impaneling a jury from 
another county; and (3) consideration of a jury ques-
tionnaire. During the discussion of the jury selection 
issue, the State asserted**407 *349 that "a change of 
venue is appropriate in terms of selecting a jury." The 
State therefore requested the court to select a jury 
from another county. 
IV. 
DID THE DISTRICT COURT ERR IN DENYING 
LEWIS' MOTION TO SUPPRESS EVIDENCE? 
We hold that the district court did not err in admitting 
into evidence certain photographs and the document 
entitled "And Then There Was James," both of which 
Lewis moved to suppress. 
[5][6][71 The search warrant issued by the magistrate 
authorized Detective Armstrong to search for the 
following: 
[Clertain evidence of a crime, to wit: pornographic 
VCR tape entitled "Boys On Film;" another porno-
graphic VCR tape untitled containing adults of 
both sexes engaging in sexual acts; lists of names 
of past, present or potential victims; memorabilia 
of victims including photos, clothing, or other per-
sonal items; a diary listing names of victims and 
activities engaged in; camera and VCR recording 
equipment; correspondence with victims; indicia of 
ownership or occupance of Apt 14, 270 I Rosehill, 
Boise. 
© 2010 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works. 
000181 
848 P.2d 394 
123· Idaho 3-36,848 P.2d 394 
(Cite as: 123 Idaho 336, 848 P.2d 394) 
In support of his request for a search warrant, Detec-
tive Armstrong signed an affidavit which detailed his 
experience (seventeen years) as a law enforcement 
officer, his experience (thirteen years) and training in 
the investigation of crimes involving the sexual abuse 
of children, including identifying adults who sexually 
abuse children, and the events that had taken place in 
the Lewis investigation. In addition, Detective Arm-
strong stated: 
Your affiant knows from his experience and train-
ing that pedophiles or adults who habitually seek 
sex with children usually keep records or diaries, 
listing their sexual partners' names and the activi-
ties engaged in. That these offenders usually keep 
pictures of their sexual victims, or keep items be-
longing to their victims in order to recall the sex 
acts with those children. These offenders often 
write out plans involving future victims, and corre-
spond via letters with victims. 
The district court ruled that the affidavit was suffi-
cient and that the material was properly seized. 
When we review the issuance of a search warrant by 
a magistrate, our review is limited to ensuring that 
the magistrate had a substantial basis for concluding 
that probable cause existed, and we give great defer-
ence to the magistrate's determination. State v. Lang, 
105 Idaho 683,684,672 P.2d 561, 562 (1983). Look-
ing to the language of the affidavit of Detective Arm-
strong, we hold that there was a substantial basis that 
probable cause existed for the issuance of the war-
rant. Furthermore, it is clear from our review of the 
record that the photographs and document fell 
within the scope of the warrant. The photographs, 
which depict, inter alia, scantily clad young men and 
homosexual acts, fall within the provision of the war-
rant providing for the search of "memorabilia of vic-
tims including photos, clothing, or other personal 
items." (Emphasis added.) The document, which was 
written in the fIrst person and regarded homosexual 
acts between the writer and a person who had the 
"unworried look of a fifteen-year-old," was properly 
seized pursuant to the "memorabilia" and "diary" 
provisions of the warrant. Although it is clearly "ex-
pressive material," "it is seizable with a valid warrant 
or under one of the exceptions to the warrant re-
quirement just as any other piece of evidence of a 
crime would be." State v. Claiborne. 120 Idaho 581, 
585, 818 P.2d 285, 289 (1991). 
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The search was lawful. The search warrant author-
ized the officers to enter Lewis' apartment and con-
duct a search for various items, including memora-
bilia and diaries.tlill 
FN13. "Memorabilia" means "things re-
markable and worthy of remembrance or re-
cord" and "a record of noteworthy things." 
Webster's Third New International Diction-
ary 1408 (1986). "Diary" means "a register 
or record of events, transactions, or observa-
tions kept daily or at frequent intervals," "a 
record of personal activities, reflections, or 
feelings," and "a book intended or used for a 
diary." Webster's Third New International 
Dictionary 625 (1986). 
**408 *350 V. 
DID THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY AP-
PL Y RULES OF EVIDENCE IN ADMITTING 
CERTAIN EVIDENCE AT TRIAL? 
I!1.L2J. We hold that the district court did not abuse its 
discretion by admitting certain evidence at trial. 
On appeal, Lewis claims that the court should not 
have admitted the following evidence pursuant to 
I.R.E. 404(b): (1) testimony from Detective Larry 
Armstrong regarding Lewis' statement that he had a 
sexual preference for young boys; (2) the videotape 
entitled "Boys On Film;" (3) a document entitled 
"And Then There Was James;" and (4) uncharged 
sexual misconduct with the alleged victim prior to the 
charged misconduct. 
Rule 404Cb) of the Idaho Rules of Evidence provides: 
(b) Other crimes, wrongs, or acts. Evidence of 
other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to 
prove the character of a person in order to show 
that he acted in conformity therewith. It may, how-
ever, be admissible for other purposes, such as 
proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, 
plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or 
accident. 
Relevant evidence is admissible, I.R.E. 402, but is 
to be weighed against its prejudicial impact, confu-
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sion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by undue 
delay, waste of time, or cumulative effect, I.R.E. 403. 
A. Detective Armstrong's Testimony: During the 
State's direct examination, Detective Armstrong testi-
fied: 
I asked Mr. Lewis if he didn't have a sexual prefer-
ence for adolescent boys, and he responded, "Yeah, 
but that doesn't mean I have to take advantage of 
the situation." 
At the time this statement was offered, Lewis ob-
jected on the basis of foundation, order of proof, and 
"opening the door" to prior convictions. The district 
court ruled that there was a proper foundation laid for 
the testimony, and that it was relevant and admissi-
ble. Lewis did not object to this testimony as viola-
tive of I.R.E. 404(b). Our review of the record satis-
fies us that the court correctly applied the rules of 
evidence in admitting this testimony. 
B. The Video "Boys On Film:" The victim testified 
that he and Lewis watched a portion of this video on 
the day in question. During pre-trial motions, Lewis 
argued that the only issue was whether the victim 
really saw the film, and that the jury did not need to 
see it. Lewis did not object to it as being violative of 
I.R.E. 404(b). The court ruled that the film tended to 
corroborate the victim's account of the crime, but it 
reserved ruling on whether the jury could view the 
film. The record does not reveal that the court ruled 
that the jury could view it. The court correctly ap-
plied the rules of evidence. 
C. The Document "And Then There Was James:" 
Detective Armstrong testified that he perceived the 
document to be indicia of pedophilia. At the time it 
was offered, Lewis objected to Detective Armstrong's 
testimony based upon the document not then being 
admitted. The court then admitted it, ruling that a 
proper foundation had been laid. The court properly 
applied the rules of evidence. 
D. Prior Uncharged Sexual Contact With The Victim: 
The victim testified regarding earlier uncharged sex-
ual acts between himself and Lewis. During pretrial 
motions, Lewis objected to this testimony as violative 
of l.R.E. 404. The State contends that the testimony 
was properly admitted as proof of Lewis' plan to 
groom the victim for sexual purposes. 
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We have recently analyzed evidence of prior un-
charged sexual misconduct between a defendant and 
his victims in State v. Tolman. 121 Idaho 899, 828 
P.2d 1304 (1992). In this regard, we focused upon 
whether the testimony revealed a common scheme or 
plan to sexually abuse an identifiable group and 
comparing that to the victim and the circumstances 
surrounding the victim's allegations. Tolman. 121 
Idaho at 905,828 P.2d at 1310. In addition, we stated 
that testimony of prior sexual **409 *351 miscon-
duct is admissible where the parties' credibility is at 
issue. Tolman. 121 Idaho at 904. 828 P.2d at 1309. 
In this case, the victim testified that he and Lewis 
engaged in sexual acts a few weeks before the acts in 
question in this case. The testimony revealed that 
during two trips the two of them took to Idaho City, 
Idaho, and to Lowman, Idaho, they engaged in oral 
sex, and Lewis tried to ease the victim's conscience 
by telling him that "everybody does it." Lewis did 
not testify at trial. Essentially, then, his defense was 
that the alleged acts did not occur. "This type of pos-
ture at trial places the credibility of the victim 
squarely in issue for the jury to decide." State v. Phi/-
lips, 123 Idaho 178. 181. 845 P.2d 1211. 1214 
(1993). When the alleged conduct in this case is con-
sidered with the victim's testimony regarding prior 
sexual misconduct with Lewis, "the jury was better 
able to compare patterns and methods, details and 
generalities, consistencies and discrepancies, and 
thereby markle a more meaningful and accurate as-
sessment of the parties' credibility." Tolman. 121 
Idaho at 90S. 828 P.2d at 1310. Our review of the 
record satisfies us that the district court properly ad-
mitted this testimony in conformity with the rules of 
evidence. 
VI. 
DID THE DISTRICT COURT ABUSE ITS DIS-
CRETION BY ALLOWING THE TESTIMONY OF 
AN EXPERT WITNESS? 
[10][11] We hold that the district court did not abuse 
its discretion by allowing the testimony of Dr. James 
Oyler, a psychologist who had treated the victim after 
the crime. 
Lewis argues that Dr. Oyler invaded the jury's prov-
ince by offering his opinion that the victim was truth-
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ful in his claim that Lewis had sexually abused him. 
This argument is flawed for two reasons: (1) the re-
cord reveals that Dr. Oyler did not testifY that it was 
his opinion that the victim was telling the truth; and 
(2) the dialogue where this statement is supposed to 
have been made was during Lewis' cross-examination 
of Dr. Oyler, during which Lewis tried unsuccess-
fully to get Dr. Oyler to express his opinion on the 
victim's truthfulness. 
Idaho Rule of Evidence 702 guides the admission of 
expert testimony. It provides: 
Rule 702. Testimony by experts.-If scientific, 
technical, or other specialized knowledge will as-
sist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to 
determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an 
expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or 
education, may testify thereto in the form of an 
opinion or otherwise. 
Furthermore, "[i]t is within the discretion of the dis-
trict court to determine whether a person is qualified 
to testifY as an expert witness." State v. Thomasson. 
122 Idaho 172. 175.832 P.2d 743. 746 (1992), citing 
State v. Rodgers. 119 Idaho 1047. 1051. 812 P.2d 
1208. 1212 (1991). In this case, Dr. Oyler testified 
that he was a psychologist licensed to practice in the 
State of Idaho. He was educated at Idaho State Uni-
versity and received a master's degree in clinical psy-
chology in San Francisco, California. He detailed his 
work experience in psychology, including his in-
volvement in therapeutic intervention with minors 
who were victims of sexual abuse and people in-
volved in homosexual issues. He further testified as 
to his therapeutic relationship with the victim, includ-
ing his opinion that the victim fit the profile of a sex-
ual abuse victim. Given Dr. Oyler's qualifications and 
experience, as set forth in the foundation laid for his 
testimony, we cannot say that the district court 
abused its discretion by allowing him to testifY re-
garding whether the victim fit the profile of a sexual 
abuse victim. If a proper foundation has been laid, it 
is proper for the expert to testifY regarding whether a 
person has been sexually abused. State v. Hester. 114 
Idaho 688, 692-93. 760 P.2d 27.31-32(988). 
VII. 
DID THE DISTRICT COURT ABUSE ITS DIS-
CRETION BY DENYING LEWIS' MOTION FOR 
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A NEW TRIAL? 
Ll.fl We hold that the district court did not abuse its 
discretion by denying Lewis' motion for a new trial. 
**410 *352 The decision to grant a new trial rests in 
the sound discretion of the district court. State v. 
Lankford. 116 Idaho 860, 873,781 P.2d 197, 1010 
(989), cert. denied, 497 U.S. 1032, 110 S.Ct. 3295, 
11 J L.Ed.2d 803 (990). 
Lewis' motion for a new trial was based upon Mi-
chael Carver's and Joie Hein's statements concerning 
the whereabouts of a videotape on the day the alleged 
conduct occurred between Lewis and the victim. The 
victim testified that he had watched certain portions 
of the videotape with Lewis on this day. Subsequent 
to the trial, Carver and Hein signed affidavits stating 
that Carver, who was Lewis' roommate, had loaned 
the videotape in question to Hein, and Hein was still 
in possession of it on the day the victim testified that 
he had watched it with Lewis. The district court ruled 
this evidence to be newly discovered evidence, and 
concluded that the motion be denied pursuant to the 
standard set forth in State v. Drapeau. 97 Idaho 685, 
551 P.2d 972 (1976). 
The Drapeau standard, which applies to motions for 
new trials based upon newly discovered evidence, is: 
(1) the evidence was unknown to the defendant at the 
time of trial; (2) the evidence is material, not merely 
cumulative or impeaching; (3) it will probably pro-
duce an acquittal; and (4) failure to learn of it was 
due to no lack of diligence on the part of the defen-
dant. Drapeau. 97 Idaho at 691, 551 P.2d at 978. The 
trial court ruled that the evidence was merely im-
peaching evidence, that it probably would not pro-
duce an acquittal, and that failure to learn of it was 
due to a lack of diligence on Lewis' part. As to the 
diligence question, the court found that while Lewis 
was in jail prior to the trial, Carver visited Lewis 
forty-five times, and Hein visited Lewis ten times, 
and that both Carver and Hein were frequently at the 
courthouse proceedings relating to Lewis. The record 
shows that the court perceived this issue as a discre-
tionary determination, that it correctly applied the 
proper analysis, and reached its decision through an 
exercise of reason. 
VIII. 
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DID THE DISTRICT COURT ABUSE ITS DIS-
CRETION BY SENTENCING LEWIS TO A FIXED 
TERM OF LIFE IN PRISON? 
[ill We hold that the district court did not abuse its 
discretion by sentencing Lewis to a fixed term of life 
in prison. In other words, the sentence imposed by 
the district court is reasonable. 
Our standard in reviewing sentences is: 
Sentencing is a matter committed to the discre-
tion of the trial judge, and the defendant has the 
burden of showing a clear abuse thereof on appeal. 
In exercising that discretion, reasonableness is a 
fundamental requirement. 
State v. Broadhead. 120 Idaho 141. 144, 814 P.2d 
401. 404 (1991), overruled on other grounds; State v. 
Brown, 121 Idaho 385, 394, 825 P.2d 482, 491 
(J 992), citing State v. Dillon. 100 Idaho 723, 724, 
604 P.2d 737,738 (1979). 
Lewis' burden is to "show that in light of the govern-
ing criteria, [his] sentence was excessive under any 
reasonable view of the facts." Broadhead. I 20 Idaho 
at 145, 814 P.2d at 405, quoting State v. Small. 107 
Idaho 504, 505, 690 P.2d 1336, 1337 (1984). Thus, in 
order for this Court to conclude that Lewis' fixed life 
sentence is unreasonable, we must be convinced that 
the sentence was excessive under any reasonable 
view of the facts, considering (I) the protection of 
society, (2) deterrence of Lewis and others, (3) the 
possibility of Lewis' rehabilitation, and (4) punish-
ment or retribution for Lewis. Broadhead. 120 Idaho 
at 146, 814 P.2d at 406. 
The record reveals that Lewis has previously been 
convicted for a sexual offense against a minor in 
1979 in Nashville, Tennessee. Also, Lewis was HIV-
positive at the time of the acts for which he was con-
victed in the present case. Further, there were several 
allegations of uncharged sexual misconduct between 
Lewis and minors during the sentencing proceedings. 
Finally, Lewis continues to deny that he committed 
this crime. Based upon the information before it, the 
district court **411 *353 stated that this was the 
"most aggravated case [it has] seen." It considered 
the objectives of sentencing, and concluded that "the 
protection of society does warrant the penalty of life 
in prison without possibility of parole." Based upon 
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the record, we hold that the sentence imposed by the 
district court was not excessive under any reasonable 
view of the facts. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of conviction 
and the sentence imposed by the district court are 
affirmed. 
JOHNSON and TROUT, JJ., and REINHARDT, J., 
Pro Tern., concur. BISTLINE, Justice, concurring in 
Parts II, V(B) and (C), and VIII, dissenting from the 
remainder. 
"Drunk driving is a national tragedy. Prosecutors' 
offices are often overworked and may not always 
have the time to monitor seemingly minor cases as 
they wind through the judicial system. But these facts 
cannot excuse the need for scrupulous adherence to 
our constitutional principles." Grady v. Corbin. 495 
U.S. 508, 524. 110 S.Ct. 2084, 2095, 109 L.Ed.2d 
548 (1990). Thus spoke the United States Supreme 
Court in Grady, a case with which the majority deals 
extensively. Child molestation is in some ways more 
of a national tragedy than drunk driving. Also, let it 
be noted that Lewis is hardly a sympathetic defen-
dant. In forcing his will on someone too young to be 
able to consent to sex, he also tried to engage in a 
course of conduct that, if successful, could potentially 
have exposed his young victim to a deadly virus. It is 
crucial to recall, however, that this Court must not 
decide its criminal cases based upon the character of 
the accused, as difficult as that may sometimes be to 
disregard. Instead, we must decide our cases based on 
the law. Because the majority, for whatever reason, 
disregards aspects of the proceedings against Lewis 
that are blatantly contrary to the relevant constitu-
tional, statutory and case law, I cannot concur in 
much ofthe majority opinion. 
I. The Lewd and Lascivious Prosecution Against 
Lewis Is Barred by the Double Jeopardy Clause. 
The majority's discussion of the law of double jeop-
ardy is both cogent and complete, but its analysis of 
the facts sub judice and its application of the law to 
those facts are neither. The majority opinion attempts 
to apply the relevant precedent of Grady to Lewis's 
case in a three-sentence paragraph, to-wit: 
In establishing the essential elements of the lewd 
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conduct charge, the State introduced evidence that 
Lewis' conduct consisted of anal-genital or oral-
genital contact with an under sixteen year old vic-
tim and that Lewis or the victim had the intent to 
arouse, appeal to, or gratify their lust, passions, or 
sexual desires. This conduct does not constitute a 
violation of the HIV offense because the State did 
not produce evidence of Lewis' conduct as a know-
ing carrier of HIV. Therefore, the lewd conduct 
prosecution was not barred by double jeopardy. 
State v. Lewis, at 405 (emphasis omitted). The Court 
summarily concludes that double jeopardy does not 
bar the lewd and lascivious prosecution since Lewis's 
"conduct does not constitute a violation of the HIV 
offense because the State did not produce evidence of 
Lewis' conduct as a knowing carrier of HIV." Id. 
(emphasis added). This conclusion is not only wholly 
unsupported by meaningful analysis, but it also bla-
tantly disregards the same opinion's preceding legal 
analysis. The majority thereby engages in an al-
chemic attempt to convert evidence of an element of 
a crime into conduct. 
By analyzing the evidence involved rather than the 
conduct, the majority opinion defies the dictates of 
Grady. As the majority explains, Grady requires 
analysis of the defendant's conduct to determine 
whether an accused is being punished twice for the 
same offense, holding that ''the Double Jeopardy 
Clause bars a subsequent prosecution if, to establish 
an essential element of an offense charged in that 
prosecution, the government will prove conduct that 
constitutes an offense for which the **412 *354 de-
fendant has already been prosecuted." 495 U.S. at 
510. 110 S.Ct. at 2087 (emphasis added). Grady later 
specifically asserts that "[t]his is not an 'actual evi-
dence' or 'same evidence' test. The critical inqUiry is 
what conduct the State will prove, not the evidence 
the State will use to prove that conduct." 495 U.S. at 
521, 110 S.Ct. at 2093 (emphasis added). 
To demonstrate the majority's error, it is necessary to 
delineate precisely what conduct is at issue in the two 
prosecutions. It is first noted that the indictment 
which laid the HIV charge states, 
Lewis, on or about February, 1989, ... did attempt 
to transfer his body fluids to another person, know-
ing that he has been afflicted with the Acguired 
Immunodeficiency Syndrome (AIDS), AIDS re-
Page 19 
lated complexes (ARC), or other manifestations of 
the Human Immunodeficiency Virus, to-wit: at-
tempting to anal/y penetrate [the victim] with his 
penis, with the intent to gratify the sexual desires 
of the defendant, by passing seman [sic] onto or 
into [the victim's] body. 
Thus, the first prosecution alleged that Lewis at-
tempted anal-genital contact.f!:l.!1 The subsequent 
prosecution, initiated by complaint and information, 
charged Lewis with the crime of lewd and lascivious 
conduct in that "Lewis, on or about February, 1989, 
... did, ... commit a lewd and lascivious act upon the 
body of a minor, ... to-wit: of the age of 15 years, by 
placing his mouth on [the victimj's penis and by at-
tempting to anally penetrate [the victim] with his 
penis, with the intent to gratify the sexual desire of 
the defendant." FNI5 
FNI4. The reference to "passing" semen 
"onto or into [the victim]'s body" is some-
what ambiguous, in light of the evidence ad-
duced that Lewis ejaculated onto the vic-
tim's body but did not actually engage in ac-
tual anal-genital contact. Nonetheless, the 
indictment must refer to the attempted anal-
genital contact only. Idaho Code § 39-608, 
the statute under which Lewis was originally 
prosecuted, specifically defines "transfer," 
an essential element of the crime (absent a 
specific intent to infect), as "engaging in 
sexual activity by genital-genital contact, 
oral-genital contact, [or] anal-genital con-
tact.. .. " Nowhere in this definition can one 
find semen-skin contact, nor would one ex-
pect to, since the HIV virus has rarely, if 
ever, been shown to be transferred by such 
means. 
FN 15. As far as can be ascertained from the 
record before the court, the jury was in-
structed that Lewis could be convicted in the 
lewd and lascivious trial for both oral-
genital and attempted anal-genital contact. 
The charging documents, statements of the 
prosecution's theory of proof, should be 
binding until challenged by the State. Cf 
Grady, 495 U.S. at 522-23. 110 S.Ct. at 
2094. Here, the State never claims that 
Lewis was convicted only for the oral-
genital contact, not for the attempted anal-
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genital contact. In fact, the State candidly 
admits, "The attempted anal penetration that 
formed part of the basis for this charge [the 
attempted transfer of body fluids which may 
contain the HIV virus] was the same act as 
the attempted anal penetration charged in the 
lewd conduct case." Respondent's Brief, p. 
5. The State's reference to "part of the basis 
of this charge" is unclear; in light of the dis-
cussion in the above footnote, the "rest of 
the basis" for the HIV charge must be the 
other elements of the offense, including the 
fact that Lewis was HIV positive. 
The question then becomes what constitutes "con-
duct." Although the majority opinion does not state 
as much, its careless reference to conduct would 
seem to embrace not only the oral-genital contact and 
the attempted anal-genital contact, but also the vic-
tim's age, Lewis's and/or the victim's intent, and 
Lewis's HIV-positive status. How these latter facts fit 
into the definition of "conduct" is not readily under-
stood. Webster defines "conduct" as, inter alia, a 
noun meaning "I. The way a person acts: BEHA V-
lOR." Webster's II New Riverside University Dic-
tionary 295-296 (1984). Black's Law Dictionary 
similarly defines the word: "Personal behavior; de-
portment; mode of action; any positive or negative 
act." Black's Law Dictionary 268 (5th ed. 1979). 
Hence, "conduct" means a course of physical action. 
Assuming that the members of the United States Su-
preme Court, all of whom signed on to the relevant 
portion of Felix, know the dictionary meaning of the 
word "conduct" (and that is a safe assumption), 
"conduct" does not mean the defendant's status nor 
state of mind, nor the victim's age. 
The majority's implicit analysis of what constitutes 
Lewis's conduct also fails because its presumed defi-
nition is no more than a re-application of the Block-
burger **413 *355 test, as Lewis pointed out. 
Whether Lewis was a knowing carrier of HIV or 
whether Lewis possessed the requisite intent to grat-
ify his desires on a fifteen year old are elements of 
the two crimes, not "conduct." It is the Blockburger 
test, not the Grady test, which looks to the elements 
of the two charged crimes. No quarrel can be made 
with the majority opinion's statement that the Lewis 
prosecutions fail to satisfY the B10ckburger inquiry 
and thus that the subsequent prosecution is not barred 
under that theory. But the Supreme Court intended 
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the Grady inquiry as separate and additional to the 
B10ckburger inquiry. In including these elements in 
its Grady inquiry under the guise of "conduct," the 
majority does little justice to United States Supreme 
Court precedent. 
The majority appears to have accepted the State's 
contention, advanced in oral argument, that a passage 
in Grady indicates that Grady's rationale would only 
bar the second prosecution if the prosecution alleged 
that Lewis was HIV -infected. The theory by which 
the State reaches this conclusion is seductively clever 
but ultimately unpersuasive. The Grady dicta which 
the State points to discusses what sort of prosecution 
would have been acceptable in regard to Corbin, the 
defendant in Grady: 
By its own pleadings, the State has admitted that it 
will prove the entirety of the conduct for which 
Corbin was convicted-driving while intoxicated 
and failing to keep right of the median-to establish 
essential elements of the homicide and assault of-
fenses. Therefore, the Double Jeopardy Clause bars 
this successive prosecution .... This holding would 
not bar a subsequent prosecution on the homicide 
and assault charges if the bill of particulars re-
vealed that the State would not rely on proving 
conduct for which Corbin had already been con-
victed (i.e., if the State relied solely on Corbin's 
driving too fast in heavy rain to establish reckless-
ness or negligence). 
495 U.S. at 522-23. 110 S.Ct. at 2094 (emphasis 
added). The State makes an Olympian leap in logic 
from the dicta contained in the above paragraph to its 
argument that what conduct is involved is not the 
central inquiry. The State does so by contending that 
in Grady, driving constituted conduct and intoxica-
tion a condition, yet the Grady court expressly would 
permit Corbin to be subsequently prosecuted for the 
same conduct, driving (i.e., driving too fast in heavy 
rain). Thus, so the argument would go, the Supreme 
Court did not really mean that the same conduct may 
not be prosecuted twice.ftlli Here, the State argues 
similarly that attempted anal-genital contact is con-
duct and HIV -positive is a condition, so the Double 
Jeopardy Clause would permit a subsequent lewd and 
lascivious prosecution of Lewis by alleging attempt-
ing anal-genital contact, the conduct, without proof of 
HIV infection, the condition. 
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FN 16. At least one problem with the State's 
analysis is that Grady's holding involves a 
vertical comparison-that is, between the 
conduct for which the defendant is fIrst 
prosecuted and the conduct for which' he or 
she is subsequently prosecuted. Grady does 
not purport to concern itself with a horizon-
tal comparison-that is, between conduct that 
might have been charged in the fIrst prose-
cution and conduct actually charged in that 
same prosecution. 
As shown above, however, it is impossible to escape 
the Grady court's express holding that the proper in-
quiry involves examining conduct, not evidence ad-
duced, as well as myriad other references to "con-
duct," even in the paragraph cited by the State. The 
Grady court obviously considered that driving while 
intoxicated is a separate course of conduct from driv-
inf. too fast, the driving amounting to a "transaction" 
FN 7 consisting of various separate courses of conduct. 
This defInition is as thin as the defInition of "con-
duct" should **414 *356 be spread.Bill Thus, the 
state would need to argue that attempting anal-genital 
contact while HIV -positive is a separate course of 
conduct from the same instance of attempted anal-
genital contact without proof of such status" by the 
same person at the same time. 
FN 17. The term "transaction" is used be-
cause it falls within the United States Su-
preme Court's terminology, not because it is 
necessarily the best choice of word. (The 
same might be said of "conduct," and in fact 
the Court in Felix acknowledged that "[i]t 
appears that while Grady eschewed a 'same 
evidence' test, and Garrett rejected a 'single 
transaction' test, Garrett v. United States, 
[471 U.S. 773, 790, 105 S.Ct. 2407. 2417, 
85 L.Ed.2d 764 (985) ], the line between 
those tests and the 'same conduct' language 
is not easy to discern.") 
FNI8. This Court should not give credence 
to the perilous sophistry needed to conclude 
that being HIV positive constitutes conduct. 
People are generally known to drink a lot for 
the purpose of getting drunk; on the other 
hand, people generally do not receive blood 
transfusions or engage in unprotected inter-
course for the purpose of getting the AIDS 
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virus. Moreover, intoxication is a temporary, 
controllable state and much more akin to 
conduct rather than HIV -positive status, 
which, as of now, is a permanent and incur-
able condition. 
Such an argument defIes common sense. Corbin en-
gaged in at least three courses of conduct as alleged 
in the fIrst prosecution: he drove while intoxicated, 
failed to keep to the right of median, and drove too 
fast. These courses of conduct were all separate 
courses of conduct, although, all three occurred 
roughly contemporaneously. For instance, Corbin 
could have driven too fast without driving while in-
toxicated, or vice versa. Hence, as the Supreme Court 
suggested, it was possible to have a subsequent 
prosecution on the homicide and assault charges us-
ing only the conduct of driving too fast as proof of 
intent in the assault and homicide prosecutions. 
The distinction becomes obvious when applying the 
same analysis to the instant case. The State alleged in 
both the HIV case and the lewd and lascivious case 
that Lewis had attempted to engage in anal-genital 
contact with the victim. The only conduct actually 
constituting the element of attempted transfer of body 
fluid in the HIV case was attempted anal-genital con-
tact. Such a transfer would be impossible without the 
conduct comprising attempted anal-genital contact-
the same conduct that constituted an essential ele-
ment in the subsequent lewd and lascivious case-
unlike the situation in Grady, where Corbin's speed-
ing occurred independently of homicide and assault. 
If the State had alleged in the HIV case that Lewis 
attempted anal-genital contact but had alleged in the 
lewd and lascivious case that he engaged in only 
oral-genital contact, it would be possible for Lewis to 
commit the attempted transfer without engaging in 
the conduct charged in the lewd and lascivious case, 
and vice versa. In this hypothetical situation, the oral-
genital contact and attempted anal-genital contact 
would have occurred within the same transaction but 
would not constitute the same conduct. Thus, this 
hypothetical second prosecution would have been 
permitted by the Double Jeopardy Clause, since the 
Supreme Court has expressly rejected the "same 
transaction test." Grady. 495 U.S. at 523 n. 15, 110 
S.Ct. at 2094 n. 15. The above analysis is tortuous, 
but, again, common sense tells us that one instance of 
attempted anal-genital contact is not two courses of 
conduct. And if the Double Jeopardy Clause bars 
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anything, it bars prosecuting the accused twice for the 
exact same course of conduct. 
The prosecution's allegations of Lewis's conduct-the 
only relevant inquiry under Grady and its progeny-
amounted to the same instance of attempted anal-
genital intercourse in both prosecutions. And in using 
the entirety of the conduct for which Lewis had pre-
viously been prosecuted, i.e., attempted anal-genital 
contact, the government sought to establish an essen-
tial element of the lewd and lascivious offense, i.e., a 
lewd or lascivious act. 
The alleged oral-genital contact raises another ques-
tion.Rill As explained above, Grady would permit 
subsequent prosecution of Lewis for alleged oral-
genital contact because the oral-genital contact was 
conduct separate from the attempted anal-genital con-
tact and because oral-genital contact was not the con-
duct for which Lewis was prosecuted in the HIV 
case. The fact remains, however, that the State in the 
lewd and lascivious case inexplicably alleged both 
oral-genital contact and attempted anal-genital con-
tact. Because it is impossible to determine whether 
the jury convicted Lewis on the lewd and lascivious 
charge based on the anal-genital contact, **415 *357 
the oral-genital, or both and because the subsequent 
allegation of attempted anal-genital contact violated a 
fundamental constitutional right, this error cannot be 
considered harmless. 
FNI9. Oddly enough, this issue was not 
raised by the State. 
Concluding that Lewis was twice prosecuted for the 
same conduct does not end all inquiry of whether the 
Double Jeopardy Clause bars the subsequent prosecu-
tion. Reprosecution after a mistrial is permissible if 
the defendant requested or acquiesced in the mistrial. 
us. v. Dinitz. 424 U.S. 600, 96 S.Ct. 1075, 47 
L.Ed.2d 267 (I976)' Here, the trial judge in the HIV 
case sua sponte declared a mistrial, to which Lewis 
objected. Reprosecution after mistrial is also permis-
sible if there was a "manifest necessity" for the mis-
trial. See, e.g., United States v. Perez, 22 U.S. (9 
Wheat.) 579, 6 L.Ed. 165 (1824). A review of the 
record reveals not a scintilla of necessity in the trial 
judge's declaration of mistrial. The trial judge held 
proceedings in which he declared, 
Now, Mr. Lewis, it has come to my attention via 
Page 22 
the media and statements that this case is beginning 
to have a great deal of press coverage, and as I un-
derstand from sources that I've received that appar-
ently there was even a TV special yesterday in re-
gard to this matter, though I didn't see it.. .. And I 
note, for the record, that I accepted a letter regard-
ing some personal problems or life of myself. And 
while I don't know of anything on my own life that 
has any effect on this, I can't see how I can handle 
this case anymore with the publicity and the things 
that are going on. 
Transcript of Proceedings of October 30, 1989, p. 1. 
If excess publicity were a problem, the trial judge 
would have possessed various other remedies to deal 
with it. Certainly, the sole act of substituting a new 
judge would not solve the perceived problem of ex-
cess publicity. Too, the judge's cryptic reference to a 
letter is not explained. Two remedies would then 
appear to be appropriate: either this Court should 
vacate the judgment of conviction or it should re-
mand back to the trial court in the lewd and lascivi-
ous case to determine by evidentiary hearing whether 
manifest necessity for the new trial existed in the 
HIV case. 
II. The Prosecution Did Not Move to Impanel a Jury 
from Another County. 
In its discussion of this issue, the majority apparently 
accepts Lewis's argument that a trial court may not 
sua sponte order selection of a jury from another 
county. This position is correct, in light of I.C. §§ 19-
1816, 19-1801, and 19-1808; I.C.R. 21; and State v. 
Ash, 94 Idaho 542, 493 P.2d 701 (1972). The Court 
then proceeds to conclude that the State did move for 
the change of jury selection. This conclusion is based 
solely on the fact that the prosecution stated that "a 
change of venue is appropriate in terms of selecting a 
jury" after the district court repeatedly had mentioned 
that it was considering resorting to an out-of-county 
jury selection. The ftrst mention of out-of-county jury 
selection appears in the following exchange at a 
status conference: 
Mr. Cahill [Lewis'S counsel at trial]: ... I realize 
that the court had us here for some reason that I 
am not really sure has to do with the jury selection, 
and perhaps I should just talk to him [Lewis]. [ ] If 
I could have some time to talk to him to see what 
his position is going to be- ... is the court contem-
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plating jury selection outside of this jurisdiction? 
The Court: I am thinking about it, yes. What I 
would like to do is let you know what topics we are 
going to discuss today, and I will give you a time 
to discuss the matter with your client.. .. 
Tr., Vol. I, p. 2 (emphasis added). The trial court con-
tinues by analyzing why it believes such an action 
would be necessary, concluding 
My feeling is at this point, ... that the wisest course 
would be to leave the county, go to another district, 
choose a jury there, keep the jury sequestered for 
the trial, and try it in Ada County, but choose the 
jury elsewhere. That would be my feeling that that 
is probably the best course. 
**416 *358 Jd, p. 5 (emphasis added). It then 
granted a ten-minute recess to allow Mr. Cahill to 
discuss the jury selection matter, as well as the other 
matters the court brought up for discussion, with his 
client. After the recess, the trial court returned to the 
topic: 
The Court: All right, now, about the other issues, 
do you have any input on the issue of whether or 
not we should choose an out-of-county jury in this 
case?" 
Mr. Cahill: Your Honor, after discussing the mat-
ter, we certainly appreciate the court's concern. 
However, it is our desire that jury selection take 
place in Ada County. We do not-we are not mov-
ing for a change in venue, in other words. 
The Court: The State? 
Mr. Rosenthal [the prosecutor]: Your Honor, I 
think in light of the pUblicity that has taken place ... 
I think a change of venue is appropriate in terms of 
selecting ajury .... 
Tr., Vol. I, pp. 7-8 (emphasis added). 
In light of the above, the majority's concept of "mo-
tion" here is nothing less than bizarre. It is clear that 
the trial court brought up the issue of out-of-county 
jury selection sua sponte and then merely asked 
whether the parties had "input." In the earlier ex-
change, Mr. Cahill noted that the trial court had 
called the parties there to discuss matters, including, 
perhaps, jury selection. The prosecution merely ac-
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quiesced in the trial court's suggestion after the trial 
court had engaged in substantial analysis on its own, 
without the parties' input. 
Clearly, the prosecutor did not provide any sort of 
notice to Lewis that he was "moving" for a change in 
venue or for a change in county for the purposes of 
jury selection. As State v. Ash. 94 Idaho 542, 493 
P.2d 701, explained, in holding that a trial court may 
not change venue on its own motion, "There is a 
good reason for this rule: under it, both parties have 
an opportunity to present their views on the necessity 
for a change of venue to the court before its decision 
on the issue." Ash. 94 Idaho at 545. 493 P.2d at 704 
(emphasis added). This is no less true than for a mo-
tion for selecting an out-of-county jury. A ten-minute 
recess culminating in an exchange between the par-
ties and the court comprising less than a page of tran-
script demonstrates that the court provided neither 
party with an opportunity to present their views fully 
and effectively. 
Furthermore, Idaho Criminal Rules require that a pre-
trial motion be in writing. Rule 21 requires that "[t]he 
court upon motion of either party shall transfer the 
proceeding to another county if the court is satisfied 
that a fair and impartial trial cannot be had in the 
county where the case is pending." I.C.R. 21(a) (em-
phasis added). Rule 12, which governs motions be-
fore trial, states in relevant part that "[e]very plead-
ing, motion, notice, or judgment or order of the court 
shall be typed with black ribbon or produced by a 
computer or word processor type printer .... " I.C.R. 
lM£}. It is evident, then, that the State should have 
put its "motion" in writing. FN20 
FN20. Even if we were inclined to overlook 
the plain language of the Idaho Criminal 
Rules, the State still should have substan-
tially complied with such regulations-that is, 
it should have provided notice to Lewis. 
Another good reason to require a motion and thus 
notice is that a change in venue (or a change in jury 
pool) implicates a substantial and express constitu-
tional right. The Sixth Amendment of the United 
States Constitution commands, "In all criminal 
prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a 
speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the 
state and district wherein the crime shall have been 
committed, which district shall have been previously 
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ascertained by law .... " Such a change in venue or jury 
pool should not occur. lightly, on the whim of the 
district court, but should be fully argued by both par-
ties, with time for them to consult relevant law. 
In view of the above, and in view of the fact that I.C. 
§ 19-1816 requires a previous motion for transfer of 
venue before a trial court may impanel a jury from 
another county, the State's mere acquiescence in 
**417 *359 the trial judge's motion to impanel an 
out-of-county jury is not a "motion." FN2! 
FN21. Because of my suggested disposition 
of the procedural aspect of the jury charge, I 
do not address Lewis's substantive constitu-
tional argument. Unfortunately, neither does 
the majority, except for its introductory sen-
tence: "We hold that the district court did 
not violate a constitutional right or abuse its 
discretion by selecting a jury from another 
county .... " Because of its disposition of the 
procedural issue, the majority should discuss 
beyond a one-sentence conclusion Lewis's 
contention that even if the appropriate pro-
cedure was followed, the jury selection vio-
lated his substantive Sixth Amendment 
rights. 
III. "And Then There Was James" Exceeded the 
Scope of the Search Warrant and Thus Should Have 
Been Suppressed. 
Putting aside whether the majority correctly con-
cludes that probable cause existed for issuance of the 
search warrant, it is not correct in asserting that the 
document entitled "And Then There Was James" 
("James") fell within the scope of the warrant. Hence, 
the trial court erred in denying Lewis's motion to 
suppress "James." 
The search warrant provided that the police could 
search for "memorabilia of victims ... ; a diary listing 
names of victims and activities engaged in." Again, 
the majority distorts commonly understood, unambi-
guous words in order to affirm Lewis's conViction. 
"James" is a short narrative, perhaps fiction, told as a 
flashback in the first-person. As such, it cannot qual-
ify as a "diary" as dermed by the majority-"a register 
or record ... kept daily or at frequent intervals" be-
cause "James" appears on its face to be only one 
day's worth of writing. And if the narrative is fiction, 
Page 24 
which it may well be, it cannot qualify as a "record" 
or therefore "memorabilia." FN22 Moreover, the ma-
jority's analysis implodes when one actually reads the 
warrant; "James" does not qualify as either a diary or 
memorabilia as defined by the search warrant. Both 
of these warrant provisions describe items containing 
descriptions of multiple victims. "James," however, 
is a narrative, perhaps fictional, about sexual activity 
which the narrator conducted with a nineteen year old 
male who is described as having "the soft, unworried 
look ofa fifteen-year-old." Even if "James" describes 
a non-fictional incident, which is by no means clear, 
the recipient of adult, consensual sex can hardly be 
called a "victim." Moreover, "James" only concerns 
sexual activity with one person. 
FN22. Since "James" implicates the First 
Amendment as explained below, this court 
should err on the side of caution and pre-
sume that "James" is fiction and therefore 
not memorabilia. 
The fact that "James" is not even remotely described 
in the search warrant is particularly troubling be-
cause, as the majority opinion notes, "James" is 
clearly expressive material. That opinion, however, 
goes on to cite State v. Claiborne. 120 Idaho 581, 818 
P.2d 285 (1991), for the proposition that expressive 
material "is seizable with a valid warrant or under 
one of the exceptions to the warrant requirement just 
as any other piece of evidence of a crime would be." 
Claiborne, 120 Idaho at 585, 818 P.2d at 289. This 
quotation is disingenuous when Claiborne is read in 
its entirety. In Claiborne, this Court held that a book 
plainly and on its face constituting "sexually ex-
ploitative material," as defined and barred by a 
criminal statute governing child pornography, could 
be seized because it was "at the same time evidence 
of the crime of possession of sexually exploitative 
material," not because it was evidence of the underly-
ing lewd and lascivious crime for which Claiborne 
was prosecuted. Id A narrative describing sex be-
tween two adults does not on its face violate any 
criminal statutes, since it is not clearly obscene unless 
and until so judged after a trial. Thus, "James" falls 
outside the rationale of Claiborne but within the ra-
tionale of Maryland v. Macon. 472 U.S. 463, 105 
S.Ct. 2778, 86 L.Ed.2d 370 (1985): "The First 
Amendment imposes special constraints on searches 
for and seizures of presumptively protected material, 
and requires that the Fourth Amendment be applied 
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with 'scrupulous exactitude' in such circumstances." 
472 U.S. at 468, 105 S.Ct. at 2781 (quoted in 
Claiborne. 120 Idaho at 583, 818 P.2d at 287). As 
explained above, **418 *360 a better view is that 
"James" does not at all fall within the scope of the 
warrant. But even if one accepts the majority's argu-
ments as to "James" falling within "memorabilia" or 
"diary," the narrative does so with a remarkable 
amount of ambiguity. 
The fact that "James" is clearly expressive material 
which was not described with particularity in the 
search warrant should mandate a holding that the 
district court erred in denying Lewis's motion to sup-
press and in thereafter admitting "James" as evi-
dence. 
IV. Detective Armstrong's Testimony and Prior Un-
charged Sexual Contact with Victim Constituted 
Prejudicial Character Evidence and Thus Should 
Have Been Excluded. 
The majority contends that Lewis waived the issue of 
whether Detective Armstrong's testimony violated 
LR.E. 404(b) because Lewis failed to cite the specific 
rule in his objection. Nonetheless, the majority ad-
mits that Lewis's counsel did object to the proffered 
testimony on the grounds that the statement 
"open[ ed] the door" to prior convictions, i.e., bad 
acts. Rule 404(b) is entitled "Other crimes, wrongs or 
acts." The majority's hypertechnicality is patent and 
unfair. Keeping in mind the intense and quick-
moving nature of a trial, it is unrealistic to expect 
counsel to object to a piece of evidence in precisely 
the same manner that he or she would later raise the 
issue on appeal. As a matter of law, it is plain that 
Lewis adequately preserved the issue of Armstrong's 
testimony for appeal. Elm. 
FN23. I agree with the majority that Lewis 
did not preserve the admissibility of "James" 
beyond the search warrant issue dealt with 
in the motion to suppress hearing. This is 
unfortunate, because the probity and rele-
vancy of the document was minimal at best, 
while the potential prejudicial effect was 
enormous. Thus, had the issue been pre-
served properly, the inescapable conclusion 
would be that the admission of "James" vio-
lated I.R.E. 403. 
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Rule 404(b) bars the admission of evidence of "other 
crimes, wrongs, or acts" for the purpose of "prov[ing] 
the character of a person in order to show that he 
acted in conformity therewith." I.R.E. 404(b). It is 
difficult to imagine a statement which contravenes 
this rule greater. The prosecution offered Detective 
Armstrong's testimony to suggest that Lewis pos-
sessed an attraction to "adolescent boys" and thus 
possessed a propensity to engage in sexual behavior 
with them. The State does not assert any Rule 404(b) 
exception (for instance, that the testimony was of-
fered for other purposes, such as proof of motive or 
intent), presumably because there is no exception 
within which the testimony falls. 
As for the evidence of prior uncharged sexual contact 
with the victim, this justice stands by his dissent in 
State v. Phillips. 123 Idaho 178, 845 P.2d 1211 
(1993). State v. Tolman. 121 Idaho 899, 828 P.2d 
1304 (1992), and its progeny were wrongly decided 
in that they expand the "common scheme or plan" 
exception in I.R.E. 404(b) to engulf and render mean-
ingless the general rule therein: that evidence of other 
acts is not admissible to attempt to show a defen-
dant's person's propensity to engage in such acts. 
What the majority refers to as a "plan" is nothing 
more than evidence offered to prove the character of 
Lewis as a pedophile, thus intimating to the jury that 
he acted in conformity with that character. Also 
noteworthy is that the majority's rationale that the 
jury should hear the evidence of prior, uncharged acts 
because the jury is "better able to compare patterns 
and methods," etc., ignores that the jury is also better 
able to conclude that since Lewis engaged in earlier 
acts, he 1) committed in the charged act or 2) de-
served to be punished for the charged acts, even if the 
latter were not proven beyond a reasonable doubt. 
The raison d'etre of the rules of evidence is that not 
every piece of evidence should go to the jury, and for 
good reason. 
V. Dr. Oyler's Testimony that the Victim Fit the Pro-
file of a Sexual Abuse Victim and that the Victim 
Had Been Abused Should Not Have Been Allowed. 
For the most part, the majority opinion correctly dis-
poses of Lewis's claim that Oyler's**419 *361 testi-
mony was improper. The troubling aspect of Oyler's 
testimony involves the following exchange between 
the prosecutor and Oyler: 
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[Prosecutor]: Doctor, based on your training, your 
edu~ation<and your experience, as well as on your 
evaluation, therapeutic intervention with [the vic-
tim], can you state with a reasonable psychological 
probability whether [the victim] has been sexually 
abused? 
[Oyler]: He clearly fits the profile, and based on 
that, I would say yes. 
Tr., Vol. IV, p. 694. 
First of all, although Lewis did not object as to foun-
dation, it is notable that Oyler never testified as to 
what this "profile" might be or what character traits it 
might consist of. If Oyler had testified as to psycho-
logical or behavioral traits of which a profile of a 
sexually abused youth might consist-laying the ap-
propriate scientific foundation, of course-and then 
noted which of these the victim exhibited, such testi-
mony would be permissible, provided that it is be-
yond the knowledge of the average juror and that it is 
scientifically sound. Second, notwithstanding this 
Court's decision in State v. Hester. 114 Idaho 688, 
760 P.2d 27 (1988), it is an inappropriate invasion of 
the jurors' fact-finding function for an expert witness 
to proceed the extra step and to conclude that a vic-
tim has actually been abused. Only the jury is entitled 
to arrive at that conclusion if it so chooses based 
upon the testimony it has heard. 
Conclusion 
Because of all of the constitutional, statutory, and 
evidentiary errors noted above, this Court should 
reverse and vacate the conviction. A neutral system 
of justice demands no less. 
Idaho, 1993 . 
State v. Lewis 
123 Idaho 336, 848 P.2d 394 
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